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In China, teacher performance pay has been implemented for eight years, but teachers’ 
perceptions regarding its implementation have been examined seldomly. Exploring 
teachers’ perceptions is a path to hear teachers’ voices, inspect implementation practice, 
and evaluate impacts. This mixed-method study explored teachers’ perceptions toward 
performance pay in Panda School District of Kunming City, Yunnan Province, China 
through surveys, interviews, and artifacts. A total of 333 valid responses to the survey 
were collected and 14 teachers participated in follow-up semi-structured interviews. The 
quantitative results indicate low to moderate teacher support for performance pay. The 
qualitative themes generated through content analysis present teachers’ perceived merits 
and problems associated with the implementation of performance pay. A seven-factor 
model was extracted through principal component analysis drawn from the teacher 
perception survey, with 58.4% of the variance in perceptions explained. Significant 
differences in teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay and evaluation measures 
were found based on participating teacher and school characteristics. The findings 
suggest that local governments should increase funding in teacher performance pay if it is 
to be successful. Additionally, the specific guidance needs to be developed to regulate 
school-based performance pay programs that consider school contexts. Further, 
policymakers and school administrators should focus on the structure and associated 
evaluation indicators of performance pay. It is necessary for school leaders to improve 
leadership through professional development programs at the same time of implementing 
performance pay. 
  
TEACHER PERCEPTIONS OF TEACHER PERFORMANCE PAY AND 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION IN YUNNAN PROVINCE, CHINA 




In 2008, the State Council of China issued the Guidelines to the Implementation 
of Performance Pay in Compulsory Schools, mandating K-9 schools incorporate a teacher 
performance pay system, beginning on January 1, 2009. The move to pay teachers based 
on their performance spurred a major shift in human resources management in Chinese 
public sectors. The new teacher performance pay system required that teachers’ salaries  
be comprised of 70% basic salary and 30% incentive salary. Basic salary is largely 
contingent on local economic level, consumption level, and teachers’ duty, and jointly 
determined and distributed by local agencies of human resource management, finance, 
and education (State Council of China, 2008). Incentive salary is based on teachers’ work 
load and contributions, and is determined by the school (State Council of China, 2008). 
Schools are responsible for designing an implementation plan of teacher performance pay 
based on their teacher evaluation methods. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Education (MOE) 
issued the Guidelines to Teacher Performance Evaluation in Compulsory Schools to 
facilitate the implementation of teacher performance pay, and which conveyed the 
importance, principles, composition, methods, execution, and administration of teacher 
performance evaluation (MOE, 2008). This document suggested that teacher performance 
evaluations has the potential to provide a systematic basis for determining teacher 
performance pay due to its accurate reflection of teachers’ performance and contributions.
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It ensures that teacher performance pay is evidence-based and legally constituted. 
Accordingly, teachers are more likely to be motivated to improve their teaching practice. 
Ultimately, the goal of the teacher performance pay program is to retain effective 
teachers in schools and to attract more college graduates to teaching as a profession 
(MOE, 2008). 
According to S. Liu, Zhao, Xie (2016), the reform of teacher performance pay 
implied the decentralization of policy in China because it empowered local government 
agencies and schools to make decisions. Since 2001, the central government has loosened 
its control over curriculum and assessment through the New Curriculum Reform (Preus, 
2007);  another big step in education reform towards decentralization. Also, the pay-
based-on-performance concept, which stems from capitalistic ideology, breaks the 
premise of the communist system that teachers should be equally paid if they have the 
same background (i.e., teaching experience, professional ranking, and educational level) 
(S. Liu, Zhao, et al., 2016). To some degree, the reform attempted to lessen the impact of 
hierarchical human resource structures, which linked teachers’ salaries solely to their 
background, by incorporating a competition mechanism, teaching performance. This 
change shifts the traditional payment focus from teachers’ background to teaching 
effectiveness and student outcomes. 
One of the goals in implementing teacher performance pay is to increase and 
moderate teachers’ salaries. The salary level of government officials is used as a standard 
to compare with K-9 teachers’ pay. The teacher performance pay reform advocates urge 
that teachers’ salaries should not be lower than those paid to government officials. 
According to the deeply ingrained Confucianism in Chinese culture, teachers should be 
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placed in a position of high social class and teaching is a highly respected career. 
However, the assumed high respect fails to be reflected in teachers’ salaries. In 2008, K-9 
teachers’ salaries were ranked 12th out of 19 occupations (National Bureau of Statistics 
of China, 2009). In 2014, the rank was moved up to 10th out of 19 occupations (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2015) and it surpassed the salary level of government 
officials. Although the growth of K-9 teachers’ salaries is significant after implementing 
teacher performance pay, the other ranked occupations also have had the same growth 
under the influence of China’s economic development. Consequently, the inequity of 
teachers’ salaries still exists across occupations, areas (urban and rural), schools, and 
even among colleagues (Fan & Fu, 2011). The inequality in teacher pay has caused high 
rates of teacher turnover (Lai, 2014). A survey study also indicated a large proportion of 
teachers were not satisfied with their income, social status, and social respect (Lin & 
Wang, 2013). Therefore, learning about Chinese teachers’ perceptions regarding 
performance pay is necessary and important. 
Additionally, studies of teacher performance evaluation systems in China indicate 
that due to the heterogeneity of local circumstances teacher performance evaluation 
practices are problematic in achieving their goals (e.g., Hong, 2014; Meng & Yuan, 2014) 
and methods (e.g., Chai & Wang, 2010; Mi & Dai, 2011; Xiong, 2009), and utilizing 
their results (e.g., Hong, 2014; S. Sun, 2009; Q. Wang, 2015). In many regions and areas 
in China, implementation of teacher performance evaluations contradict the policy set 
forth by the MOE, such as performance pay is based on administrative positions, not 
teachers’ teaching load (Xiong, 2009) or distributing equal incentive payment to teachers 
regardless of their different input (Mi & Dai, 2011). Additionally, because each school 
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has its own unique evaluation plan, the ability to use uniform standards of monitoring and 
inspecting the progress of performance evaluation is restrained, though they can 
potentially ensure the fidelity of implementation. Research evidence indicates that an 
array of factors—school types, variety in evaluation plans, degrees of emphasis on 
performance evaluation, disparities of performance payment, and conflicting 
management—influence the quality of teacher performance evaluation (K. Li, 2013).  
Thus, despite national guidelines from the MOE, the lack of conformity by local school 
districts in their use of teacher performance evaluation resulted in various problems and 
inequality perceived by teachers. Related to the problems with local implementation of 
the teacher performance evaluation and teachers’ dissatisfaction of performance pay, a 
legitimate question of teacher support for the performance pay policy can be raised. 
Without teachers’ support, the performance pay system would fail to effectively motivate 
teachers to improve their teaching because if teachers felt the reform agenda is not 
aligned with their interests, beliefs, and values, they resisted the reform (Muncey & 
McQuillan, 1996).  
In the United States, studies regarding teachers’ attitudes toward performance pay 
report mixed findings (e.g., Neal, 2011; Podgursky & Springer, 2007; Springer et al., 
2009). Similarly, the research findings in China have also been inconsistent and 
inconclusive. In China, two years after the implementation of performance pay, certain 
research evidence suggested that a large proportion of surveyed teachers had confidence 
in performance pay and were satisfied with the implementation plans (e.g., Fu & Gui, 
2010; He & Liu, 2011; X. Li, 2010; X. Liu, 2011). However, other studies showed more 
negative results (e.g., K. Liu, 2012; H. Li & Li, 2011; S. Sun, 2009). The total number of 
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empirical studies exploring teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay was limited, 
and the extant studies provided little information regarding study design. Most recently, 
using a case study, S. Liu, Zhao, et al (2016) found that less than half of teachers studied 
supported teacher performance pay; no teacher characteristics (e.g., teaching experience 
and professional ranking) had a significant influence on the results. However, the study 
only included 132 teachers from three schools in one province of China, therefore, the 
generalizability of the study results is questionable. Due to large economic and 
educational diversity across China, a great number of empirical studies is needed to fill 
the research gap in this area. 
Statement of the Problem 
The problem I investigated in this mixed-methods study is Chinese teachers’ 
perceptions toward teacher performance pay in Panda Schools Districts, Yunnan 
Province, China. Teacher performance pay has been implemented in China for nearly 
eight years, but limited empirical studies have been conducted to explore Chinese 
teachers’ perceptions regarding performance pay. Exploring teachers’ perceptions is a 
path to hear teachers’ voices, inspect implementation practice, and evaluate impacts. The 
study contributed to a comprehensive understanding of teacher perceptions regarding 
performance pay from the level of teachers’ support, to perceived effects. Specifically, 
the study examined the extent to which Chinese teachers support performance pay 
programs and the perceived effects of these programs on them (e.g., teaching 
effectiveness, collaboration, work motivation, and job stress). Additionally, the study 
looked into the merits, shortcomings, and concerns of performance pay from teachers’ 
perspectives through teacher interviews and artifacts. Also, the study examined teachers’ 
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preferences regarding performance evaluation measures, which provided the evidence for 
decisions of performance pay. Finally, the study analyzed the effects of teachers’ and 
schools’ unique characteristics (e.g., gender, professional ranking, teaching experience, 
and school rank) on their perceptions toward performance pay.  
Research Questions 
Using both quantitative and qualitative data from this mixed-methods study, the 
following research questions are addressed:  
1. To what extent do participating teachers support the implementation of 
performance pay at their public schools?  
2. From the perspectives of participating teachers, what are the specific merits and 
shortcomings of performance pay? 
3. What are participating teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation 
measures? 
4. What factors emerge from a perception survey of participating teachers regarding 
performance pay and teacher evaluation?  
5. Are there differences in the perceptions of participating teachers toward 
performance pay based on selected characteristics of teachers (e.g., gender, teaching 
experience, professional ranking, and teacher type) and schools (e.g. grades level, 
and school rank)? 
6. Are there differences in the perceptions of participating teachers regarding 
evaluation measures upon which performance pay is based in their public schools in 
terms of selected characteristics of teachers (e.g., gender, teaching experience, 
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professional ranking, and teacher type) and schools (e.g., grades level, and school 
rank)? 
Significance of the Study 
  Teacher performance pay is an important topic, which is associated with teacher 
evaluation, teacher effectiveness, teacher retention, and student achievement. Teacher 
performance pay is an approach to motivate teachers and reinforce effective teaching 
practice. Although its effects, especially on improving student achievement, are 
controversial, exploring teachers’ perceptions will add research evidence to the 
discussions and decision-making to enhance teacher pay structure and ultimately improve 
teacher quality.  
From a leadership perspective, the study results provided insights to school 
administrators and policymakers. First, the study results provided the evidence for school 
administrators and local educational agencies to improve local implementation plans of 
teacher performance evaluation and existing pay structures to better reward effective 
teaching practice. Second, the study offered evaluation results of teacher performance 
pay practice to policymakers who can revise policies to better serve the needs of both 
administration and teachers. Third, the study provided a way to hear the voices of front-
line teachers, which was lacking in the design and implementation of teacher 
performance pay as evident in the extant literature (Xiong, 2009).  
 An abundance of research regarding teacher performance pay has been done in 
many Western countries (e.g., Eberts, Hollenbeck, & Stone, 2002; Fryer, 2013; 
Glazerman & Seifullah, 2010; Goodman & Turner, 2010; Marsh et al., 2011; Springer, 
Ballou, et al., 2010, Springer et al., 2012), such as the United States and the United 
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Kingdom, but research, especially empirical research, in China is limited. Due to the 
large disparities of economic development across China, the implementation of teacher 
performance pay in different districts varies (K. Li, 2013). This study contributed to the 
empirical studies of teacher performance pay in China, and added to the literature on 
international studies of teacher performance pay from Chinese teachers’ perspectives.  
Definition of Terms 
Motivation, refers to “the inner force that energizes the direct behavior” (Spinath, 
2015, para. 1). In the context of this study, motivation relates to teachers’ desire or 
willingness to teach effectively in schools.  
Perceptions, refers to “how sensory information is processed into perceptual 
experiences” from the perspective of psychology” (Twedt & Proffitt, 2015, para. 1). In 
the context of the study, perceptions is generalized to teachers’ understanding, attitudes, 
and awareness of the policy and the experience of performance pay through the school-
level implementation.  
Performance pay, also called pay for performance or merit pay in different 
literatures and contexts, is “a system of compensation in which employees are 
remunerated for their achievement of certain performance goals. It can either be used to 
supplement an already-sufficient base salary or constitute a significant portion of 
workers’ annual salaries” (Vagi, 2014, p. 99). Teacher performance pay is based on the 
hypothesis that teachers who are more effective or more competent should receive more 
financial rewards than the others. Different from merit pay in United States, which is 
dependent on “student outcomes attributed to a particular teacher or group of teachers 
rather than on ‘inputs’ such as skills or knowledge” (Podgursky & Springer, 2007, p. 
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912); the teacher performance pay in China is based on multi-factor performance 
evaluation conducted by local school administrators; the incentive pay based on teachers’ 
performance only makes up 30% of their total salaries. Additionally, State policy 
indicates that it is forbidden to use student enrollment rates and testing scores to evaluate 
teachers as the only source for evaluation (State Council of China, 2012). Therefore, 
student outcomes do not carry a large weight in teacher performance pay in China.  
Performance evaluation, provided evidence to teacher performance pay in China. 
It relates to the teacher evaluation, which involves various indicators and multiple 
sources, targets on assessing the quantity and quality of teacher’s work.  
Banzhuren, is “similar to the home classroom teacher, advisor or counselor” in the 
U.S. schools. Banzhuren at schools in China is “the leader of teachers, and the key person 
to develop the whole community of students by classrooming” (J. Li & Chen, 2013, p. 
92). 
Professional ranking for primary and secondary teachers in China is similar to the 
university faculty promotion system. Local educational agencies are responsible for 
providing specific requirements for teachers’ professional promotion at each level. 
Teacher’s professional ranking is contingent on: teachers’ highest degree, years of 
teaching experience, teaching performance, professional knowledge, and mentoring and 
research experience. Based on the highest degree, the lower-ranked teacher should have 
one to five years of teaching experience to be qualified to apply for the higher ranking. 
Teacher type refers to honorary titles given teachers to acknowledge their 
distinctive effectiveness and contribution in education. Teachers with “expert” titles at 
different levels (e.g., national, provincial, municipal, and school) are regarded as the role 
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model for the particular level. Expert teachers are usually selected or recommended at 
different levels based on their age, years of teaching experience, professional rankings, 
and teaching effectiveness. 
School rank is accredited by local educational agencies contingent on various 
indicators, such as teacher quality, students’ academic performance in enrollment exams, 









This chapter includes a review of the literature related to exploring the question of 
how teachers perceive performance pay and performance evaluation measures in China. 
The literature review highlights the connections between the research questions of the 
study and the extant literature with both theoretical constructs and empirical evidence. 
Research gaps are identified to provide a rationale for this study, as well as future studies. 
The literature review begins with the context of teacher performance pay in China. This 
section contains an analysis of the historical development and status quo of teacher 
performance pay and performance evaluation in China. It identifies the chronological 
development of performance evaluation and relevant national policies of teacher 
performance pay in China. It also summarizes problems with the implementation of 
performance pay and performance evaluation in recent years in China.  
In the second part, the review focuses on theories supporting performance pay, 
which includes motivation theory and equity theory. Due to the limited number of 
empirical studies in the Chinese context, studies regarding teacher performance pay in the 
context of the United States and selected other countries are incorporated to demonstrate 
teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay in non-Chinese contexts. Although 
teachers’ perceptions might be shaped by different cultures to some degree, the research 
evidence also shows the commonalities of teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay 
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by comparing the literature across countries. Also, empirical research evidence from 
other countries presents the recent trend of studies in teacher performance pay, and 
provides insights for future studies in the Chinese context. The specific topics regarding 
teacher perceptions toward performance pay include teacher support for performance 
pay, impacts of teacher performance pay, and variables influencing teacher performance 
pay.  
The third focus is teacher performance evaluation, which is tied closely to 
performance pay. This part of the literature review contains measures of teacher 
performance evaluation in China and teachers’ perceptions toward performance 
evaluation in China. It identifies specific teacher performance indicators that are 
evaluated in the Chinese context, which include teachers’ ethics, professional duties, 
personality, impact on student academic achievement, and communication and 
collaboration in schools. It also provides research evidence on teachers’ perceptions 
toward the indicators of performance evaluation in China.  
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Context of Teacher Performance Pay in China 
This section provides the context regarding teacher performance pay in China, 
which includes its historical development and status quo. Teacher performance pay and 
performance evaluation are closely related. Performance evaluation provides evidence for 
performance pay, while performance pay is the application of performance evaluation. 
The development of teacher performance pay and performance evaluation are intertwined 
and have coexisted. 
Historical development of teacher performance pay in China. The 
development of a teacher performance pay system in China is contingent on the reform of 
teacher performance evaluation. Formal practice of teacher evaluation in China was 
started in the 1960s and procedure has been used since the 1980s (Yang & Jiang, 2009). 
According to S. Liu and Zhao (2013), the historical development of teacher evaluation in 
China included three stages: before 2001, 2001-2009, and 2009-present. Teacher 
evaluation before 2001 was regarded as traditional teacher evaluation, which has been 
criticized as a “one-dimension evaluation for all practical purposes” (S. Liu & Teddlie, 
2003, p. 252). The limitations of the traditional teacher evaluation system are 
summarized as follows: the purpose of the evaluation overemphasized reward and 
punishment without regard to teacher development; the evaluation sources focused too 
much on quantitative data; school leaders were dominant in traditional teacher evaluation; 
and, in reality, student scores were the only dimension used in the evaluation system 
(normally, the other dimensions include ethics, diligence, and ability; S. Liu & Teddlie, 
2003; S. Liu & Zhao, 2013).   
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Starting in 2001, with the implementation of the New Curriculum Reform, the 
Chinese teacher evaluation system made a significant change. The New Curriculum 
Reform emphasized changing test-driven and summative evaluations to formative and 
scientific to improve teaching practices and student learning (MOE, 2001). Accordingly, 
teacher evaluations started to put an emphasis on improving professional development, 
test scores, and teacher ethics, as well as requiring multiple evaluators to participate in 
the process of teacher evaluation (S. Liu & Teddlie, 2005; S. Liu & Teddlie, 2003).  
In 2009, China adopted teacher performance pay in compulsory education. The 
State Council of China issued “Guidelines to the Implementation of Performance Pay in 
Compulsory Schools” to regulate compulsory schools’ implementation of teacher 
performance pay (State Council of China, 2008). Correspondingly, the Ministry of 
Education issued “Guidelines to Teacher Performance Evaluation in Compulsory Schools” 
(Guidelines), which pointed out the importance, principles, contents, methods, 
applications, and administration of teacher performance evaluation (MOE, 2008). In 2012, 
the State Council of China developed “Suggestions of the State Council on Strengthening 
the Building Up of the Ranks of Teachers” emphasizing that an integrated teacher 
evaluation system should focus on teachers’ ethics, capability, teaching performance, and 
contribution to school, involving the participation of school, students, teachers, and the 
public. It is forbidden to use student enrollment rates  and testing scores to evaluate 
teachers as the only source for evaluation (State Council of China, 2012). This document 
suggests the importance of including multiple indicators of teacher performance and 
multiple evaluators in the evaluation. Additionally, it indicates that teacher performance 
evaluation should not be completely based on students’ academic achievement.  
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Status quo of teacher performance pay in China. In 2011, two years after the 
launch of teacher performance pay, He and Liu (2011) interviewed teachers and 
principals across 27 provinces in central and western China and found that both teachers 
and principals supported the implementation of performance pay . Approximately 86% of 
teachers paid close attention to the policy of performance pay, 79% of teachers held high 
expectations of the policy, and 89.3% of teachers were satisfied with the plan of 
performance evaluation. Also, the study indicated positive effects of teacher performance 
pay in increasing teachers’ salaries in some regions, and motivating teachers to improve 
work effort, which was also supported by other studies (Fu & Gui, 2010; X. Li, 2010; X. 
Liu, 2011). However, due to lack of information on study design and limited sample size, 
the study results are not generalizable and inconvincible to some degree. In the study 
conducted by Fu and Gui (2010) indicated, in Hubei, Hunan, Henan and Jiangxi 
provinces, the teacher population in higher salary level was increased while the 
population in lower level was decreased after implementing performance pay. 
Additionally, the adjustment of teachers’ salaries was aligned with government officials’, 
which fulfilled the requirements in the national guidelines. X. Li (2010) suggested that 
the increased upward mobility of teacher populations towards higher salary levels 
demonstrated the increase of teachers’ salaries in general. Fu and Gui (2010) found that 
more than 60% of 1,906 surveyed teachers in their study perceived an increase in 
motivation.   
However, due to the heterogeneity of economic development across different 
regions in China and lack of uniform implementation of standards across schools, the 
positive effects found in the studies above lacked generalizability. More studies 
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suggested the problems with the implementation of performance pay. Noticeably, with 
time passing, fewer and fewer studies—either the theoretical analysis or empirical 
studies—have been conducted after the implementation of teacher performance pay. 
However, in order to assess the long-term impact of performance pay and provide 
solutions for the problems with policy implementation identified in previous studies, 
more recent empirical studies are needed. Main problems associated with the 
implementation of performance pay are described below.  
Significant salary disparities among teachers. Researchers have pointed out that 
the implementation of performance pay resulted in large disparities in teachers’ salaries 
across subjects taught (e.g., K. Liu, 2012; L. Wang, Lai, & Luo, 2014; Z. Zhang, 2010), 
teaching experience (H. Li & Li, 2011; K. Liu, 2010; S. Sun, 2009), schools (K. Li, 2013; 
H. Liu, 2012), and region (Fu & Gui, 2010; X. Li, 2010). Teacher performance pay was 
unbalanced in different regions across China and between urban and rural areas, which 
can be attributed to the local economic development and educational input (Fu & Gui, 
2010; H. Liu, 2012). Within one school, the disparity of salaries among teachers with 
similar background reached up to 50% (H. Li & Li, 2011). Expert teachers, who were 
effective in teaching to tests, obtained higher performance pay than the other teachers, 
who made great contributions in other areas (S. Sun, 2009). Salaries of teachers teaching 
core subjects (e.g., Chinese literature, mathematics, and English) were higher than 
teachers teaching the other subjects (e.g., music and physical education) (K. Liu, 2012; S. 
Liu, Xu, et al., 2016; L. Wang et al., 2014; Z. Zhang, 2010). The salary disparity was 
antithetical to the educational goal of enhancing students’ all-around development (Z. 
Zhang, 2010). Additionally, in some schools, performance pay favored those in the 
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administrative ranks, resulting in teachers’ performance pay being lower than 
administrators’ (K. Liu, 2012; Z. Zhang, 2010). Teachers were not represented in 
designing the performance pay implementation plan (H. Li & Li, 2011);  Subsequently 
teachers felt the performance pay plans were unfair (H. Li & Li, 2011; C. Li, 2014; H. 
Liu, 2012; K. Liu; 2012; X. Liu, 2011), which further resulted in problems associated 
with teaching effectiveness, professional development, retention, and recruitment.  
Negative impact on teachers’ personal development. Theoretical analysis from 
Chinese scholars finds that teacher performance pay discouraged teachers’ intrinsic 
motivation, self-development (B. Li, 2014) and professional identity (Q. Wang, 2015). 
Based on the limited empirical evidence, only a small number of surveyed teachers 
reported that performance pay increased their work effort (He & Liu, 2011; X. Liu, 
2011). In some schools, the 30% incentive pay was detained by schools each month and 
only distributed at the end of the year according to results of teachers’ performance 
evaluation (K. Liu, 2012). This part of the income was unstable for teachers, which 
resulted in work dissatisfaction (K. Liu, 2012). In some areas, performance pay had no 
effect in motivating teachers due to the small amount of the incentive payment (X. Li, 
2010; K. Liu, 2012). For example, a study based on 382 teachers in one city of Henan 
province showed that all surveyed teachers perceived the incentive payment to be 
incommensurate to the input required to receive the pay; the teachers were unwilling to 
put forth the effort to obtain the incentive pay (K. Liu, 2012). For experienced teachers, 
with high professional rank and who were satisfied with the status quo, performance pay 
failed to make a difference and appeal to them (X. Li, 2010). Although national 
guidelines stated that performance pay should not be solely based on student test scores 
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and enrollment rates, some surveyed teachers reported that the essence of performance 
pay was linked to student academic performance (K. Li, 2013; X. Li, 2010). The 
emphasis on teacher teaching load, for the purpose of improving students’ test scores by 
increasing teacher input, has led to high teacher pressure and burnout (He & Liu, 2011). 
It is teachers’ self-efficacy that support them to resist the demotivating impact of 
performance pay, but it is questionable regarding how long such support could last (Mao, 
2013). The competition among teachers resulting from performance pay was also a high 
source of teachers’ pressure, hampering teachers’ job satisfaction (S. Sun, 2009). X. Liu 
(2011) conducted a survey in one county of Fujian province and found that 
approximately 60% of teachers perceived that performance pay had a negative impact on 
teachers’ professional development because it reduced teachers’ motivation, and teachers 
were unwilling to focus on teaching.  
Negative impact on school culture. Researchers pointed out that performance pay 
increased after-school teaching time because the more time a teacher spent on after-
school teaching, meant more performance pay for teachers (He & Liu, 2011). However, 
problems stemmed from after-school teaching;  teaching effects were lessened during the 
regular school time, and both teachers and students had longer but less effective school 
time which negatively affected students’ learning and teachers’ teaching, and both of 
their well-being. Teachers were also overtly concerned about students’ test scores rather 
than their individual development (H. Li & Li, 2011). Additionally, while competing for 
the incentive payment, teachers reported they no longer collaborated with each other (He 
& Liu, 2011; H. Li & Li, 2011). Moreover, due to the unequal and unfair performance 
payment, conflicts among teachers, and between teachers and administrators emerged and 
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resulted in tensions of colleague relationship (X. Liu, 2011). Teachers were less 
encouraged to take on extra duties that were not included in the performance evaluation, 
such as research and temporary assignments (H. Li & Li, 2011).  
Another distinct problem associated with teacher performance pay is the 
performance evaluation, which provides the basis for performance pay. The status quo of, 
and problems with, performance evaluation are discussed in the following section. 
Status quo of teacher performance evaluation in China. With educational 
reforms, teacher evaluation in China has stepped into a new era in which teacher 
evaluation is more directly connected to a school’s human resource management. Teacher 
evaluation is intended to support the improvement of all teachers, and to provide 
accountability of both teachers and evaluators. However, from opinion-based journal 
articles to limited empirical evidence, teacher performance evaluation in China is 
identified as problematic in goals, methods, and application of results. Some scholars 
criticize that teacher performance evaluation was based on the assumption of 
“commercialized man,” a concept of management science meaning that each human 
being is motivated by economic factors in working, and employers used money or 
punishment to control employees’ motivation (Hong, 2014; S. Sun, 2009). Additionally, 
because each school has its own evaluation plan, a number of school-related factors such 
as different school types, degree of emphasis on performance evaluation, disparities of 
performance payment, and conflict management affected the quality of teacher 
performance evaluation (K. Li, 2013). Thus, the lack of conformity in evaluation plans in 
local school districts has resulted in ineffective implementation. Furthermore, regarding 
performance pay, “the far greater reliance on the stick than on the carrot has increased 
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teachers’ workloads and failed to win their hearts and minds, leading to many teachers 
becoming ‘performative workers’” (L. Wang et al., 2014, p. 440). The main problems 
with teacher performance evaluation in Chinese context are summarized as below. 
Overemphasis on accountability. Due to the major intended functions of teacher 
evaluation include accountability, promotion, and professional development (Teddlie, 
Stringfield, & Burdett, 2003), the goal of teacher performance evaluation should focus on 
teacher development and providing evidence for school improvement. Furthermore, with 
teacher quality improvement, the ultimate goal is to enhance school development and 
student learning. Meng and Yuan (2014) conducted a literature analysis based on teacher 
performance evaluation plans of 56 primary and middle schools in Guangzhou China. 
The results indicated that the summative function of teacher performance evaluations was 
overemphasized while the function of enhancing teachers’ development was relatively 
ignored. Hong (2014) also pointed out that the present teacher performance evaluation 
had no effects on enhancing teachers’ development due to the vague evaluation standards, 
unregulated evaluation process, and overemphasis on accomplishment of assignment 
from the educational agencies. Additionally, the goal of teacher performance evaluation 
is to connect a teacher’s individual development with the school’s mission and vision 
(Meng & Yuan, 2014). Consequently, teachers’ contributions related to school 
development would build acknowledgement, and school development could be realized 
through the teachers’ development.   
Conflict between teacher evaluation and traditional Chinese culture. C. Li 
(2014) summarized the problems of teacher performance evaluation through analyzing 
the conflicts between teacher performance evaluation and Chinese traditional culture 
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using the cultural dimensions theory developed by Hofstede, a scholar in the Netherlands. 
C. Li (2014) pointed out that Chinese people tend to make long-term plans and education 
was a long-term process in Chinese culture, while teacher performance evaluation 
focused on short-term outcomes (a semester, or an academic year). Therefore, 
ambivalence was produced. The goal of teaching spans a long-term period, but for 
meeting the evaluation requirements, novice teachers have to reach the goal through 
shortcuts, such as teaching to test. They neglect the long-term goal, but just focus on the 
short-term one, therefore, regular teaching would be largely driven by tests. There is 
almost a consensus that test-driven education negatively influences the quality of teachers 
and schools, undermining students’ opportunities to learn higher-level skills that cannot 
be readily measured by tests. According to an educational survey, when teachers were 
asked about “Have you put more emphasis on students’ testing scores after implementing 
teachers’ performance pay?”, 33.25% teachers chose “Yes” (Chai & Wang, 2010). The 
results indicated teacher performance evaluation and performance pay would reinforce 
teachers’ understanding and approach towards test-driven instruction. 
Yang and Jiang (2009) indicated that the traditional evaluation, functioning as 
reward or punish teachers, was the summative evaluation targeting on school 
development; while the performance evaluation was the formative evaluation targeting on 
teachers’ personal development. These two kinds of teacher evaluation are 
complementary. Therefore, combining these two evaluation methods suggests the 
philosophical convergence of teachers’ personal values and social values. To some 
degree, the value of education is to accomplish the convergence of personal and social 
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development. The present teacher evaluation system needs to reconstruct its content to 
achieve this goal.  
 Oversimplified evaluation process. The Guidelines emphasized that multiple data 
sources and evaluators should be involved in the evaluation process, both formative and 
summative evaluation should be used to completely evaluate teachers’ performance, and 
the evaluation process should be fair, open, and transparent (MOE, 2008). In reality, 
however, school administrators simplified the evaluation process, disobeying the 
guidelines for various reasons. A middle school teacher in Shanghai reported that teacher 
performance evaluation in the school was based on ranks assigned by the administration 
office, but not on teaching performance (Xiong, 2009). School leaders categorized all the 
teachers and staff into four levels: the first level is the principal and the secretary; the 
second level is the vice principal and the middle-level administrators; the third level is the 
expert teachers; and the fourth level is the other teachers. Teachers are paid according to 
their levels. In some rural and impoverished areas, due to the limited budget, it was 
difficult to design teacher performance evaluation that satisfied everyone and, meanwhile, 
differentiated teachers’ teaching load and effectiveness. Therefore, egalitarianism, 
distributing equal incentive payment to teachers regardless of differences of their 
teaching load, was a method for the reform of teacher evaluation, which prevented 
conflicts of interests among teachers and between teachers and school leaders (Mi & Dai, 
2011). However, egalitarianism is ineffective in motivating teachers to improve their 
performance. Egalitarianism is fundamentally equivalent to no evaluation at all.  
In some schools, teacher performance evaluation put higher values on teachers’ 
working experience than teachers’ contributions. Educational statistics indicated that 
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53.54% of the variance in teachers’ performance payment is caused by their professional 
ranks, 18.09% accounted by the difference between school leaders and teachers, and 
13.69% explained by the difference of teaching load (Chai & Wang, 2010). Therefore, 
teachers’ professional level is the key factor that decides teachers’ performance payment.  
Overemphasis on quantitative data. The evaluation sources focused too much on 
quantitative data (Meng &Yuan, 2014). For example, the evaluation indicators mainly 
included: teaching load, attendance, overtime working, student achievement, and the 
number of research projects and published papers. Qualitative data, such as teaching 
effectiveness, group cooperation, and students’ moral development was severely limited. 
The implementation processes were found to be unitary and standardized. Classroom 
observation and interview were seldom used in the evaluation process (Meng & Yuan, 
2014). Although the quantitative data is more objective, it failed to accurately and 
completely demonstrate teachers’ actual performance. In addition, overemphasis on 
quantitative indicators resulted in narrowing teachers’ work (C. Li, 2014). From the 
teachers’ perspective, however, grown in the culture of low uncertainty avoidance, 
Chinese teachers were more likely to work with vague regulations rather than with 
specific ones. It was hard for teachers to completely accept precisely quantified 
evaluation standards (B. Li, 2014). Additionally, evaluation indicators should be 
connected with daily administrative practices and teachers’ lives, so that teachers could 
comfortably and effectively adapt to the evaluation reform (Hong, 2014). Quantitative 
data provided limited effective information of teachers’ performance. Teachers’ 
resistance to evaluation with specific regulations negatively influenced the objectivity 
and accuracy of teacher performance evaluation.  
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Lack of validity and transparency. Researchers found the performance evaluation 
data sources lacked validity, and the evaluation process failed to be transparent. 
Administrators and teacher delegates were the main evaluators held responsible for 
evaluation implementation (C. Li, 2014; Meng & Yuan, 2014); however, the 
corresponding training for evaluators was deficient (B. Li, 2014). Lack of training for 
evaluators is a threat to the reliability of the evaluation data. Although the Guidelines 
emphasized that multiple evaluators should be involved in the evaluation process, the 
reality was that the voice of the front-line teachers were largely neglected. At one school 
in Shanghai, teacher delegates were primarily school administrators, while none of the 
front-line teachers, occupying 55% of the total faculty and staff, were included (Xiong, 
2009). Furthermore, even when multiple evaluators participated in teacher performance 
evaluation, it was difficult to ensure that all of the evaluators’ evaluations were fair and 
objective (S. Sun, 2009). Due to the collectivism of Chinese society, emphasis on 
nepotism sabotaged the fairness in performance evaluation and the evaluation outcomes 
lacked fidelity (B. Li, 2014). Additionally, concerns regarding primary and middle school 
students’ participation in the evaluation were existed because some scholars questioned 
about primary- and middle- school students’ limited perceptions toward teacher 
effectiveness, which might result in inaccurate and unreliable results of teacher 
evaluation (Sun, 2009; Wang, 2015). Involving multiple evaluators should not be 
simplified, it requires a sub-system to substantially support its effectiveness within the 
evaluation process.  
  Additionally, teacher performance evaluation might be effective in improving the 
quality of teaching and learning in school in the short term. But, from a long-term 
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perspective, the financial motivation for teachers would increase the school’s economic 
burden and stimulate various conflicts (S. Sun, 2009). Again, the problem indicated the 
importance of setting a long-term goal—teacher’s development for teacher performance 
evaluation.  
Teacher Performance Pay 
In this section, I reviewed literature regarding teacher performance pay across 
countries. Most of the literature are empirical studies, which provided evidence of 
teachers’ attitudes (support or object) and perceptions (perceived impacts of performance 
pay) toward performance pay. The review starts from theories supporting performance 
pay, and then focuses on teachers’ support of performance pay, and teachers’ perceived 
impacts of performance pay on student academic achievement, as well as on their work 
and personal attributes. Variables affecting teachers’ perceptions, such as gender, 
teaching experience, and grade level are discussed with evidence. 
Theories supporting performance pay. Theories of psychology and 
management science have been used to explain performance pay. For establishing the 
theoretical basis for teacher performance pay, motivation theory and equity theory, the 
two fundamental theories in literature, are discussed in this section.  
Motivation theory. Performance pay is assumed to enhance teacher performance 
and improve teacher quality. The psychological hypothesis of performance pay is to 
“change behavior by changing motivation” (Richardson, 1999, p. 23). Incentives that are 
outside of an individual are regarded as extrinsic motivation while an individual’s 
internalized rewards are intrinsic motivation (Vagi, 2014). Take performance pay as an 
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example: Paychecks to teachers are an extrinsic motivation while teachers’ internal desire 
to teach children is intrinsic motivation.  
Research indicates that individuals who are intrinsically motivated are more likely 
to work harder and longer than individuals who are extrinsically motivated; further, 
intrinsic motivation is regarded as more important to an individual’s behavior than 
extrinsic motivation (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999). From the perspective of 
reinforcement theory, which is one school of motivation theory, performance pay is used 
as a motivational tool to reinforce teachers’ efforts (Perry, Engbers, & Jun, 2009). In this 
case, pay is the consequence and high performance is the desired target behavior (Perry, 
Mesch, & Paarlberg, 2006). The reinforcement theory emphasizes on the function of the 
extrinsic motivation rather than the intrinsic motivation from the perspective of 
organization.  
   Frey (1997) pointed out that individuals’ perceptions toward external incentives 
also impact their intrinsic motivation. Specifically, if external incentives are perceived as 
supportive, intrinsic motivation is augmented, resulting in increased work effort; 
nevertheless if external incentives are perceived as controlling, intrinsic motivation is 
reduced, resulting in decreased work effort. Andersen and Pallesen (2008) conducted an 
empirical study regarding the relationship between the financial incentives and the 
number of publications at 162 Danish research institutions, and the results supported the 
theory that “the perception of the financial incentive is essential for its impact” (p. 42). In 
other words, if employees perceive incentives as supportive, they are more likely to be 
motivated to improve work effort (Andersen & Pallesen, 2008). But, it is hard to identify 
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“a clear, objective, and fair relationship” between the intrinsic and the extrinsic 
motivation, although many have researchers tried (Andersen & Pallesen, 2008, p. 43).  
Critics of teacher performance pay indicate that external monetary rewards 
diminish teachers’ intrinsic motivation (desire to improve teaching practice and to teach 
children), which is a strong predictor of teachers’ job satisfaction (Thomas, 2009). S. Sun 
(2009) argued that treating teachers as “commercialized men,” who are solely motivated 
by monetary incentives, neglected teachers’ social, emotional, and cultural needs, and 
failed to take efficacy and creativity of the human being into consideration.  
Equity theory. Equity theory was developed by Adams (1963), who pointed out 
that individuals adjust their behavior according to their evaluation of the ratio of inputs 
(performance) and outcomes (pay). Simply speaking, if individuals feel they are 
overcompensated, they may make an effort to make up the discrepancy, and vice versa 
(Schay & Fisher, 2013). Additionally, individuals not only balance their own inputs and 
outputs, but also compare with others to determine fairness, which influences their 
motivation (Johnson & Johnson, 1991; S. Liu, Zhao, et al., 2016). In educational settings, 
unfair or unequal performance pay demotivates teachers’ work effort (S. Liu & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2014; S. Liu, Zhao, et al., 2016).  
In China, one of the goals of performance pay is to solve income inequality 
between teachers working in different schools and regions (L. Wang et al., 2014). 
However, literature indicates that teachers in China perceive unfairness regarding 
performance pay. The national guidelines (MOE, 2008) suggest that a teacher’s salary 
consists of 70% basic salary and 30% incentive. However, in some schools with limited 
budgets, the total amount of teachers’ salary has not changed and, moreover, the 30% 
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incentive is drawn from teachers’ basic salary “reward” teachers based on their 
performance. Teachers felt it was unfair that schools used “their own money” as 
incentives and it was ineffective in motivating them to improve work effort (S. Liu, Zhao, 
et al., 2016). Additionally, at schools with school choice, where parents “donate” extra 
money other than regular fees to have their child enter a “good” school, teachers received 
more money than those working in ordinary schools, resulting in teacher salary disparity; 
teachers perceived this as unfair (L. Wang et al., 2014). As mentioned in the section of 
status quo of teacher performance in China, the inequality of teachers’ salaries, within 
one school, and among schools in one district, also led to teachers’ perceived unfairness, 
which ultimately negatively affected teacher motivation, work effort, and retention.  
Teacher support for performance pay. Teacher support is a key to ensuring 
effective implementation of performance pay. Simply stated, without teacher buy-in, 
performance pay programs cannot be implemented successfully. In China, most literature 
regarding performance pay at compulsory schools are theoretical discussions focusing on 
the policy analysis of performance pay (e.g., B. Li, 2014; Mi & Dai, 2011; X. Wang, 
2013; Wei, 2013), and comparative analysis of performance pay across countries (e.g., 
Jiang & Wei, 2013; Xin Zhang, & Zhu, 2009). Limited empirical research evidence has 
been conducted on teachers’ attitudes toward performance pay in China since the 
implementation of teacher performance pay in 2009. For example, S. Liu, Zhao, et al. 
(2016) surveyed 132 teachers at three schools in China and reported that approximately 
half of the surveyed teachers supported the performance pay program. Fan and Fu (2011) 
conducted survey studies in 32 counties in four provinces in China, but little information 
regarding study design and sample selection were reported. Results suggested that 
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approximately 45% of the 1,906 surveyed teachers perceived teachers’ salaries in one 
region were unbalanced after the implementation of performance pay, and 25.4% agreed 
that the reform of teacher performance pay enhanced the balanced development of 
compulsory education in urban and rural areas. H. Zhao, Hui, and Fu (2011) interviewed 
administrators of local education agencies in 77 counties across 25 provinces and 
principals at 279 schools. The results indicated that 93% of school principals supported 
teacher performance pay, but teachers (no exact number) opposed the incentives being 
taken from the original teacher salary.  
In the United States, many states have developed and implemented teacher 
incentive programs within their teacher management systems (Sojourner, Mykerezi, & 
West, 2014). Numerous studies have been conducted to evaluate the programs and 
examine teachers’ attitudes. Results from recent studies on teachers’ attitudes towards 
performance pay are mixed, including both support and opposition. For example, 
Springer, Ballou, et al. (2010) reported that 64% of teachers participating in The Project 
on Incentives in Teaching (POINT) in Nashville, Tennessee, supported effective teachers 
being rewarded with extra compensation. Similarly, a high support rate for performance 
pay (74%) was found for teachers in Austin, Texas (Burns, Gardner, & Meeuwsen, 2009). 
However, Jacob and Springer (2008) found only moderate support for performance pay 
from teachers in 199 public schools of Florida, with only half of surveyed teachers 
agreeing that performance pay was a positive change. Further, the majority of teachers in 
Rhode Island were opposed to teacher incentive programs (Forand, 2012). Ballou and 
Podgursky (1993) concluded that reasons teachers opposed performance pay included 
“fairness of performance assessments, negative effect on relationships with other teachers, 
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level of base pay, teacher characteristics, community characteristics, experience of merit 
pay” (p. 51-52). Additionally, studies indicated teachers’ attitudes were affected by 
teacher and school. Connecting the results of the 2006 Washington State Teacher 
Compensation survey with individual characteristics, Goldhaber, DeArmond, and 
DeBurgomaster (2011) found female teachers and experienced teachers were less 
supportive of merit pay than male and novice teachers across grade levels. Also, teachers 
in high school were found to be more supportive of merit pay than those in elementary 
schools. Teachers with more trust among colleagues were found to be less supportive of 
merit pay.  
International studies have also examined teachers’ attitudes toward performance 
pay in various countries. For example, Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) reported 
that over 80% of 1056 teachers from 300 government-run schools had supportive 
opinions towards incentive pay based on objective measures of student performance 
improvement in India. Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer (2010) reported that after one-year 
implementing an incentive program in Kenya, where teachers were awarded prizes based 
on students’ academic performance in grades four to eight, all surveyed teachers from 
100 schools supported the program and thought it was effective in motivating teachers.  
Impact of teacher performance pay on student achievement. The ultimate goal 
of teacher performance pay is to improve student academic performance by improving 
teaching practice; therefore, quantifiable student achievement is used as an indicator in 
evaluating the impact of teacher performance pay. This section presents the empirical 
evidence regarding the impact of teacher performance pay on student outcomes in the 
United States, China and other countries. 
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Impact of teacher performance pay on student outcomes in United States 
studies. The  literature regarding the impacts of performance pay in the United States is 
inconclusive (Neal, 2011; Podgursky & Springer 2007; Springer et al., 2009). The most 
recent meta-analysis based on 44 primary studies from 1989-2016 revealed that the merit 
pay program is positively affected student achievement with an effective size of 0.052 
(Pham, Nguyen & Springer, 2017). While, the previous meta-analysis indicated that the 
performance pay program “persistently fail to deliver on its promise” (p. 46) based on 57 
studies conducted between 1977 and 2008 (Perry et al., 2009).  
Student academic performance is often used as an important indicator to evaluate 
the effectiveness of performance pay due to causal theory that performance pay programs 
affect teacher behavior which, in turn, affects student academic performance (Jones, 
2013). In previous empirical studies focusing on the impact of teacher performance pay 
on student academic performance, some studies indicated a positive effect (Figlio & 
Kenny, 2007; Goldhaber & Walch, 2012; Murnane, Willett, & Levy, 1995; Sojourner et 
al., 2014; Vigdor, 2008; Winters, Greene, Ritter, & Marsh, 2008). Other studies indicated 
a zero, or even a negative effect (Eberts, Hollenbeck, & Stone, 2002; Fryer, 2013; 
Glazerman & Seifullah, 2010; Goodman & Turner, 2010; Marsh et al., 2011; Springer, 
Ballou, et al., 2010; Springer et al., 2012).  
Researchers have stated that the composition of the workforce, type of 
performance-pay plan (Jones, 2013), context, and pre-and-post compound factors within 
the contexts (Sojourner et al., 2014) might explain the different results of previous 
studies. Additionally, Heneman, Worth, Arrigoni, Kimball, & Milanowski (2013) 
suggested that rigorously-designed studies (e.g., Glazerman & Seifullah, 2012; Marsh et 
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al., 2011; Springer, Ballou, et al., 2010; Springer et al., 2012) indicated no relationship 
between performance pay and student academic performance, while less-rigorous studies 
(e.g., Goldhaber & Walch, 2012; Vigdor, 2008) demonstrated some degree of positive 
impact. For example, Springer, Ballou, et al. (2010) conducted a randomized control 
study to examine the effects of teacher performance pay on student outcomes and 
teachers’ instructional practices over three academic years, and found no significant 
difference between students whose teachers were assigned to the treatment group and 
those whose teachers were assigned to the control group. Figlio and Kenny (2007) used 
cross-sectional data and found the positive relationship between students’ test scores and 
incentive pay in teacher compensation, but the researchers admitted that because of the 
cross-sectional strategy they employed in the study, the positive relationship was not a 
definitive conclusion that it might be attributed to unobserved school quality other than 
the incentives. 
Impact of teacher performance pay on student outcomes in studies from other 
countries. Many recent international experimental studies focusing on the impact of 
teacher performance pay showed positive results on student academic achievement, and 
teachers’ teaching practice and effort (Atkinson et al., 2009; Glewwe et al., 2010; Lavy, 
2009; Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011; Woessmann, 2011). Atkinson et al. (2009) 
employed a difference-in-difference methodology controlling for the effects of pupil, 
school, and teacher in England, and found that performance pay schemes improved test 
scores on average by about 40% of a grade per pupil. Glewwe et al. (2010) found a 
significantly positive effect of a teacher incentive program on student test scores with 
Kenyan teachers when schools were randomly selected to participate in a teacher 
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incentive program. However, in Sweden, Lundström (2012) regarded performance-
related pay schemes as “a counterproductive pay system” (p. 388) after conducting semi-
structured interviews with 23 Swedish upper-secondary teachers. 
Even the studies with positive results indicated some negative outcomes of 
performance pay. After participating in the incentive program, Kenyan teachers were 
found to increase test preparation sessions, and the temporary test-score effects were only 
found on exams linked to the incentives, not on exams that were not linked to the 
incentives. This seems to support the argument in previous literature that,  the gains in 
student test scores may be attributed to “a temporary boost” resulting from teaching to the 
test for the performance pay, rather than a substantial improvement in teaching practice 
(G. Liang & Akiba, 2015 p. 381). The increase of exam preparation by teachers was also 
found by Muralidharan & Sundararaman (2011), who reported positive effects of 
performance pay on student academic achievement in India. However, as an unintended 
outcome of teacher performance pay, teaching to the test does exist, and it could have 
negative influences on student academic performance (Jacob & Levitt, 2003). In Israel, 
Lavy (2009) examined the effects of a teacher incentive plan on English and math 
teachers, and the results indicated the positive effects on student mean test scores and 
teachers’ teaching effort. However, Lavy (2009) and Muralidharan and Sundararaman 
(2011) did not find significant differences between the treatment group and control group 
teachers on their teaching practice.  
Using country-level performance-pay measures and student performance data on 
internationally comparable tests (including reading, math, and science), Woessmann 
(2011) found student test scores are 24.8% of a standard deviation higher in countries 
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with teacher performance pay than those in countries without teacher performance pay. 
The effect size, which is small, is similar to what Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) 
found. From the international perspective, teacher performance pay is effective in 
improving student academic performance, but in the future, longitudinal studies should 
be conducted to assess impact of incentive programs over a long-term period.  
Impacts of teacher performance pay on student outcomes in China studies. In 
China, S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016) investigated the impact of performance pay on teachers’ 
collaboration, motivation, and job stress. The results indicated that around half of the 
surveyed teachers agreed that teachers are more likely to encourage students to be 
persistent when they came across challenges after the implementation of performance pay. 
However, less than half of the surveyed teachers perceived that performance pay 
increases student learning. The other survey studies (e.g., Fan & Fu, 2011; H. Zhao et al., 
2011) have no results related to the impact of teacher performance pay on student 
outcomes.  
Impact of teacher performance pay on teachers’ work and personal 
attributes. Besides the impact on student achievement, performance pay directly affects 
teachers’ teaching practice, motivation, and collegiality, which may be relate to teachers’ 
job stress. In this section, research evidence of the impact on teacher collaboration, 
motivation, and job stress are discussed.    
Teacher collaboration. Teaching is a collaborative job. In a collaborative school 
culture, teachers are more likely to establish mutual learning to increase productivity 
(Che & Yoo, 2001), teach creatively, and develop professionalism (Helsby, 2000). Some 
opponents of teacher performance pay argue that incentives have a negative effect on 
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teachers’ intrinsic motivation and result in destructive competition among teachers 
(Firestone & Pennell, 1993). Historically, the negative impact of performance pay 
programs on teachers’ collaboration and collegiality at school (Bacharach, Lipsky, & 
Shedd, 1984) is a reason that teachers are not supportive of performance pay (Ballou & 
Podgursky, 1993).  
Although the construct of “teacher collaboration” is hard to accurately measure, 
teachers’ perception could reflect, to some degree, changes in collaboration with the 
implementation of performance pay. Some studies have found teacher perceptions of 
collaboration have increased after the implementation of performance pay. For example, 
based on the use of a similar survey, teachers reported an increase of teacher 
collaboration after the implementation of performance pay in the United States (Burns et 
al., 2009) and China (S. Liu, Zhao, et al., 2016). Winters et al. (2009) evaluated a pay-
for-performance program in Arkansas, in which teachers receive awards based 
completely on yearly gains of student test scores, and found that teachers in schools 
participating in the program perceived collaboration among teachers has increased while 
teachers in the comparison group disagreed.  
The impact results of performance pay on teacher collaboration differ by 
performance pay plan type, individual-based versus group-, or school-, based . 
Lundström (2012) reported that teachers in Sweden perceived that an individual 
performance-related-pay system caused a negative climate between colleagues. Marsh et 
al. (2011) examined the School-Wide Performance Bonus Program in New York City 
and found no significant differences between teachers in the treatment group and teachers 
in the control group regarding the effect on teacher collaboration. In Springer, Ballou, et 
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al. (2010), mathematics teachers in Metro-Nashville Pubic Schools were recruited to 
voluntarily participate in a three-year monetary incentive program that a bonus will be 
awarded to teachers whose students outperformed on a state standardized test. The 
findings suggested no effects of bonus programs on teachers’ perceptions of collaboration 
and collegiality. A simple explanation regarding the different results based on incentive 
type is that group- or school-based performance pay rests upon collective benefits, so 
teachers are more likely to work collaboratively to achieve the incentive pay. However, 
Brewer, Myers, and Zhang (2015) argued that the zero effect of Springer, Ballou, et al. 
(2010) “is mostly attributable to the fact that the merit pay scheme did not reward 
teachers for how they performed comparatively to other teachers, rather, a predetermined 
benchmark” (p. 47).  
Teacher motivation. The goal of performance pay is to motivate teachers to 
improve their teaching practices and, ultimately, enhance student learning (G. Liang & 
Akiba, 2015). As the evidence regarding the impact of performance pay on teaching 
practice and student academic performance is mixed, the empirical results regarding the 
impact on teachers’ motivation are mixed as well. Adjustments to teachers’ behavior that 
was motivated by performance pay ultimately results in changes to student academic 
performance. Based on this logic, the researcher might conclude that studies, which 
showed the positive impact of performance pay on student achievement, teaching 
practice, and teacher collaboration, equally demonstrated that teachers were positively 
motivated by performance pay. Some other specific indicators that teachers were 
motivated by performance pay were decreased teachers’ absence rate (Ahn, 2013; Eberts 
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et al., 2002; Fryer, 2013; Goodman & Turner, 2010; Jones, 2013), and increased working 
hours (Jones, 2013; Lavy, 2009).  
In China, Fan and Fu (2011) reported that more than 60% of surveyed teachers 
perceived that teacher performance pay motivated teachers to improve their work effort. 
S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016) indicated that at one school, where teacher performance pay is 
related to teacher workload, and the incentives occupy a large part of teachers’ salary, 
teachers were motived to work hard.  
For studies that indicated that teachers were not motivated by performance pay, 
the following points indicate possible reasons.  
1. “While merit pay may increase productivity in jobs performing simple tasks, it 
may not be as effective in more complex forms of work, like teaching” (Vagi, 
2014, p. 100).  
2. Some teachers were found to have limited knowledge on the criteria of 
performance pay, and so were not motivated to improve their teaching practice 
because of the criteria improving (Lundström, 2012).  
3. The design of an incentive program, including as goals, the amount of 
incentive, and norms, affected whether teachers would be motivated or not.  
1) If the goal to achieve the incentive was too high, teachers were not 
generally motivated to change practices. Moreover, even if teachers 
perceived the goal as achievable, “they were non-committal on whether 
the incentives would motivate them to change practices” (Springer, Lewis, 
et al., 2010, p. 132).  
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2) Framing the bonus program as designed to emphasize more on 
teachers’ accountability for student performance rather than recognizing 
teachers’ good performance is less likely to motivate teachers 
(Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011). 
3) One participant in S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016) stated that “there are no 
influences on teachers’ motivation because the reward amount is too small” 
(p. 800).  
4) Teachers were more likely to be motivated if “the provision of external 
incentives based on objective measures of performance that are 
transparently and fairly applied” (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011. p. 
396).  
4. Teachers already worked as effectively as they could before the implementation 
of performance pay, therefore, the program was unable to motivate teachers to 
change behaviors (Springer, Ballou, et al., 2010).  
In general, to better motivate teachers via performance pay, policymakers and 
school leaders should learn more about teachers’ perceptions other than the simple 
motivation theory in designing incentive programs. 
Teacher job stress/pressure. Job stress is psychologically defined as “a negative 
emotional experience being triggered by the teacher’s perception that their work situation 
constituted a threat to their self-esteem or well-being” (Kyriacou, 2001, p. 28). It is 
positively correlated with teacher turnover (S. Liu & Onwuegbuzie, 2014). Even though 
performance pay may increase teachers’ productivity and enhance student academic 
performance, “given the choice, teachers will accept decent pay and good working 
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conditions over extraordinary pay and a stressful workplace” (Gersen, 2010, para. 9). 
Limited studies explored the impact of performance pay on teachers’ job stress, where it 
has been included as a survey question in studies examining teachers’ perceptions 
towards performance pay to evaluate teachers’ job satisfaction (e.g., Burns et al., 2009; 
Springer, Lewis, et al., 2010).  According to the research evidence mentioned above, 
even though job stress is not a direct product of performance pay, it is a byproduct of the 
impacts on student academic performance, teacher motivation, and collaboration. Any of 
these factors might cause the stress perceived by teachers as they related to performance 
pay, such as accountability of student academic performance, competition among 
colleagues, and pressure to obtain incentives. S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016) indicated that 
more than half of surveyed teachers felt performance pay increased their job stress. 
Additionally, the qualitative data suggested that the standards and amount of performance 
pay directly affected teachers’ job stress level (S. Liu, Zhao, et al., 2016). Future studies 
should be conducted to fill the gap regarding the impact of performance pay on teachers’ 
job stress so that policymakers and school leaders could have evidence to create a more 
stress-free working culture and environment for teachers.   
Variables influencing teacher performance pay. Traditionally, teacher pay 
schemes were based on teacher education level and teaching experience (Brewer et al., 
2015). In a meta-analysis, Perry et al. (2009) identified the variables of performance pay 
in public sectors (as shown in Figure 2); employee characteristics, pay system design, 
environmental conditions, and organizational characteristics are the major variables that 
affect performance pay in public sectors. All of these variables could be perceived by 
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Figure 2. Variables of performance pay in public sectors. Adapted from “Back to the 
Future? Performance-Related Pay, Empirical Research, and the Perils of Persistence,” by 
J. Perry, T. Engbers, and S. Jun, 2009, Public Administration Review, 69, p. 41. 
Copyright 2008 by the American Society for Public Administration.  
 
Previous empirical evidence in educational settings also indicated that teachers’ 
perceptions toward performance pay were affected by variables such as program design 
(Pham et al., 2017; Springer, Ballou, et al., 2010), program type (school-based or 
individual-based), teachers’ characteristics (gender, teaching experience, and teaching 
effectiveness), and school characteristics (size, subjects, and grade level), as shown in 
Table 1. Jacob and Springer (2008) identified teacher characteristics, besides teaching 
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experience, that impact teacher perception of teacher performance pay at the individual 
level, including teachers’ view of their principal’s leadership ability, and teachers’ 
teaching quality; both are positively associated with teachers’ attitudes towards 
performance pay. But, the school-level variables, such as school size and students’ 
average achievement level were not associated with teachers’ attitude. Burns et al. (2009) 
found teachers were more favorable to performance pay for teaching in a “hard to staff” 
school than in a “hard to staff” subject (p. 20). In China, S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016) found 
no significant differences of teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay based on 
gender, teaching experience, and professional ranking; this may be attributed to the small 
sample size. However, the qualitative data indicated that the work load associated with 
specific subjects, and different school-level incentive programs affected teachers’ 
perceptions regarding performance pay. Although teachers’ educational background used 
to be one of the decisive factor in teachers’ salary, few empirical studies examined its 
influence on teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay. Therefore, more studies need 
to explore the variables associated with teacher performance pay.  
Teacher Performance Evaluation 
In this section, the review focuses on teacher performance evaluation, which 
provides evidence for performance pay. Two main parts are included. Performance 
evaluation measures that are frequently used in teacher evaluation practice and discussed 
in journal articles in the Chinese context are summarized. Also, the empirical evidence 
regarding Chinese teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation is presented.  
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Table 1 
 
Variables of Teacher Performance Pay in Relevant Studies 
Levels Variables Relevant Studies  
Teacher-
level 
Gender Ballou & Podgursky, 1993; Jacob & Springer, 
2008; Jones, 2013; S. Liu, Zhao, et al., 2016; 
Goldhaber et al., 2011 
Teaching experience Ballou & Podgursky, 1993; Goldhaber et al., 
2011; Jacob & Springer, 2008; Jones, 2013; 
Sojourner et al., 2014; L. Wang et al., 2014 
View of their principal’s 
leadership ability 
Jacob & Springer, 2008 
Level of teaching quality Jacob & Springer, 2008; Jones, 2013 
Teaching subjects Goldhaber et al., 2011; L. Wang et al., 2014 
School-
level 
School size Jacob & Springer, 2008 
Average achievement 
level 
Jacob & Springer, 2008 
Grade level 
(elementary/secondary) 
Goldhaber et al., 2011; Jacob & Springer, 2008; 
Springer, Ballou, et al., 2010 
 
Measures of teacher performance evaluation in China. Teacher evaluation in 
China has been focused on teachers’ ethics, competence, attendance, performance, and 
effectiveness (B. Wang, 2009). According to Cai and Lin (2006), three dominant types of 
teacher evaluation are teacher competence or quality evaluation, teacher performance 
evaluation, and teacher effectiveness evaluation. Teacher competence evaluation is 
employed to assess the knowledge and skills a teacher possesses and provide evidence for 
teacher qualification certification or professional training (Cai & Lin, 2006). Teacher 
performance evaluation focuses on teachers’ job behaviors, and it is “a subjective 
appraisal made by either supervisors or peers or students in class” (p. 31). Teacher 
effectiveness evaluation is used to assess teaching effect on students and the gains of 
students’ test scores indicate teacher effectiveness. In practical application, the three 
styles are mixed as teacher evaluation (Cai & Lin, 2006). However, students’ test scores 
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are regarded as the primary and solely evidence for teacher evaluation in many schools 
because they are objective and quantifiable. Although using students’ achievement to 
assess teachers with value-added models is a research trend in teacher evaluation 
worldwide, with the implementation of teacher performance pay, Chinese government 
mandated that teacher evaluation should be based on multiple sources, not only students’ 
achievement (State Council of China, 2012). The guidelines indicated that teachers’ 
ethics, teaching performance, and banzhuren work were the primary aspects of teacher 
performance evaluation (MOE, 2008).  
Previous studies examined teacher characteristics and teaching behaviors as the 
evaluation indicators, and found the relationship between the indicators and teaching 
effectiveness (Xin et al., 2009). However, a composite score (simply add all indicators 
into one score) is not the aim of such teacher performance evaluation, which is 
ineffective in comprehensively evaluating teachers’ performance. Also, J. Wang (2012) 
reviewed relevant literature of teacher performance evaluation indicators in China and 
other foreign countries, and pointed out that teacher performance evaluation in 
compulsory schools in China was weak. Three problems were found with the indicators 
of teacher performance evaluation: First of all, indicators were more likely to reflect the 
goals of school development while the goals of teachers’ personal development were 
neglected; second, evaluation content was too general, and specific implementation 
process were limited; and third, limited studies provided evidence to the combination of 
different types of teacher evaluation (e.g., formative and summative; J. Wang, 2012).  
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Five primary indicators of teacher performance evaluation were found via 
reviewing previous literatures, which were ethics and professional duties, professionalism 
or dispositions, impact on effectiveness, communication and cooperation in schools.  
Ethics and professional duties. Teachers’ ethics and professional duties have 
served as the most fundamental indicators of teacher performance evaluation. Teachers’ 
ethics have been emphasized in legislations and governmental policies in China. The 
MOE Guidelines (MOE, 2008) suggested that ethics was the priority of teacher 
performance evaluation. Additionally, teachers had to obey the Regulations of Teachers’ 
Profession and Ethics in Compulsory Schools at schools (MOE, 2008). Specific 
indicators associated with teachers’ ethics were caring about students, and respecting 
students. The correspondently observable behaviors were a good attitude towards 
students, equal treatment towards every student, no physical punishment, and so on 
(Wang, 2009).  
Teachers’ professional duties include the specific steps associated with planning, 
instruction and assessment, classroom management, and professional development. 
Researchers found the indicator system of teacher performance evaluation in compulsory 
education schools included two primary levels: The first-level indicators were planning 
(28%), classroom management (25%), after-class activities (20%), and professional 
obligations (27%); the second-level indicators were more specific descriptions of the 
first-level: planning (instruction goals; instruction plans; planning quality); classroom 
management (classroom environment management, instruction delivery management, 
students behavior management); after-class activities (reviewing assignment; testing; 
extra-curriculum activities); professional obligations (teaching reflection, teaching 
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seminars, professional development, teaching effects; Dong & Fu, 2009). The similar 
weight of each indicator demonstrated the equal importance of these indicators. However, 
the practical application of this evaluation indicator system had not been mentioned in 
Dong and Fu (2009); its effectiveness was questionable.  
The 360-degree evaluation model, which indicated that teacher performance 
evaluation should be comprehensive and integrated involving multiple evaluators, 
focused on teachers’ teaching, banzhurens’ classroom management, teachers’ ethics, and 
teachers’ abilities in scientific research and innovation (N. Li, 2010). Participation of 
students, parents, teachers themselves, colleagues, and administrators within the 
evaluation process ensured its comprehensiveness to a great extent (N. Li, 2010). There 
are two problems associated with the 360-degree evaluation indicators shown in the 
studies. First, teaching is a sophisticated process and teaching behaviors are complex. 
These evaluation indicators failed to show the sophistications and the relationship 
between teachers’ teaching behaviors and the goal of education, which is to nurture 
individual’s development. Secondly, these indicators put more emphasis on teachers’ 
teaching behaviors over teachers’ educating behaviors.  
Professionalism or dispositions. Besides a teacher’s ethics and professional 
duties, researchers also found that teacher evaluation should take teachers’ 
professionalism or dispositions into consideration, which refers to teachers’ 
characteristics of being caring, fair, enthusiastic, responsible and so on in the Chinese 
context. H. Xu (2013) analyzed the evaluation indicator system of expert teachers based 
on the results of survey questionnaires of 5000 primary and secondary school teachers in 
12 provinces of China. The study results indicated that the evaluation indicator system of 
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the expert teachers included two dimensions: professionalism and behaviors. The 
professionalism involved teachers’ characteristics of being ethical, fair, enthusiastic, 
determined, and harmonic, and teachers’ competence in teaching, self-development, 
research and management. Similar indicators of teachers’ professionalism were also 
found in Ma, Tang, Wang, and Zhou (2012). D. Sun (2014) suggested that teacher 
evaluation should be students-based because teachers and students are coexisted and the 
ultimate goal of the development of teachers is the development of students. Teachers 
should care about students’ growth (not only the growth of academic achievement, but 
the general growth as a whole) in teaching practice. Evaluating the disposition of teachers 
reflects teacher performance evaluation is based on human nature (D. Sun, 2014). 
Additionally, teachers’ ability to learn and self-development are emphasized in teachers’ 
professionalism (D. Sun, 2014).  
Impact on effectiveness. Student test scores and enrollment rates were primary 
indicators of traditional teacher evaluation in China. However, with the reform of teacher 
evaluation, student academic achievement has changed from a primary source to one of 
the indispensable indicators of teacher evaluation. Value-added assessment is a pattern of 
teacher evaluation based on their students’ test scores (Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, 
2011. This evaluation method uses statistical models to separate teacher contribution on 
student achievement, which is regarded as more fair and accurate (Bian & Sun, 2015). In 
the United States, various models of value-added teacher evaluation have been discussed 
and applied to empirical studies, while in China, empirical studies in this area are limited. 
B. Wang (2005) introduced the value-added method of evaluation and applied the method 
with empirical data to a high school in Shanghai. B. Wang (2005) found, from students’ 
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test score, the value-added method proved that the teacher of one class in Chinese 
literature had a greater impact on student achievement than the teacher of the other class. 
B. Wang (2005) also discussed the shortcomings of the value-added method, namely that 
students’ academic achievement could be influenced by various factors other than 
teachers.  
Scholars reviewed the development of value-added teacher evaluation in the 
United States (e.g., Hu & Shi, 2014; S. Xu & Zhao, 2009; Zhou & Bian, 2012), while 
other scholars focused on analyzing the construction of value-added models and the 
application within the context of Chinese schools (Bian & Sun, 2015; Deng & Bian, 
2012). For instance, Bian and Sun (2015) analyzed the research development of value-
added teacher evaluation and discussed the practical implications of teacher evaluation 
reform in China. Deng and Bian (2012) analyzed eight value-added models used in China 
and other countries, and provided suggestions for choosing models based on different 
hypothesis, confounding factors, and assessment errors.  
Besides the theoretical discussion, there were a limited number of empirical 
studies that have applied value-added models in the practice of teacher evaluation in 
China. For instance, W. Zhang, Xin, and Kang (2012) studied 1,238 fourth-grade students 
and 42 math teachers from 42 primary schools in Beijing using value-added model. The 
research results indicated that teachers’ characteristics (gender, age, years of teaching, 
and major) had no significant effect on students’ achievement gain, while teachers’ 
professional title, and final educational qualification had a significant effect on the 
achievement gain (W. Zhang et al., 2012). Inconsistently, Fan and Ren (2013), who 
conducted a study of value-added assessment of fifth grade students’ academic 
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achievement in Chinese in Xinjiang, found that teachers’ professional title, gender, years 
of teaching, and self-efficacy were positively associated with students’ achievement gain, 
while teachers’ final educational degree was negatively associated with students’ 
academic gain. Due to the limited evidence from studies of value-added models and the 
complexity of teacher effectiveness, teacher impacts on student academic achievement 
and growth are hard to evaluate accurately.  
Communication and cooperation in schools. Teacher communication and 
cooperation in the school setting have been emphasized in teacher evaluation as an 
indicator for contextual performance. However, teachers’ contextual performance was 
neglected in previous studies (Xin et al., 2009). According to the six-dimensional teacher 
quality construct theory developed by Cai and Lin (2006), teacher job performance 
included both task performance and contextual performance. Task performance included: 
“teaching effectiveness, teacher-student interaction, and teaching value” (p. 33). The 
contextual performance included “occupation ethics, job dedication, and assistance and 
cooperation” (p. 33). Teachers’ task performance and contextual performance were 
correlated with each other, and contextual performance tended to have more influence on 
teachers’ performance. 
With the same emphasis on teachers’ contextual performance, H. Sun, Wang and 
Lu (2010) conducted a survey study of teachers, school administrators, and principals in 
Shengyang province based on the National Board’s Five Core Propositions for Teaching 
developed by U.S. National Board for Professional Teaching Standards. The Five Core 
Propositions are:  
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“Teachers are committed to students and their learning; teachers know the 
subjects they teach and how to teach those subjects to students; teachers are 
responsible for managing and monitoring student learning; teachers think 
systematically about their practice and learn from experience; teachers are 
members of learning communities” (National Board’s Five Core Propositions for 
Teaching, 1989, p. 2-4).  
The results from 1053 questionnaires were analyzed using factor analysis, and 
three factors were found to explain 52.291% of the total variability: Teachers’ 
commitment to students and their learning; classroom instruction; and teachers’ reflection, 
communication, and cooperation (H. Sun et al., 2010). Additionally, among the 21 
second-level standards of National Board’s Five Core Propositions for Teaching, 17 of 
them have been acknowledged by Chinese participants, which suggested the 
homogeneity of professional teaching standards in China and the United States (H. Sun et 
al., 2010).  
In summary, teachers’ ethics, professional duties, professional or dispositions, 
effectiveness, and communication and cooperation in school were five primary indicators 
of teacher performance evaluation. All the indicators are interrelated and are associated 
with the core—teaching and learning—of school education. It is equally important to 
treat teachers as  human beings and in a professional manner in teacher performance 
evaluation; teachers’ qualities, teaching abilities, and educational competence 
simultaneously affect students’ academic and personal growth to a great extent.  
Teachers’ perceptions of teacher performance evaluation in China. A limited 
number of empirical studies have explored teachers perceptions toward performance 
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evaluation measures. S. Liu, Xu, et al. (2016) conducted a mixed-methods study to 
investigate Chinese middle school teachers’ preferences on performance evaluation 
indicators. The quantitative findings suggested collaboration with colleagues, students’ 
test scores, and fulfillment of additional roles were the most important indicators for 
performance evaluation, while the qualitative findings suggested teachers’ ethics, 
workload, and student test scores were the most important. Qi (2012) surveyed 151 
teachers from four elementary schools in Shandong province. The findings showed that, 
questioning response to the question, “Who should be the evaluators of performance 
evaluation?,” the surveyed teachers’ choices, from top to bottom, were professional 
evaluators outside of the school, self evaluation, peers, program coordinators, parents, 
students, and school administrators. The rank of teachers’ preferred evaluators was 
different from the rank they perceived the school used. Additionally, the surveyed 
teachers’ preferred performance evaluation measures, from top to bottom, were students’ 
test scores, open class, participation in research projects and publications, student 
homework, instruction plans, and self-evaluation. F. Liang (2012) found 14.3% of the 
surveyed teachers agreed that students should participate in the performance evaluation, 
and only 8.8% agreed on parents’ participation. Teachers’ cooperation in performance 
evaluation and performance pay is substantially associated with teachers’ attitudes toward 
performance evaluation measures. Therefore, more empirical studies should be conducted 
to explore this area to provide evidence for improving the design of performance 
evaluation and the implementation process.  
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Summary  
Teacher performance pay is an important part of educational reform around the 
globe.  
“From a theoretical viewpoint, performance-related pay may elicit both incentive 
effects—raising motivation and effort of current teachers who strive to increase 
their pay—and sorting effects—attracting and retaining graduates in the teaching 
profession who expect to do well under performance-based compensation 
schemes” (Woessmann, 2011, p. 404).  
The substantial body of research provides a sketchy illustration of how teachers 
perceive performance pay and performance evaluation. Also, studies indicated the impact 
of performance pay on student academic achievement was mixed, but the impacts on 
teachers’ motivation, collaboration, and job stress were mostly negative.  
In the Chinese context, teacher performance evaluation has stepped into a new 
era, along with the implementation of performance pay since 2009. It has targeted 
improving teachers’ professional development and enhancing teacher quality as a whole, 
rather than, solely rewarding or punishing teachers. It has incorporated multiple sources 
and evaluators in the evaluation process, rather than, using one dimension for all 
purposes (S. Liu & Teddlie, 2003). From the legislation, the national guidelines stated the 
primary principles for implementing performance pay and performance evaluation in 
compulsory education schools is that local agencies and schools have the control of 
designing and accomplishing specific implementation plans. In the early years of the 
performance pay implementation, Chinese teachers were found supportive of 
performance pay and they placed high expectations on it (He & Liu, 2011). However, 
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with the implementation moving forward, problems emerged, and teachers were less 
supportive than before. Problems found with teacher performance pay included: 
significant salary disparities among teachers across regions, school districts, teaching 
subjects, and teaching experience; negative impacts on teachers’ professional 
development and well-being; and negative impacts on school culture. These problems 
contributed to teachers’ perception of the unfairness of performance pay, contradicting 
the goals of performance pay which were to lessen the inequality of teachers’ salaries, 
motivate teachers to improve teaching practice, and ultimately enhance students’ 
academic achievement. Without teacher buy-in, the performance pay reform is 
ineffective. The reasons resulting in the ineffective implementation of teacher 
performance pay in China were unbalanced economic development across areas, and lack 
of uniformed standards of implementing performance pay and performance evaluation.  
The literature also revealed that, from the theoretical perspective, measures of 
teacher performance evaluation had been identified as teachers’ ethics, professional 
duties, personality, effectiveness, and communication and collaboration in schools. 
However, some of the indicators are not accurately measurable in practice. Moreover, the 
lack of uniform standards of teacher performance evaluation and without teacher 
representation in decision making, teacher performance evaluation in China was found to 
be problematic in goals, process, and results application. The specific problems included 
an overemphasis on accountability, conflict with traditional Chinese culture, 
oversimplified evaluation process, overemphasis on quantitative data, and a lack of 
validity and transparency.  
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Admittedly, the conclusions regarding teachers’ perceptions toward performance 
pay in the Chinese context are based on both reflective journal articles and limited 
empirical research evidence. To hear the voice of front-line teachers and to provide 
convincing evidence to administrators and policy makers, more empirical studies are 
needed. These studies must explore teachers’ perceptions regarding performance pay, 
because teachers’ support is the key to the effective implementation of the reform. More 
importantly, most of the published empirical studies in Chinese journals failed to provide 
sufficient information of study design, and the validity and reliability of the studies were 
questionable. It is necessary to conduct scientifically-designed empirical studies that can 
result in valid and reliable findings in this area. Therefore, this mixed-methods study 
explored teachers’ perceptions towards performance pay in Kunming, Yunnan province, 
China. The study will contribute to the empirical studies of teacher performance pay in 
China, and will add to the literature of international studies of teacher performance pay 
from Chinese teachers’ perspective. 
  




Chapter three outlines the research design of this study, including its paradigm, 
research strategy, instrumentation, sampling method, data collection, data analysis and 
limitations. The study orients to a positivist paradigm and incorporates mixed methods, 
including both quantitative and qualitative designs. The primary data sources of survey, 
interview, and artifacts are used for data collection and generation. Descriptive statistics, 
factor analysis, and multivariate statistical analysis are conducted for quantitative data 
analysis; content analysis are used for qualitative data analysis. The primary research 
questions guiding this study are:  
1. To what extent do participating teachers support the implementation of 
performance pay at their public schools?  
2. From the perspectives of participating teachers, what are the specific merits and 
shortcomings of performance pay? 
3. What are participating teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation 
measures? 
4. What factors emerge from a perception survey of participating teachers 
regarding performance pay and teacher evaluation?  
5. Are there differences in the perceptions of participating teachers toward 
performance pay based on selected characteristics of teachers (e.g., gender, 
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teaching experience, professional ranking, and teacher type) and schools (e.g. 
grades level, and school rank)?
6. Are there differences in the perceptions of participating teachers regarding 
evaluation measures upon which performance pay is based in their public schools 
in terms of selected characteristics of teachers (e.g., gender, teaching experience, 
professional ranking, and teacher type) and schools (e.g., grades level, and school 
rank)? 
Paradigm 
Paradigm is defined as “a worldview, together with the various philosophical 
assumptions associated with that point of view” (Teddlie & Tachakkori, 2009, p. 84). It 
provides an underlying theoretical framework with assumptions, concepts, and 
propositions to orient thinking and research (Mack, 2010). The study used a quantitative-
dominant mixed method. Therefore, it is oriented on a positivist paradigm and uses 
qualitative data to supplement and expand understanding teachers’ perceptions towards 
performance pay in China. Moreover, the purpose of research within a positivist 
paradigm is to “investigate, confirm and predict law-like patterns of behaviors” (Taylor 
& Medina, 2013, para. 4). The objectivity of the research process is the focus (Creswell, 
2009; Mack, 2010). Statistical analysis, large sample size and generalizable findings are 
characteristic of positivist research (Mack, 2010; Taylor & Medina, 2013). In this study, I 
investigated the reality regarding teachers’ support and attitudes toward performance pay 
and performance evaluation measures.  
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Research Strategy 
As noted above, the study used a mixed-methods approach for data collection and 
analysis. Compared with the single-method approach, a mixed-methods approach can 
help explore complexity more adequately and gain more insight of research questions 
(Creswell, 2009). In the study, I investigated not only Chinese teachers’ perceptions 
towards performance pay and how they are impacted in general, but also investigated in 
depth how Chinese teachers in the Yunnan Province perceive the merits and 
shortcomings of performance pay, and reasons supporting their preference on 
performance evaluation indicators.  
Specifically, the study used the concurrent embedded strategy of mixed methods, 
which indicates both quantitative and qualitative data were collected simultaneously, and 
qualitative data was embedded within the quantitative design (Creswell, 2009). A paper 
survey, including 64, 5-point Likert Scale questions and five open-ended questions, was 
distributed to selected teachers. Meanwhile, semi-structured individual interviews were 
conducted to generate qualitative data. The quantitative data provided an overall 
composite assessment of Chinese teachers’ perceptions towards performance pay and 
performance evaluation. The qualitative data enriched the description of Chinese 
teachers’ perceptions towards performance pay, including their overall attitudes regarding 
performance pay and performance evaluation measures, and their perceived merits and 
shortcomings of performance pay and its implementation. 
Participants  
The study was conducted in Kunming, the principal city of Yunnan Province, 
located in southwestern China. Choosing Kunming city is based on three rationales. First, 
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the teacher population in China is too large to choose a fully representative sample. 
Second, the implementation of teacher performance pay across China is diverse because 
teachers’ salaries are largely based on local economic development levels (State Council 
of China, 2008). The analysis of teachers’ perceptions towards performance pay can be 
explained by local economic development through focusing on one region. Third, based 
on previous literatures, teachers’ perceptions towards performance pay has never been 
examined in Kunming city, which is an economically and geographically important 
second-tier city representing the urban development level of southwestern region in 
China. The tier is decided by local population and income level (China city tier system: 
How it works and why its useful, 2013). Its education quality ranked among the lowest 
cities due to the unbalanced attribution of educational resources nationwide and obtained 
less attention from the central government than other cities.  
The city consists of 15 school districts - seven urban districts and eight county-
level cities. According to the national guidelines, all school districts have implemented 
teacher performance pay, but the extent to which schools implemented the programs 
varies greatly due to financial constraints and other problems (Liu et al., 2016a). Based 
on feasibility constraints, I only focused on one school district, Panda, which is the core 
district of Kunming in terms of economy, politics, and culture. Panda school district is in 
the leading position among all school districts of Kunming, which represents the highest 
level of education quality of Kunming city. Eighty-two urban public schools are located 
at Panda district, including approximately 5,630 teachers and administrators (Yunnan 
Department of Education, 2013).  
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Stratified random sampling was used to identify a sample of teachers to 
participate in the study. Stratified random sampling “involves a sample selected so that 
certain subgroups in the population are adequately represented in the sample” (Gall, Gall, 
& Borg, 2007, p. 173). In China, most of the secondary schools include both of the lower 
(Grades 7-9) and the higher grades (Grades 10-12). Therefore, the sample of teachers in 
the study was stratified as two levels—elementary and secondary - instead of elementary, 
middle, and high. This configuration better represents the school structure in China. The 
sample was stratified to ensure the participants proportionally represent elementary 
(Grades 1-6) and secondary (Grades 7-12) teachers drawn from the population.  
With quantitative data analysis, the larger the sample size the better (Gall et al., 
2007). For survey research, Sudman (1976) suggested a minimum of 100 participants in 
each major subgroup and 20 to 50 in each minor subgroup. In the Panda district of 
Kunming, there are 1,710 teachers at public elementary schools and 1,538 teachers at 
public secondary schools, which indicates that the proportion of teachers at elementary 
level and secondary level are approximately equal. Therefore, in the study, a total sample 
of 560 teachers (280 elementary and 280 secondary) from eight urban public elementary 
schools, out of 28 in total, and eight urban public secondary schools, out of 19 in total1 in 
the Panda district of Kunming were randomly selected. Specifically, the lists of schools at 
the elementary and secondary levels were entered in Excel worksheets respectively, and 
the “RAND” function was used to randomly select schools from the lists. Thirty-five 
questionnaires were sent to each selected school, and a designated teacher was 
                                                
1 Secondary vocational schools have been excluded from the school population because 
curriculum and teacher evaluation is different in these schools. 
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responsible for distributing and collecting the surveys.  Therefore, sample sizes in both 
the major subgroups met the recommended requirements for the study.  
For qualitative aspects of the study, “in-depth information from a small number of 
people can be very valuable, especially if the cases are information-rich” (Patton, 2002, 
p. 242). Therefore, a total sample of 16 teachers (eight elementary and eight secondary) 
was randomly selected from the participants to participate in follow-up interviews. 
Specifically, name list of teachers from each participating school was input into the Excel 
sheet, and the “RAND” function was used to randomly selected one teacher from each 
school. The selected teacher was contacted, but, if the selected teacher refused to 
participate in the study, a new teacher was randomly selected from the Excel sheet.  
Data Sources 
Teacher questionnaire. The questionnaire was adopted by Dr. Shujie Liu, a 
professor at Qufu Normal University, China, primarily based on Burns et al.’s (2009) 
study, which explored the REACH teacher attitudes regarding performance pay in Austin 
Independent School District, TX (AISD). Additional items from Springer, Ballou, et al.’s 
(2010) study were added to the questionnaire, which is an evaluation report on the 
District Awards for Teacher Excellence (D.A.T.E.) program, a state-funded and locally-
designed teacher incentive pay program in Texas. The adopted questionnaire has been 
back-translated by two scholars who were proficient in both English and Chinese (S. Liu, 
Zhao, et al., 2016). Items in the questionnaire addressed teachers’ overall attitudes 
towards performance pay and performance evaluation measures, teachers’ perceptions of 
the impact of performance pay implementation on their motivation, colleague 
collaboration, and job stress, which also are a focus of the current study. Moreover, the 
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questionnaire has been validated in a Chinese context. Therefore, it was adopted as an 
appropriate instrument for the study, and used with permission from Dr. Liu.  
Additionally, according to S. Liu, Xu, et al. (2016), whose study focused on 
Chinese middle school teachers’ preference on performance evaluation indicators, three 
factors were generated from the items. S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016) investigated Chinese 
teachers’ perceptions towards performance pay based on three school cases, a four-factor 
model, which included fairness and effectiveness, competition and stress, motivation, and 
peer collaboration, was generated to represent the general pattern of teachers’ 
perceptions. In both previous studies, no significant differences were found in terms of 
teachers’ gender, teaching experience, or professional ranking. It was interesting to 
explore the factors underneath the items, and differences across teacher groups in the 
current study with a different sample of teachers from China. Therefore, the research 
results from the previous and the current studies were comparable by using the same 
questionnaire. 
Composition of the questionnaire. The questionnaire (The English version and 
the Chinese version are attached in Appendix C and Appendix D, respectively.) 
employed in the study includes four parts (Table 2). Part I, demographic information, 
includes teacher characteristics, such as teaching experience, gender, and professional 
ranking. Part II consists of 48 closed-ended items asking respondents’ overall attitude 
towards performance pay and how the implementation of performance pay impacts 
teachers, particularly in the areas of collaboration, motivation, and job stress. The items 
were measured on a 5-point Likert-format scale that ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 
5= strongly agree. Part III is composed of 15 closed-ended items asking respondents how 
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important they think each indicator is in teacher performance evaluation. The items were 
measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale that ranged from 1 = extremely unimportant to 5 
= extremely important. Part IV of the questionnaire is comprised of five open-ended 
items asking respondents to describe what they think is the most important indicators in 
performance evaluation, what are their concerns are regarding the implementation of 
performance pay, and what they think are the advantages, disadvantages, and problems 
associated with implementation of performance pay.  
Table 2  
Composition of Chinese Teachers’ Perception towards Performance Pay Questionnaire 
 Composition Topics 
Part I Demographic Information • Teachers’ characteristics (age, gender, 
teaching experience, education, 
professional ranking, additional duty, 
and school level, school ranking) 
Part II 48 closed-ended items • Teachers’ overall perception towards 
performance pay 
• How does implementation of 
performance pay impact teachers 
Part III 15 closed-ended items • Teachers’ perception on performance 
evaluation measures  
Part IV 5 open-ended items • Teachers’ perceptions on the most 
important indicator(s) in performance 
evaluation 
• Teachers’ concerns regarding the 
implementation of performance pay 
• Teachers’ perceptions regarding 
advantages, and disadvantages 
associated with implementation of 
performance 
• Teachers’ perceived effects of 
performance pay on their teaching 
practice 
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Reliability and validity of the questionnaire. Reliability of a survey instrument 
refers to consistency of the instrument (Cohen & Swerdlik, 2009), which indicates 
whether the instrument is reliable to generate the intended results. Before the 
questionnaire was formally employed by Liu and her colleagues, a pilot study was 
conducted to check the appropriateness of all the items of the questionnaire in a Chinese 
context. Based on the respondents’ feedback, the appropriate items were adopted and the 
inappropriate ones were deleted (S. Liu, Zhao, et al., 2016). Additionally, high reliability 
coefficients of two main parts of the questionnaire (Part II and III) have been reported in 
previous studies. Specifically, all items in Part II of the questionnaire have been 
employed by S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016) in a case study investigating Chinese teachers’ 
attitudes toward performance pay at three middle schools at Jilin Province, China. With 
the sample of 132 teachers, the Cronbach’s alpha internal consistency reliability 
coefficient obtained from the study was 0.81. All items in Part III of the questionnaire 
have been employed in S. Liu, Xu, et al. (2016) to explore Chinese middle school 
teachers’ preferences regarding performance evaluation measures. This study, based on 
the sample of 204 teachers, obtained a Cronbach’s alpha internal consistency reliability 
coefficient of 0.88 with a confidence interval of 0.85 to 0.91.  
Validity refers to whether the instrument measures what it purports to measure 
(Gall et al., 2007). Content validity suggests whether the instrument covers “a 
representative sample of behavior domain to be measured” (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997, p. 
115). The content validity of the questionnaire can be demonstrated from the following 
two aspects. First, the items of the questionnaire are originally from well-designed 
empirical studies (Burns et al., 2009; Springer, Ballou, et al., 2010) that focused on 
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teachers’ perceptions towards performance pay. Additionally, the questionnaire has been 
employed in a Chinese study and the results have been published in peer-reviewed 
journals. Therefore, the item content is valid. Second, the questionnaire is based on the 
theories of motivation and impacts of performance pay on teachers. These theories 
indicate (a) that teachers’ motivation is affected by performance pay, and (b) that 
teachers’ perceptions of performance pay influence their work effort, teaching practice, 
job stress, and collaboration with colleagues. The items of the questionnaire, which are 
derived from these ideas regarding teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay, are 
designed to show teachers’ attitudes toward performance pay and performance 
evaluation, and teachers’ perceptions after the implementation of performance pay. 
Additionally, the questionnaire can be used with a range of teachers regardless their 
characteristics (e.g., gender, teaching experience, educational background, professional 
rank, and schools).  
Semi-structured individual interview questions. Part IV in the questionnaire is 
composed of five open-ended questions, which are designed to supplement the data 
collected by 5-point Likert-Scale questions in the other parts of the questionnaire (Gall et 
al., 2007). The open-ended questions, which were developed by Dr. Liu and her 
colleagues and have been employed in previous studies, were revised and used for the 
semi-structured individual interview. Regarding the revision, interview questions are 
more general than the original open-ended questions in the questionnaire, as shown in 
Table 3. Two additional questions regarding the implementation of performance pay at 
the interviewee’s school and suggestions from the interviewee were added. The 
framework of interview questions is shown in Table 4 and all the questions have been 
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reviewed by Dr. S. Liu to ensure the validity. During individual interviews, these 
questions were used as prompts and allowed for follow-up questions according to the 
content of participants’ responses. Because the pertinent qualitative data generated from 
both the questionnaires and interviews are used to supplement the quantitative data and 
enrich the study, as shown in Table 5, the interview questions are aligned with the survey 
questions.   
Table 3  
 
Revision of Original Open-ended Questions  
 
Original Open-ended Questions Revised Interview Questions 
Which indicator(s) (e.g. teachers’ morality, 
professional ranking, education degree, 
teaching experience, working load, 
teaching process, and student’s 
achievement) do you think are the most 
important in teacher performance 
evaluation? And why? 
What measures are used at your school to 
evaluate teachers’ performance? And what 
do you think of these measures? 
What do you think are the main problems 
associated with the implementation of 
teacher performance pay? And why? 
(1) how much the salary can be increased 
(2) whether teachers’ salary is lower than 
local governmental officials or not 
(3) how does school allocate the incentive 
payment 
(4) the disparities of performance pay 
across different school districts 
(5) the disparities of performance pay 
among different schools at the same district 
(6) the disparities of performance pay 
among colleagues 
(7) others (please specify) 
What are your concerns regarding teacher 







  67 
Table 4 
 









1. Please introduce the implementation of teacher performance pay at your 
school. What’s the implementation plan at your school? 
2. What measures are used at your school to evaluate teachers’ performance? 
And what do you think of these measures? 
3. What are the influences of implementing teacher performance pay on your 
teaching? On peer relationships? On students’ studying?  
4. What do you think are the merits of teacher performance pay?  
5. What are your concerns regarding teacher performance pay? And why? 
6. What do you think are the main problems associated with the 
implementation of teacher performance pay? 
7. For better implementing teacher performance pay, do you have any 




Alignment of Questionnaire Close-ended Items with Interview Questions 
 
Topics of Questionnaire Close-ended 
Items 
Semi-structured Interview Questions 
Part I • Teachers’ characteristics 
(age, gender, teaching 
experience, education, 
professional ranking, 
additional duty, and school 
level, school ranking) 
• Background information of interviewees 
Part II • Teachers’ overall attitude 
towards performance pay 
• How does implementation 
of performance pay impact 
teachers 
• What do you think are the merits of 
teacher performance pay? 
• What are your concerns regarding teacher 
performance pay? And why? 
• What do you think are the main problems 
associated with the implementation of 
teacher performance pay? 
• What are the influences of implementing 
teacher performance pay on your 
teaching? On peer relationships? On 
students’ studying? 
Part III • Teachers’ perception on 
performance evaluation 
measures 
• What measures are used at your school to 
evaluate teachers’ performance? And 
what do you think of these measures? 
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Data Collection 
         Triangulation. Triangulation is defined as “the mixing of data or methods so that 
diverse viewpoints or standpoints cast light upon a topic” (Olsen, 2004, p. 3). It is a 
technique facilitating validation of data, which refers to using multiple and different 
sources, methods and theories to provide evidence (Creswell, 2013). Triangulation is not 
just about validation, but also about deepening and widening the understanding towards 
the research questions (Olsen, 2004). In this study, specifically, methodological 
triangulation was implemented through survey, semi-structured interviews, and extant 
artifacts. Information collected through the survey was limited by the depth of the 
questions asked on the questionnaire and respondents’ time for completing the survey. 
However, interviews and extant artifacts allowed the researcher to enrich and deepen the 
understanding regarding Chinese teachers’ perceptions towards performance pay.  
Survey. The survey is an efficient approach for data collection. In this study, 560 
paper surveys with a consent form (attached in Appendix B, and the corresponding 
English version is attached in Appendix A) on the cover were distributed to 16 randomly-
selected schools by an officer working at the Bureau of Education at Panda District of 
Kunming, China. A designated teacher at each school was responsible for distributing 35 
surveys to teachers at the school and collecting all the surveys after finishing.  
Individual semi-structured interview. The 45-60-minute individual semi-
structured interviews were conducted for collecting qualitative data of the study. In semi-
structured interviews, all questions were open-ended, and follow-up questions were asked 
according to the content of the interviewee’ responses. The pre-designed questions 
ensured the researcher covered key areas of the research focus in interviews, and the 
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follow-up questions were helpful in encouraging respondents’ deeper thinking on ideas 
and issues that emerged during the interview (Kvale, 1999). Interview guiding questions, 
which were used in the study, have been discussed in the Data Source section.  
Interviews were conducted in a quiet and comfortable place of the participants’ 
choice, without interruptions. Participants could decide to participate in the interview 
face-to-face or via telephone or Skype. An interview protocol, including descriptive 
information (time, place, interviewer, interviewee’s pseudonym) and the interview 
questions listed above, was used to guide the interviews (The English version and the 
Chinese version are attached in Appendix E and Appendix F, respectively). 
Member checking was applied during and after interviews, which is an approach 
to establish credibility of qualitative data. Credibility refers to the truth of the findings in 
research (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Specifically, during interviews I reflected participants’ 
comments back to them to check my understanding of their perceptions. After interviews, 
I asked participants to review the summaries of the interviews, and make corrections to 
ensure the researcher’s interpretation is accurate. All interviews were audio-recorded 
during the process and transcribed into Word documents and translated into English right 
after the end of each interview.  
        Artifacts. During the interviews, participants were asked to share artifact(s) that 
provide evidence of performance evaluation and performance pay at their schools, such 
as school-based performance evaluation standards and indicators, performance pay 
structure sheet, or documents concerning performance pay or performance evaluation 
distributed by the school administration. The purposes of including the artifacts were: 1) 
the artifact(s) can facilitate the participants thinking about their experience and recall 
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their memory regarding performance evaluation and performance pay; 2), the artifact(s) 
is an important evidence-based data source for the researcher to incorporate in data 
analysis; and 3) artifact analyses “provided greater depth and breadth to the data 
generated” (Xu, 2011 p. 92).  
Data Analysis 
Quantitative Data. SPSS Version 23 was used for statistical analyses in the 
study. Descriptive statistics, factor analysis, and MANOVA or ANOVA were used to 
analyze quantitative data.  
Descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics are “mathematical techniques for 
organizing and summarizing a set of numerical data” (Gall et al., 2007, p. 132). In the 
study, they were used to describe (a) the extent that Chinese teachers support the 
implementation of performance pay at their public schools; and (b) Chinese teachers’ 
ratings of their preferred performance evaluation indicators. Specifically, means and 
standard deviations were calculated for each item of the questionnaire. Additionally, 
percentages of teachers’ response to the question regarding Chinese teachers’ general 
attitudes toward performance pay and the extent of their support to the implementation of 
performance pay at their schools were calculated to describe their support of performance 
pay and different aspects of the implementation. The means of teachers’ ratings on their 
preferred performance evaluation measures were ranked from highest to lowest to 
indicate what indicators of performance evaluation Chinese teachers perceive as 
important.   
Principal Component Analysis (PCA). Principal component analysis is a 
statistical technique that “summarizes patterns of correlations among observed variables 
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and reduces many observed variables to a smaller number of factors” (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2014, p. 660).  The combined factors were manageable for the researcher to 
conduct the follow-up statistical analysis and use as dependent variables. Specifically, a 
PCA with oblimin rotation was conducted to examine the factor structure of both Part II 
(teachers’ overall attitude towards performance pay, and how of implementation of 
performance pay impacts teachers) and III (teachers’ preference on performance 
evaluation indicators) of the questionnaire. Within the process, multiple methods (e.g., 
eigenvalue-greater-than-one, scree plot, parallel analysis) were used to determine the 
number of factors underlying the data. 
MANOVA or ANOVA. To explore the differences of teacher perception towards 
performance pay and performance evaluation measures based on personal and school 
selected characteristics (e.g., professional rank, teaching experience, and grade level), 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) or follow-up analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) were conducted. Both ANOVA and MANOVA are statistical techniques for 
determining the group differences on dependent variable(s) (Gall et al., 2007). ANOVA 
is used for a single dependent variable while MANOVA is used for more than one 
dependent variable. In the study, the independent variables were teachers’ and schools’ 
selected characteristics (e.g., teaching experience, professional rank and school levels), 
while the dependent variables were the factors extracted from the PCAs.  
Qualitative data. A qualitative content analysis was used to analyze data 
collected from survey open-ended questions of the questionnaire and semi-structured 
interviews. Qualitative content analysis is “a research method for the subjective 
interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of 
  72 
coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1279). Based on 
the quantitative-dominant mixed-method study design, the qualitative data served to 
supplement the study and provide in-depth information regarding teachers’ perceptions 
towards performance pay. Using qualitative content analysis, I identified the key terms 
from the qualitative data, grouped them and categorized them into patterns and 
formulated a general description to capture the essence of teachers’ perceptions toward 
performance pay and performance evaluation.  
Specifically, the inductive approach of content analysis was used, which indicates 
that the qualitative data is not based on a specific theory (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). The 
analysis involved the following steps:  
1. Obtain a sense of the whole (Burnard, 1991). In the beginning, all text documents 
were read several times and I immersed in the data and got a sense of the whole 
(Creswell, 2013), because no insights appear until the researcher is thoroughly 
familiar with them (Polit & Beck, 2004).  
2. Open coding. While reading the text, I wrote down notes and themes to describe 
various aspects of the content (Burnard, 1991; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). The 
process of coding requires the researcher to “aggregate the text into small 
categories of information, seeking evidence for the code from different databases 
being used in a study, and then assigning a label to the code” (Creswell, 2013, p. 
184). An online qualitative data analysis tool, Dedoose, was used to code the data. 
All the categories were generated from open coding. 
3. Create categories. At this stage, I grouped similar categories under higher order 
categories (Burnard, 1991). The process involves comparison among primary 
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categories (Dey, 1993), which enhances understanding about the phenomenon 
(teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation and performance pay). 
Furthermore, it sets a foundation for generating knowledge through the 
researcher’s interpretation of the research topic.  
4. Abstraction. Abstraction refers to generating higher-order categories to develop a 
comprehensive description of the research topic (Polit & Beck, 2004). “Content-
characteristics words” were used to name generated categories (Elo & Kyngäs, 
2008, p. 111). For example, in the study, content-characteristics words are support, 
teacher collaboration, motivation, and fairness/unfairness. At this stage, I 
“formulated a model that best represents how those categories were related, and 
used the themes that emerged from that analysis to reassemble the data so as to 
answer proposed research questions” (Xu, 2011, p. 95).  
To establish the credibility of the qualitative findings, I emailed the original 
interview transcripts and summaries of interviews to each participant for review and 
correction. All the committee members, organized by faculty members in the School of 
Education, reviewed study design and data analysis, which strengthened the credibility as 
well. The two steps above (member checking and peer review) can also build 
confirmability of the qualitative findings, which means the study results are determined 
by the data, but not by the researcher’s bias, motivation, or interest (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985). Additionally, I developed a detailed, rich description of the analysis process and 
results to ensure readers obtain sufficient information to judge the applicability of 
findings to other settings, which is a process to establish transferability of the qualitative 
findings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).   
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As a summary, Table 6 below shows the alignment between each research 
question with the corresponding data collection/generation and analysis method(s). 
Table 6 
Alignment of Research Questions to Data Collection/Generation and Analysis. 
 
Research Question Data 
Collection/Generation 
Data Analysis 
Q1. To what extent do participating 
teachers support the 
implementation of performance 
pay at their public schools? 
Survey Questionnaire Descriptive Statistical  
Analysis 
Q2. From the perspectives of 
participating teachers, what are the 
specific merits and shortcomings of 
performance pay? 
Interview Qualitative Content 
Analysis (Inductive) 
Q3. What are participating 
teachers’ perceptions toward 







Q4. What factors emerge from a 
perception survey of participating 
teachers regarding performance 
pay and teacher evaluation? 
Survey Principal Component 
Analyses 
 
Q5. Are there differences in the 
perceptions of participating 
teachers toward performance pay 
based on selected characteristics of 
teachers (e.g., gender, teaching 
experience, professional ranking, 
and teacher type) and schools (e.g. 
grades level, and school rank)? 
Survey Questionnaire MANOVA and follow-
up analyses (ANOVA 
and post hoc) 
Q6. Are there differences in the 
perceptions of participating 
teachers regarding evaluation 
measures upon which performance 
pay is based in their public schools 
in terms of selected characteristics 
of teachers (e.g., gender, teaching 
experience, professional ranking, 
and teacher type) and schools (e.g. 




up analyses (ANOVA 
and post hoc) 
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Assumptions, Delimitations, and Limitations 
Assumptions. The study assumed that all teachers that participated in the study 
have experienced the reform of performance pay and their payments are based on the 
results of their performance evaluation in their schools. Another assumption is that 
teachers’ attitudes and perceptions towards performance pay are influenced by personal 
and schools’ selected characteristics. Also, based on motivation theory, the study 
assumed that teachers’ perceptions regarding performance pay and its implementation 
affected teachers’ collaboration, motivation, teaching effectiveness, and job stress. 
Delimitations. The study is restricted to one urban school district in a province in 
southwest China. Therefore, the study results are not be generalizable to the rural area 
and other regions of China. Additionally, based on previous research evidence and items 
of the questionnaire, the study only focuses on the limited impacts of performance pay 
perceived by teachers. Other impacts on teachers produced by the implementation of 
performance pay are not addressed in the study. 
Limitations. There are three limitations of the study. First, the sample size is 
relatively small, which influenced the power of statistical analysis. Additionally, 
generalizability of findings is constrained due to the relatively small sample size. Another 
limitation associated with the study sample is the representativeness. Due to the 
unavailability of the demographic data of teachers in Panda school district of Kunming 
city, the characteristics of the teacher sample might not be representative across teachers’ 
variables such as gender, age, teaching experience and educational background.  
Second, the study only focuses on teachers from one school district at Kunming 
city of Yunnan province, China. The findings from the study might not be generalizable 
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to the other school districts and other locations of China. In addition, all teachers in the 
sample are from urban schools, therefore, the findings are not generalizable to teachers in 
rural areas.  
Third, lack of validity of the survey results is a limitation of the study. In data 
collection, designated teachers from selected schools were responsible for distributing the 
questionnaires to teachers, but the process of selecting teachers participating the survey 
was uncontrollable. The designated teachers might randomly select teachers or only 
select teachers who were available. Also, whether participants’ responses are truthful or 
not is uncontrollable, and the respondents might make mistakes or have difficulty in 
recalling relevant information in the process of accomplishing the survey.
 
  





In this study, I explored teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay and 
performance evaluation measures in Panda School District of Kunming City, China. Data 
were collected or generated through paper surveys, semi-structured interviews, and 
artifact review. A total of 364 K-12 Chinese teachers completed the survey. They were 
heterogeneous across various characteristics such as gender, age, years of teaching 
experience, professional rankings, as well as subject areas and grade levels taught. 
Among all the received survey responses, 333 were identified as valid due to participants’ 
response to each item of the survey scale, especially the responses to the reverse-scored 
items. The quantitative data were statistically analyzed (e.g., descriptive statistics, 
Principal Component Analysis, and MANOVA). Qualitative data, composed of written 
responses to open-ended questions at the end of the survey questionnaire, as well as semi-
structured interviews with 14 teachers randomly selected from the school district, were 
analyzed by content analysis. Artifacts pertaining to teacher performance pay and 
performance evaluation were analyzed by holistic coding. In this chapter, findings of 
analyses will answer the following research questions: 
1. To what extent do participating teachers support the implementation of 
performance pay at their public schools? 
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2. From the perspectives of participating teachers, what are the specific merits and 
shortcomings of performance pay? 
3. What are participating teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation 
measures? 
4. What factors emerge from a perception survey of participating teachers 
regarding performance pay and teacher evaluation?  
5. Are there differences in the perceptions of participating teachers toward 
performance pay based on selected characteristics of teachers (e.g., gender, 
teaching experience, professional ranking, and teacher type) and schools (e.g., 
grade level and school rank)? 
6. Are there differences in the perceptions of participating teachers regarding 
evaluation measures upon which performance pay is based in their public schools 
in terms of selected characteristics of teachers (e.g., gender, teaching experience, 
professional ranking, and teacher type) and schools (e.g., grade level and school 
rank)? 
In the following sections I present how I prepared and analyzed the data, and what 
teachers shared with me about each of these questions, organized by categories and 
themes that recurred across participant responses.  
Data Preparation 
This section includes the typical process for data preparation, which includes: 
present the response rate, identify the valid response, and deal with missing values and 
reversed items. 
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Response rate. Data for the study were collected during May and June of 2016. 
An officer working at the Bureau of Education in Panda School District of Kunming, 
China, was hired to distribute 560 (280 for elementary schools and 280 for secondary 
schools) paper surveys to 16 randomly selected schools (8 elementary schools and 8 
secondary schools) in Panda School District. A designated teacher at each school was 
responsible for distributing 35 surveys to teachers at each school and collecting all the 
surveys upon completion. The officer collected the surveys and transferred them to me. 
The participation rate and valid data rate by school level are presented in Table 7. In total, 
364 questionnaires were collected (177 from elementary schools and 187 from secondary 
schools). The total participation rate was 65%. The participating rate of elementary 
teachers was 63.21%, while that of secondary teachers was 66.79%. Table 8 documents 
the participation rate for each school. Real school names have been replaced by 
pseudonyms for confidentiality purpose. The participation rates of one elementary school 
and two secondary schools were below 50%, while the remaining schools’ participation 
rates were above 50%. Neither the officer nor the designated teacher reported specific 
reasons to explain the varied participation rates.  
Table 7 
Survey Response Rate and Valid Data Rate by School Level 


















280 187  66.79% 171 61.07% 
  80 
Determination of valid response. The strategy of reverse scoring was used for 
12 items (Items 6, 13, 19, 23, 24, 25, 30, 32, 34, 38, 39, 44) in the questionnaire. The 
participants’ survey responses were screened before entering the next level of analysis. 
When vetting the responses, I regarded those with the same scores on the 5-point Likert 
scale consecutively for all items as invalid, because this suggested that the teacher 
respondents mistakenly responded to reversed items (Weijters & Baumgartner, 2012). As 
a result, 31 invalid questionnaires (15 for the Elementary subgroup and 16 for the 
Secondary subgroup) were discarded from the total sample. The final sample used for 
data analysis encompassed 333 valid questionnaires (162 from elementary schools and 
171 from secondary schools). As shown in Table 7, The valid sample of elementary 
school teachers accounted for 57.86% while the secondary school teachers accounted for 
61.07%. The total response rate of valid surveys is 59.46%.  
Missing values and reverse coding. A total of 23 missing values were identified 
for 64 items in the survey. Among them, seven surveys had two items missing and nine 
surveys had one item missing. In SPSS, series means were employed to replace missing 
values. Missing values were also found for teachers’ demographic information: four 
participants failed to report their teaching years of experience; five teachers failed to 
report their teacher types; eight teachers failed to report the professional ranking; and 14 
teachers failed to report their extra administrative duties (see Table 9). During analysis, 
the SPSS default mechanism—listwise missing value deletion—was incorporated, which 
indicated that the case with missing value was excluded from the analysis. Additionally, 
12 items (Item 6, 13, 19, 23, 24, 25, 30, 32, 34, 38, 39, 44) were reverse coded to align 
with the valence of the other items.  
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Table 8 
Survey Response Rate by School 

















35 16 45.71% 
B 
Elementary School 
35 19 54.29% 
C 
Elementary School 
35 20 57.14% 
D 
Elementary School 
35 32 91.43% 
E 
Elementary School 
35 21 60.00% 
F 
Elementary School 
35 19 54.29% 
G 
Elementary School 
35 20 57.14% 
H 
Elementary School 





35 27  77.14% 
J 
Secondary School 
35 17  48.57% 
K 
Secondary School 
35 21  60.00% 
L 
Secondary School 
35 20  57.14% 
M 
Secondary School 
35 14  40.00% 
N 
Secondary School 
35 29 82.86% 
O 
Secondary School 
35 26 74.28% 
P 
Secondary School 
35 33 94.28% 
 
Descriptive Information for the Quantitative Data 
The Teacher Perception Survey: Teacher Performance Pay and Performance 
Evaluation includes eight demographic items in Part I. The items requested information 
regarding gender, age, teaching years, educational degree, teacher type (according to 
which level of expert teachers they are), teachers’ professional ranking, and teachers’ 
extra administrative duties (besides teaching). All participating teachers were from urban 
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schools. Table 9 presents participants’ demographic information by frequency and 
percentage.  
Table 9 
Demographic Information of Surveyed Teachers in Panda School District of Kunming 
City, Yunnan Province, China 
 





Gender 333/0 Male 93 (27.9%) 
Female 240 (72.1%) 
Age 333/0 21-30 56 (16.8%) 
31-40 124 (37.2%) 
41-50 118 (35.4%) 
>51 35 (10.5%) 
Teaching years 329/4 <5 32 (9.6%) 
5-9 59 (17.7%) 
10-14 72 (21.6%) 
15-19 57 (17.1%) 
>20 109 (32.7%) 
Educational 
degree 
333/0 Doctor 2 (0.6%) 
Master 63 (18.9) 
Bachelor 236 (70.9%) 
Below bachelor 32 (9.6%) 
Teacher type 328/5 Municipal expert 27 (8.1%) 
District expert 95 (28.5%) 
School expert 57 (17.1%) 
Non-expert 149 (44.7) 
School rank 333/0 National key  0 (0.0%) 
Provincial key 128 (38.4%) 
Municipal key 29 (8.7%) 




325/8 Highest 97 (29.1%) 
Level 1 131 (39.3%) 
Level 2 79 (23.7%) 




319/14 Principal 1(0.3%) 
Vice Principal 13(3.9%) 
Chief of Teaching 12 (3.6%) 
Grade Leader 66 (19.8%) 
Banzhuren 124 (37.5%) 
None 103 (30.9%) 
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Gender. Among 333 valid responses, 93 (27.9%) were male and 240 (72.1%) 
were female. The number of female teachers was almost three times the number of male 
teachers.  
Age. Teachers in the age group of 21 to 30 accounted for 56 respondents (16.8% 
of the total survey sample). One hundred and twenty-four teachers were in the age group 
of 31-40, which represented 37.2%, the highest percentage of respondents. One hundred 
and eighteen (35.4%) fell into the age group of 41-50, and 35 teachers (10.5%) were 
above age 51.  
Teaching years. Five categories of teaching years were provided for participants 
in the survey. Thirty-two teachers (9.6%) had “less than 5 years” of teaching experience. 
Fifty-nine teachers (17.7%) had “5 to 9 years” of teaching experience. Seventy-two 
teachers (21.6%) had “10 to 14 years” of teaching experience. Fifty-seven teachers 
(17.1%) had “more than 15 but less than 19 years” of teaching experience. Teachers with 
“more than 20 years” of teaching experience represented the highest percentage of 
respondents that 109 (32.7%) teachers were found in this category. 
Educational level. Among 333 valid responses, two teachers (0.6%) had “doctor 
degree,” and 63 (18.9%) had “master degree.” A majority of the surveyed teachers (i.e., 
236, 70.9%, of the total sample) had “bachelor degree.” There were 32 teachers (9.6%) 
who had an educational degree lower than “Bachelor.”  
Teacher type. Teacher type refers to honor titles given teachers to acknowledge 
their distinctive effectiveness and contribution in education. Teachers with “expert” titles 
at different levels (e.g., national, provincial, municipal, and school) were regarded as the 
role model for the particular level. Expert teachers are usually selected or recommended 
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at different levels based on their age, years of teaching experience, professional rankings 
and teaching effectiveness. Among 328 responded participants, 149 teachers (44.7%) 
were ordinary teachers; 27 (8.1%) were titled as “municipal experts;” 95 (28.5%) were 
considered as “district experts;” and 57 (17.1%) were “school experts.” 
School rank. School rank is accredited by local educational agencies contingent 
on various indicators, such as teacher quality, students’ academic performance in 
enrollment exams, and quality of moral education2. In the survey, school rank was 
categorized as “national key,” “provincial key,” “municipal key,” and “ordinary school.” 
Among 333 responses, none of the teachers were from a “national key” school. One 
hundred and twenty-eight (38.4%) teachers were from provincial-key schools; 29 (8.7%) 
teachers were from municipal-key schools; and 176 teachers were from ordinary schools.  
Teachers’ professional ranking. Teachers’ professional ranking includes four 
levels: highest, level 1, level 2, and level 3, ranking downward. Chinese teacher’ 
professional ranking in K-12 schools is contingent on: teachers’ highest degree, years of 
teaching experience, teaching performance, professional knowledge, and mentoring and 
research experience. Based on the highest degree, the lower-ranked teacher should have 
one to five years of teaching experience to be qualified to apply for the higher ranking. 
The numbers and the associated percentages of surveyed teachers at each level were: 97 
(29.1%), 131 (39.3%), 79 (23.7%) and 18 (5.4%), respectively.   
                                                
2 Moral education is an important part of school education in China, although it is hard to 
be assessed with quantifiable indicators. Each administrative level (e.g., provincial, 
municipal and school district) has the specific standards for assessment of moral 
education at local schools. The assessment of moral education usually focuses on: school 
security, school culture, community service, citizen-related activities, and activities 
related to being the successor of the Communist Party, and etc. 
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Teachers’ extra administrative duties. Besides teaching, teachers might have 
extra administrative duties. In the survey, teachers’ extra administrative duties or titles 
included: principal, vice principal, chief of teaching, grade leader, banzhuren, and none. 
Among the total 319 valid responses, one (0.3%) participant also worked as a principal; 
13 (3.9%) were vice principal; 12 (3.6%) were chief of teaching; 66 (19.8%) were grade 
leaders; 124 (37.5%) were banzhurens; and 103 (30.9%) surveyed teachers had no extra 
administrative duties. 
Descriptive Information of the Qualitative Data 
Qualitative data were composed of three main parts. The first was written answers 
to interview questions on the questionnaire provided by the surveyed teachers. The 
second was the individual semi-structured interviews with 14 randomly selected teachers. 
The third part was the artifacts pertaining to the evidence of teacher performance pay or 
teacher performance evaluation shared by interviewed teachers.  
Responses to interview questions of the survey. A total of 210 surveyed 
teachers provided short answers to at least one open-ended question on the questionnaire. 
As shown in Figure 3, 179 teachers answered Question 1. Among them, 119 were 
elementary teachers while 60 were secondary teachers. Two hundred and five teachers 
offered answers to Question 2, and elementary teachers accounted for 122 while 
secondary teachers accounted for 83. For Question 3, the total number of answers were 
137, and 93 were from elementary teachers while 44 were from secondary teachers. One 
hundred and forty-three surveyed teachers responded to Question 4. Among them, 97 
were elementary teachers and 46 were secondary teachers. Ninety-three elementary 
teachers and 33 secondary teachers, a total of 126, answered Question 5. 
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Figure 3. Number of responses to interview questions on the survey questionnaire 
provided by teachers in Panda School District of Kunming City, Yunnan Province, 
China. 
 
Demographic information of interviewed teachers. The interview participants 
included 14 teachers from compulsory education schools in Panda School District of 
Kunming City, with 6 elementary-school teachers and 8 secondary-school teachers. 
Among them, 5 were female and 9 were male. Two teachers had less than 5 years of 
teaching experience, 3 teachers taught in school for 5-10 years, and nine teachers had 
over 10 years of teaching experience. Among 14 interviewees, eight teachers taught core 
subjects (Chinese, Math, and English), four teachers taught social studies, and two 
teachers taught science subjects. Half of the interviewed teachers had administrative 
duties. Among them, two were school principals or vice principals, two were grade 
leaders, two were team leaders of teaching and research, and one was the supervisor of 
school moral education. Among the total 14 interviewees, five of them were banzhurens. 


















Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Secondary Teachers Elementary Teachers
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Table 10 
Demographic Information of 14 Interviewed Teachers in Panda School District of 
Kunming City, Yunnan Province, China 
 
Item Category Frequency 
(Percentage) 
N=14 
Gender Male 5 (36%) 
Female 9 (64%) 
Teaching 
years 
<5 2 (14%) 
5-10 3 (21%) 
>10 9 (64%) 
Subject Core subjects (Chinese, Math, and 
English) 
8 (57%) 
Social Studies 4 (29%) 
Science 2 (14%) 
Grade level Elementary school 6 (43%) 
Secondary school 8 (57%) 
Administrative 
duties 
Principal/Vice Principal 2 (14%) 
Grade Leader 2 (14%) 
Team leader of Teaching and Research 2 (14%) 
Other 1 (7%) 
Other duties Banzhuren 5 (36%) 
Other 0 (0%) 
 
Artifacts. Among four interviewed teachers who provided related artifacts, two 
interviewed teachers shared school performance evaluation plans and the other two 
teachers shared their salary schemes during interviews. While, the remaining 10 
interviewed teachers did not provide documents regarding school-level performance pay 
or performance evaluation due to varied reasons, such as school confidentiality, difficulty 
accessing an online copy, or no copy available to teachers. The available artifacts were 
analyzed by holistic coding and the results are embedded within findings of the research 
questions below.   
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Findings for Research Question 1: 
To what extent do participating teachers support the implementation of 
performance pay at their public schools?  
As shown in Figure 4, for the question regarding the general level of teachers’ 
support for performance pay, among 333 valid responses, 136 (40.8%) teachers selected 
supportive, 18 (5.4%) teachers selected very supportive, which indicated that 
approximately 46% of total surveyed teachers supported performance pay. One hundred 
and twenty-eight (38.4%) teachers selected neutral. The numbers (percentages) of 
surveyed teachers selected very unsupportive and unsupportive were 13 (3.9%) and 38 
(11.4%), respectively.  
 
Figure 4. Teachers’ general attitude toward performance pay in Panda school district of 
Kunming city, Yunnan province, China 
 
Figure 5 presents teachers’ general attitude toward performance pay by school 
level. Approximately 12.3% elementary-school participants selected very unsupportive 
(4.9%) or unsupportive (7.4%), while the percentages of secondary-school participants on 
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teachers, 52.5% of participants selected supportive (45.7%) or very supportive (6.8%). 
For secondary-school teachers, 40.4% of participants selected supportive (36.3%) or very 
supportive (4.1%). The percentages of participants whose attitudes were neutral at 
elementary schools and secondary schools were 35.2% and 41.5%, respectively.   
 
Figure 5. Teachers’ general attitude toward performance pay by school level in Panda 
school district of Kunming City, Yunnan Province, China 
 
Findings for Research Question 2: 
From the perspectives of participating teachers, what are the specific merits and 
problems of performance pay? 
To answer this research question, the qualitative data from responses to open-
ended questions on the questionnaire and individual semi-structured interviews were 
analyzed using content analysis. The findings suggest that the surveyed and interviewed 
teachers have observed more problems than merits with performance pay.  
Merits of the teacher performance pay. For merits of teacher performance pay, 
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beneficial because it “sounds” like an effective policy to motivate teachers and its 
intention is to support teachers. Regarding the goal, the function, and the intended 
outcomes, some teachers acknowledged the merits of performance pay as follows. Also, 
Table 11 shows the number of respondents who identified the themes regarding merits of 
performance pay in the open-ended survey questions and in interviews, respectively. 
Table 11 
 
Frequencies of Respondents Identifying Themes Regarding Merits of Performance Pay in 
Surveys and Interviews  
 
Themes Survey Interviews 
Theme 1: Motivate teachers and reward good 
performance. 
8 2 
Theme 2: Reflect teachers’ working load. 3 1 
Theme 3: Introduce competition among teachers 
in public schools. 
4 1 
 
1) Teacher performance pay’s original goal of motivating teachers and 
rewarding good performance is theoretically appealing. Two teachers’ comments 
exemplified this point:  
“The goal and concept of performance pay is proper because that the front-line 
teachers shall be motivated to make more effort in teaching, especially for young 
teachers. Also, they are more willing to take on extra responsibility because of the 
incentive payment.” 
“I think it can motivate teachers to continuously improve their professional 
performance.” 
2) Teacher performance pay accurately reflects teachers’ working load to some 
degree. One teacher’s comment was: 
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“I felt like our salary scheme is more open than before after implementing 
performance pay because it shows our teaching load, such as the subject we’re 
teaching and the number of classes we have to teach per week to reach full 
capacity.” 
3) Teacher performance pay introduced competition among teachers in public 
schools. Two teachers’ comments on this point were:  
“Teacher performance pay might bring in the competition mechanism, which is a 
good thing for the development of public schools.” 
“Performance pay creates competition, which breaks the egalitarianism in public 
schools.” 
Problems with teacher performance pay. The analysis of the qualitative data 
generated 14 themes pertaining the problems of teacher performance pay perceived by 
the surveyed and the interviewed teachers. These main problems were further classified 
into four major categories. The categories and key themes are listed in Table 12.  
Limited and unbalanced funding. The first category “Limited and Unbalanced 
Funding” represented the problems of performance pay in the funding source at the level 
of the local educational agency. Two themes were under this category:  
First, the local educational agency had a limited budget to support teachers’ 
performance pay. Two teachers commented that:  
“Even though school has the right to design the implementation plan, the whole 
cake is too small. It’s hard to design a plan that can satisfy everyone.” 
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“The funding for performance pay from the school district is limited, but school 
administrators still saved part of it for some other irrelevant rewards. 
Consequently, the performance pay per teacher is really low.” 
Compared to other school districts in Kunming city, the funding for teacher 
performance pay in Panda School District was relatively low. Another teacher stated:  
“Panda School District has the best students’ academic performance and best 
educational resources, but teacher performance pay here is the lowest among the 
four main districts of the city.” 
Second, the local educational agency distributed unbalanced performance bonus 
irrespective of school contexts. Teachers at low-ranked schools where students’ source 
were not as good as the high-ranked schools expressed their concerns regarding the 
unbalanced input in teacher performance pay at the district level. Two teachers shared 
that: 
“It is unfair that teachers at the advantageous schools have a higher end-of-year 
bonus than us, just because their students’ have better academic achievement. 
The government never thinks about the disadvantaged schools’ situation. Our 
teachers made even more effort than teachers in those schools because our source 
of students was not as good as those schools.” 
“Even though the average amount of teacher performance pay at our district is 
uniform, those advantageous schools could always obtain extra funding for 
rewarding their teachers. However, schools like us don’t have that extra funding. 
So, teachers had opinions towards the performance pay.” 
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Table 12 
Major Categories and Themes Regarding Problems of Teacher Performance Pay 




Unbalanced Funding  
1) Local educational agency had limited budget to 
support teachers’ performance pay. 
2) Local educational agency distributed performance 




1) Teachers were not well informed of the 
implementation plan. 
2) The implementation plan of performance pay was 
not transparent to teachers. 
3) The indicators of teacher performance pay were 
oversimplified, failing to reflect the complexity of 
teachers’ work. 
4) Teacher performance pay failed to differentiate 
teachers based on their effectiveness and 
responsibilities. 
Unfairness 1) The school-level implementation plan of 
performance pay lacked the voice from the front-
line teachers. 
2) The school-level performance pay favored those in 
administrative positions.  
3) Teachers’ original payment was used as an 
incentive in performance pay.  
4) The fundamentally uniform standards of the 
performance pay plan were lacking within the 
school district. 
Demotivating 1) The amount of performance pay was too small to 
motivate teachers. 
2) Teacher performance pay caused conflicts among 
colleagues. 
3) Teacher performance pay increased “teaching to the 
test” practice. 
4) For maintaining collective benefits and harmony, 
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Problematic implementation process. The category of “Problematic 
Implementation Process” included the problems that arose during the implementation of 
performance pay at the school level. Four themes emerged under this category:  
The first problem identified was that teachers were not well informed of the 
implementation plan. It was worth noting that seven out of 14 interviewees with 
administrative duties stated that they understood the teacher performance policy included 
indicators and distribution plans, while the other seven teachers (those without 
administrative duties) reported they only had a rough understanding regarding teacher 
performance pay policy and its indicators. Some teachers commented that they “just 
know the general idea, not the specific details.” However, not all seven teachers with 
administrative duties were confident about their understanding of the policy when they 
were asked to introduce their school plan of teacher performance pay. Some of them 
continuously corrected their responses regarding the indicators and design of teacher 
performance pay during interviews, which suggests their vague knowledge about the 
school plan of performance pay.  
Additionally, only four of the total 14 interviewed teachers shared artifacts of 
teacher performance pay (evidence of performance evaluation and performance pay at 
schools) during or after interviews. The explanations provided by the teachers who did 
not share artifacts suggests that teachers had limited access to the evaluation or 
performance pay plans and they were not familiar with them. Two teachers who provided 
their own salary schemes expressed uncertainty when they introduced the details of their 
salary schemes. One of them found it was hard to differentiate categories within 
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performance pay by the confusing titles, such as “basic performance pay,” “rewarding 
performance pay,” and “subsidy of reform.”  
The second theme under this category was that the implementation plan of 
performance pay was not transparent to teachers. Some teachers thought manipulations 
were involved in the implementation process, which were unfair to them. The theme was 
supported by comments from three teachers: 
“Even for me, a math teacher, I couldn’t understand the plan of performance pay. 
The HR representative just read the whole plan, involving figures and formula, in 
the meeting. I felt the administrators don’t want teachers to fully understand the 
plan in case you might have opinions. They tried to confuse teachers.” 
“The administrators explained the plan of performance pay in school meetings, 
but the reality is different from what they said. And teachers were always 
confused about their performance pay.” 
“We used to have a piece of paper indicating the salary structure, so that we 
know how much we got for each category. But now, everything is electronic, and 
our monthly salary is only a number in the bank account. We don’t know what 
was included. Even though you may check with the HR person, no one would 
bother to do that as long as you didn't find [the amount of] your salary was too 
weird this month.” 
The third theme is that the indicators of teacher performance pay were simplified, 
failing to reflect the complexity of teachers’ work. Although the national policy 
advocated that it was forbidden to use students’ test score as the only indicator to 
evaluate teachers’ performance, some interviewed teachers still perceived that indicators 
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of teacher performance pay were oversimplified and, in most circumstances, students’ 
enrollment achievement was used as the only indicator for distributing teachers’ 
performance pay. Besides students’ enrollment achievements, attendance and teaching 
loads were the other two most frequently used indicators in teacher performance pay 
because of the quantifiable characteristics. A teacher stated, “Teaching is a complicated 
process and the quantifiable indicators, such as teaching load and students achievement 
restricted the range of teaching effects.” 
Some interviewed teachers reported that, from the perspective of administrators, 
teacher performance pay has done a good job reflecting teachers’ performance in both 
quantity and quality. However, from the interviewed teachers’ perspective, indicators of 
“quantity” and “quality” were unreasonable. For instance, the quantity of teacher 
performance was simply calculated by whether teachers had absences or sick leave and 
the total teaching loads per week, while students’ test scores demonstrated the quality of 
teacher performance. None of interviewed teachers reported that they ever had classroom 
observation or professional knowledge tests for performance evaluations. Only one 
elementary teacher mentioned that novice teachers were required to be observed by 
experienced teachers for improving instructional skills, which was unrelated to the 
performance pay.   
The fourth theme—“Teacher performance pay failed to differentiate teachers 
based on their effectiveness and responsibilities” —suggested a problem associated with 
the function of the performance pay. Multiple causes, encompassing previous themes, 
resulted in this problem. Especially, the third theme—the oversimplified indicators failed 
to reflect the sophistication of teachers’ work—was the direct cause. Admittedly, the 
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initial cause of this problem was the limited funding for the teacher performance pay, 
which made it difficult to craft a versatile plan showing distinguished differences among 
teachers. The other reason reported by interviewed teachers was the “egalitarian” 
philosophy school administrators held. In some schools, administrators were afraid of 
conflicts that might be triggered by the prominently diverged performance pay; therefore, 
they purposefully minimized the disparities of performance pay among teachers. This 
egalitarianism demotivated the effective teachers or hard-working teachers who deserved 
more performance pay than the ineffective teachers or regular teachers.  
The categories of “Unfairness,” and “Demotivating” captured the problems 
pertaining the impacts of implementing performance pay as perceived by participating 
teachers.  
Unfairness. The participating teachers perceptions of “unfairness” can be grouped 
into the following four themes.  
1) The school-level implementation plan of performance pay lacked the voice 
from the front-line teachers. According to teachers’ responses, the absence of the front-
line teachers’ participation in the decision-making of the school-level teacher 
performance pay plan was a result of both the centralized school administrative system 
and teachers’ passive position in school decision-making process. Several teachers 
commented: 
“School had meetings and administrators said teachers’ suggestions were 
welcomed, but none of teachers’ suggestions have ever been taken.” 
“Performance pay is a school-level thing, all decisions were made by 
administrators.” 
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“Teachers are afraid of expressing opinions because we don’t have democracy in 
China.”  
“Teachers have no power to control it, so just let it be, especially for young 
teachers.” 
“Public school is an organization where you could stay without great 
contribution, as long as you don’t challenge school administrators”.  
2) The school-level performance pay favored administrative positions. Some 
interviewed teachers felt this was unfair because they perceived their work was more 
challenging than the administrators’. Additionally, some teachers had the opinion that 
teacher performance pay should focus on teachers’ teaching, but not the administrative 
work because it was called “teacher performance pay.” Even though some administrators 
had multiple duties, including teaching, their effort in teaching was not as much as the 
full-time teachers’. Other interviewed teachers perceived that some administrators had 
multiple positions, but not every position required full effort. These teachers shared the 
opinion that a person’s time and energy is limited. They doubted that administrators who 
had multiple duties could accomplish well all the associated work. In some 
circumstances, administrators only used the titles of their duties to claim the performance 
pay without doing any substantial work. Therefore, teachers felt it was unfair when the 
performance pay put high values on administrative titles but failed to give enough credits 
for front-line teachers’ invisible work, especially banzhurens’.  
3) Teachers’ original salary was treated as an incentive in the performance pay 
structure. Two teachers shared their concerns: 
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“It is unfair to use what originally belonged to us as incentives. If you don’t teach 
core subjects and you’re not a banzhuren with different administrative titles, you 
cannot obtain the full-amount of the incentive even though you do the same work 
as before.” 
“It’s unreasonable to use our money to reward us. If it is called performance pay, 
there should be extra funding to reward good performance. Otherwise, how could 
teachers be motivated by taking their money from one pocket and putting only 
part of it into the other one?” 
4) The performance pay plan was lacking fundamentally uniform standards within 
the school district. Several interviewed teachers admitted that they and their colleagues 
frequently discussed the salary issue with teachers from other schools in Panda School 
District. Through comparison, teachers felt it was unfair when they found that teachers 
with similar backgrounds and working loads at different schools obtained different 
performance pay due to the different evaluation standards and performance plans used by 
individual schools. One teacher commented: 
“Within one school district, there should be some uniformed standards. It is 
unfair that our performance pay is based on professional ranking while that of 
other schools is based on teaching load.” 
Demotivating. Both the surveyed and interviewed teachers perceived the 
implementation of performance pay demotivated them, which was contrary to its original 
goal. Three main themes emerged under the “Demotivate Teachers” category.  
1) The amount of performance pay was too small to motivate teachers. Some 
interviewed teachers perceived that the performance pay in their salary scheme was too 
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low, so that they “lost passion and interest in working.” They thought the low amount of 
performance pay was not worth their extra effort, because “the extra effort doesn’t make 
a difference in the salary,” especially for experienced teachers with high professional 
ranking whose basic salary was a major part of their salary scheme. However, young 
teachers who tried to earn more in performance pay by making extra effort and taking 
more responsibilities to make up their disadvantages in the basic salary were demotivated 
because the amount of performance pay was too low no matter how hard they tried. 
Furthermore, young teachers were more likely to turnover or even quit the teaching 
profession because, as one teacher shared, “Due to the low amount of performance pay 
and the unfair implementation plan, teachers lost passion and interest in working.” 
Additionally, teachers felt demotivated when comparing their salary with that of 
other professionals. Local governmental officials’ salaries were frequently used for 
comparison with teachers’ due to the similar organizational characteristics of public 
sectors and the advocacy of national policy that teachers’ salary should not be lower than 
local governmental officials’. Many teachers felt demotivated that their salary and end-
of-year bonus were lower than the governmental officials’. One teacher shared: 
“Teachers’ work is much more energy-consuming than governmental officials, 
but teachers’ performance pay is lower than theirs, even though the national 
policy has advocated to treat teachers equally as governmental officials.” 
Some teachers perceived that the low performance pay associated with the 
universal low teacher salary failed to satisfy their middle-class living requirements. They 
thought teacher deserved a “decent” and “respectful” life, equal to their effort and social 
class. However, the low salary—including the low performance pay—failed to recognize 
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teachers’ hard work and contribution. Among the issues of the performance pay 
implementation, how much the salary could be increased was what concerned teachers 
the most. Some interviewed teachers admitted that they secretly found other sources 
outside school to earn money, such as being private tutors or teaching at after-class 
tutorial schools, accepting the risking of being fired if schools found out.  
Even though teachers felt demotivated by the low amount of performance pay, 
they thought the implementation of performance pay had no impact on their teaching and 
working because they had high professional ethics. Even if they felt disappointed, they 
still endeavored to teach students as usual. However, some teachers also admitted they 
had doubts about the persistence of their work ethic. Two teachers shared: 
“How long can my passion and spirit of altruism sustain? In many situations, 
when you feel tired, you can’t help thinking whether my endeavor was worthy. 
Teachers always think about it.” 
“In many situations, teachers, especially banzhurens, contribute a lot based on 
their unselfish spirit and the sense of responsibility without complaint and without 
recognitions from the school, but they still do their work all the time. But, it is 
unfair and unreasonable to compensate teachers’ sense of responsibility with 
such low payment.” 
2) The performance pay caused conflicts among colleagues. Some teachers found 
that the unfair and nontransparent performance pay caused conflicts among colleagues, 
even though the conflicts were not shown in public. Also, some teachers felt pressure 
from the competition and conflicts caused by the performance pay, which negatively 
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influenced their job satisfaction and mental health. They felt “both physically and 
mentally tired.”  
3) The performance pay pressured teachers to teach to the test. Several 
interviewed teachers reported that the test-score-driven teacher performance pay 
unintentionally “forced” teachers to teach to test. Several interviewed teachers had the 
philosophy that education should foster students’ well-rounded development, but in the 
meantime teachers were urged to put emphasis on students’ test scores in order to gain 
higher performance pay.  
  4) For maintaining collective benefits and harmonic school culture, the teacher 
performance pay failed to reward good performance. Two teachers’ comments 
exemplified this theme: 
“In our school, teacher performance pay did not make a difference. I don’t want 
to say it’s useless, but it is in that way. For maintaining harmony, it’s hard to 
reform thoroughly. Our school leaders were afraid of conflicts, so they just made 
everyone equal, which was meaningless to teachers. For those hardworking 
teachers, that’s unfair and demotivating.” 
“For the good of the whole, the benefits of a small number of teachers, especially 
expert teachers and banzhurens, were sacrificed. Usually, principals talked with 
these teachers privately and persuaded them to accept the reality and teachers 
had no options other than agreeing.” 
In the process, the goal of performance pay was shifted from motivating the 
individual teacher to equalizing teachers’ payment, which teachers felt demotivated.  
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Findings for Research Question 3: 
What are Chinese teachers’ perceptions, in Yunnan Province, toward performance 
evaluation measures? 
Both quantitative and qualitative results provided answers to this research 
question. Quantitative results showed teacher preferences on 15 generic performance 
evaluation measures. Qualitative results indicated the most important dimension(s) of 
performance evaluation perceived by participating teachers according to their school 
performance evaluation plan and the reasons associated with their preferences. 
Additionally, three themes of participating teachers’ perceptions toward performance 
evaluation were generated.  
Quantitative results. The sample size, means and standard deviations for each of 
the 15 items pertaining to teachers’ preferences toward performance evaluation measures 
are shown in Table 13, with means ranked in descending order. Participating teachers 
selected “serving as banzhuren, or on other duties,” “students’ test scores,” and 
“performance evaluations by principals” as the top three measures in teacher performance 
evaluation. “banhuren” is similar to the advisor and the counselor in schools in the U.S. 
Teachers who are banzhurens usually working longer hours and taking more 
responsibilities, including monitoring and advising students, and contacting with parents, 
than teachers who are not banzhurens. The bottom three measures selected by 
participating teachers were “performance evaluations by peers,” “awards certifications”, 
and “independent evaluation of teaching portfolios.” 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to test the statistical 
difference among the 15 ranked items. Given the significant result of the Mauchly’s test, 
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c2(104) =1471.533, p= .000, which indicated the violation of the assumption of 
sphericity, and the Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of sphericity (e=.562), which is smaller 
than .75, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used to interpret the result of within-
subject effects (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014). A statistically significant repeated measures 
ANOVA was obtained, Greenhouse-Geisser correction = 176.919, F(7.865, 2611.019) = 
25.014, p=.000, eta square is .07 (see Table 14). It shows that the 15 items are statistically 
different from each other. 
Table 13 
Means and Standard Deviations for Each Item of Teachers’ Preferences Toward 
Performance Evaluation Measures  
 
Item M SD 
Serving as banzhuren, or on other duties 4.03 0.82 
Students’ test scores 3.88 0.91 
Performance evaluations by principals 3.80 0.89 
Time spent in professional development 3.79 0.82 
Collaboration with peers and staff 3.62 0.79 
Efforts to involve parents in students’ education 3.62 0.84 
Teaching in specific subject 3.59 1.02 
Mentoring other teachers 3.57 0.80 
Working with students outside of class time 3.57 0.90 
Student evaluations of teaching performance 3.57 0.72 
Parent satisfaction with teacher 3.56 0.73 
Highest academic qualification degree 3.50 1.03 
Performance evaluations by peers 3.37 0.84 
Awards certifications 3.37 0.86 
Independent evaluation of teaching portfolios 3.34 0.81 
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Table 14 
 
Test of Within-Subject Effects of 15 Items of Teachers’ Preferences Toward Performance 
Evaluation Measures 
 









Assumed 176.919 14 12.637 25.014 .000 .070 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 176.919 7.865 22.496 25.014 .000 .070 
Huynh-Feldt 176.919 8.073 21.914 25.014 .000 .070 




Assumed 2348.181 4648 .505    
Greenhouse-
Geisser 2348.181 2611.019 .899    
Huynh-Feldt 2348.181 2680.377 .876    Lower-bound 2348.181 332.000 7.073    
 
As shown in Table 15, the pairwise comparisons among the first and the last three 
items suggested that the first three items chosen by participating teachers were 
statistically different from the bottom three ones, respectively. Similarly, the bottom three 
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Table 15 
 
Pairwise Comparisons of the Top Three and the Bottom Three Items Regarding 
Teachers’ Preferences Toward Performance Evaluation Measures 
 
















or on other 
duties 
Students’ test scores .150 .047 .021 .012 .288 
Performance evaluations by principals .233 .071 .018 .022 .444 
Performance evaluations by peers .661* .059 .000 .485 .836 
Awards certifications .664* .053 .000 .506 .822 
Independent evaluation of teaching 
portfolios .697
* .057 .000 .528 .865 
Students’ 
test scores 
Serving as banzhuren, or on other duties -.150 .047 .021 -.288 -.012 
Performance evaluations by principals .083 .068 1.000 -.118 .284 
Performance evaluations by peers .511* .061 .000 .332 .690 
Awards certifications .514* .061 .000 .332 .695 
Independent evaluation of teaching 
portfolios .547




Serving as banzhuren, or on other duties -.233 .071 .018 -.444 -.022 
Students’ test scores -.083 .068 1.000 -.284 .118 
Performance evaluations by peers .428* .057 .000 .258 .598 
Awards certifications .431* .068 .000 .230 .632 
Independent evaluation of teaching 
portfolios .464




Serving as banzhuren, or on other duties -.661* .059 .000 -.836 -.485 
Students’ test scores -.511* .061 .000 -.690 -.332 
Performance evaluations by principals -.428* .057 .000 -.598 -.258 
Awards certifications .003 .050 1.000 -.143 .149 
Independent evaluation of teaching 
portfolios .036 .036 1.000 -.071 .143 
Awards 
certifications 
Serving as banzhuren, or on other duties -.664* .053 .000 -.822 -.506 
Students’ test scores -.514* .061 .000 -.695 -.332 
Performance evaluations by principals -.431* .068 .000 -.632 -.230 
Performance evaluations by peers -.003 .050 1.000 -.149 .143 
Independent evaluation of teaching 





Serving as banzhuren, or on other duties -.697* .057 .000 -.865 -.528 
Students’ test scores -.547* .059 .000 -.720 -.373 
Performance evaluations by principals -.464* .060 .000 -.640 -.288 
Awards certifications -.036 .036 1.000 -.143 .071 
Independent evaluation of teaching 
portfolios -.033 .045 1.000 -.167 .101 
Note. * p =.000. a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
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Qualitative results. Survey participants provided short answers to the question 
regarding the most important aspects/indicators of performance evaluation (e.g., teachers’ 
ethics, professional ranking, education degree, teaching experience, working load, 
teaching process, and student’s achievement) and the associated reasons. The findings 
revealed that surveyed teachers mentioned most frequently “ethics,” “working load,” and 
“teaching practice.” Teachers who chose “ethics” regarded ethics to be the fundamental 
quality of being a teacher. They believed that a teacher’s ethics had a great impact on 
students because a teacher is a role model for students in daily teaching practice. 
Additionally, some surveyed teachers thought teachers’ ethics were the basis for building 
up a nation’s overall morality. It is closely related to both the personal and the national 
interest. Surveyed teachers who chose “working load” and “teaching process” thought the 
two indicators reflected teachers’ working performance in quantity and quality, 
respectively. Two representative statements made by the teachers were: 
“Teaching process represents the comprehensive working process.” 
“Some of teachers’ work is invisible, but the working load could reflect how much 
we’ve done in some degree.” 
Some teachers also stated that all the indicators were important, but they admitted 
that not all the indicators were quantifiable. Only the quantifiable indicators (e.g., 
professional ranking and administrative duties) were frequently used to evaluate teachers’ 
performance.  
During interviews, all 14 teachers provided their understanding of the indicators 
that were used to evaluate their performance and their opinions regarding performance 
evaluation. Two teachers shared their school-level performance evaluation plan. 
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Generally speaking, “ethics,” “competence,” “attendance,” and “effectiveness” were the 
four major parts of performance evaluation emphasized by school administrators. The 
specific evaluation indicators under each category and the corresponding percentage were 
different across schools, but the universal indicators mentioned by interviewed teachers 
are summarized in Table 16.  
Table 16 
Summaries of Teacher Performance Evaluation Categories and Indicators 
Categories Indicators 
Ethics  • Obeying school rules and regulations 






• Teaching practice  
o Planning instruction 
o Delivering instruction 
o Classroom observation 
o Assessment of student learning 
• Professional development (training)  
• Banzhuren work 
• Administrative duties 
Attendance • Daily attendance 
• Basic teaching load per week 
• Extra-curricular activities 
Effectiveness • Students’ academic achievements (ranking) 
• Publications  
Extra credits • Awards in teaching or researching  
• Distinctive contribution  
 
According to teachers’ responses, the full credits in “ethics” and “attendance” 
were default values if a teacher had not broken any laws or rules and had no record of 
absence or tardiness. In most circumstances, the full credits for “teaching practice” were 
also a default value if teachers had no teaching accident (e.g., absence without notice, late 
attendance and early dismiss) or lawsuit from students or parents, even though the 
indicators of teaching practice (e.g., instruction planning, delivering, and assessment for 
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students) were specified in the evaluation plans and were expected to be part of the 
evaluation. Student achievement was frequently used as the indicator for teachers’ 
teaching quality or effectiveness in terms of the class rank among the cohort within and 
across schools. Some teachers were concerned about using “publication” in performance 
evaluation because they thought putting high values on publications would distract 
teachers’ attention from teaching and publications cannot demonstrate actual classroom 
performance.  
Based on teachers’ responses, the following three themes emerged, which were 
associated with teachers’ perceptions toward the implementation of performance 
evaluation.  
1) Teacher performance evaluation was more summative than formative, 
mainly serving the purpose of accrediting teachers’ professional ranking. Some 
interviewed teachers demonstrated this point by stating: 
“Performance evaluation is just an expression used by administrators; there is no 
substantial evaluation at school. We have evaluation for administrators’ work, 
but no formal evaluation for teachers.” 
“It is a common sense that teachers who need evaluation results to upgrade the 
professional ranking are usually evaluated as ‘excellent.’ Teachers’ professional 
ranking is important in teachers’ professional development. We usually take turns 
to be ‘excellent’ because it is fairer to every teacher and each teacher’s condition 
could be considered.”  
2) Teacher performance evaluation lacked uniform and specific standards and 
rubrics. Regarding this point, some interviewed teachers expressed their perceptions as: 
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“Each school’s evaluation is different. In my school, I found the evaluation is 
non-transparent. I don’t know what is linked with my performance results and the 
performance incentive.” 
“I think the specific standards are important for teachers, so that the results or 
the incentives could differentiate teachers’ performance. If the evaluation 
[doesn’t] differentiate teachers’ performance, I think it is useless. A complete 
plan should be able to represent the subject’s characteristics; teachers’ working 
load, both in class and after class; and students’ academic achievement. All the 
details should be taken into consideration.” 
3) The process of teacher performance evaluation was simplified to focus on 
limited quantifiable indicators that are biased and problematic. Teachers’ attendance 
record, administrative titles, student test score were the frequently used indicators, which 
were quantifiable, but failed to fully represent teachers’ performance.  Some illustrative 
comments by the interviewed teachers are:  
“Student achievement is a biased indicator in teacher evaluation. In some 
circumstances, students’ testing scores fail to reflect teachers’ effort in a short 
period. Additionally, we don’t have tests for students every month, but teachers’ 
salary should be distributed monthly. We can’t evaluate students monthly and use 
the results to evaluate teachers. So, it is unfair to use students’ academic 
achievement to evaluate teachers.” 
“Now, our evaluation is mainly based on attendance and students’ test scores. It 
seems like the evaluation includes both teaching quantity and quality, but 
substantially, as we all know, it does not.” 
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“Why are administrative duties…included in teacher performance evaluation? 
Why didn’t schools…make an additional plan for administrative duties? It should 
not be mixed up with teachers’ teaching performance. Teachers’ performance 
evaluation should be just about teaching.” 
Findings for Research Question 4: 
What factors emerge from a perception survey of participating teachers regarding 
performance pay and teacher evaluation?  
Principal component analysis. The Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was 
conducted with all 63 items of the questionnaire. The validity of PCA is contingent on 
sample size. Regarding sample size, Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) have suggested that 
factor analysis should have at least 300 cases in total. Stevens (1996) indicated that 
including 5-20 participants per variable is an appropriate way to determine sample size. 
Based on these guidelines, the sample size (N = 333) was large enough for conducting 
factor analysis. Initially, the question regarding whether the PCA was appropriate for the 
scale was examined by the following criteria. First, 61 of the 63 items correlated at least 
.30 with at least one other item, indicating reasonable factorability. Second, the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was .91, which is above the 
recommended value of .6. Additionally, the Bartlett’s test was statistically significant for 
the data, c2 (1953) = 13226.65, p < .001. Therefore, given these overall conditions, PCA 
was considered appropriate for the scale.  
Factors. Thirteen factors/components were extracted by the initial PCA with 
promax rotation, explaining 67.11% of the variance. I chose promax rotation because 
correlation between items existed and correlation between factors was hypothesized. The 
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results of the initial PCA indicated low to medium correlations among the extracted 
factors, which further indicated that the promax rotation was reasonable. The Cronbach’s 
alpha internal consistency reliability coefficient of the overall scale was .95. Three 
methods were used to determine how many factors should be retained for further 
interpretation.  
First is the Kaiser’s eigenvalue-greater-than-one rule: factors with eigenvalues 
greater than one were retained for interpretation (Ledesma & Valero-Mora, 2007). 
According to this rule, 13 factors should be retained in the analysis. However, this rule 
was critiqued as problematic for retaining too many factors because “the number of 
eigenvalues greater than 1.0 is highly influenced by the number of variables” (Reise, 
Waller, & Comrey, 2000, p. 291).  Due to the critique, other methods were used.  
The second method is the Cattell’s scree plot test. As shown in Figure 6, the first 
six factors should be retained because the line leveled off at the point of the sixth factor. 
However, this rule involves subjective judgment, which is not completely accurate.  
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Figure 6. Scree plot of initial principal component analysis 
 
Third, the Horn’s parallel analysis was conducted using the syntax of O’Connor 
(2000). By comparing the raw data eigenvalues with the mean and the 95th percentile 
random data eigenvalues, the first seven factors should be retained for interpretation, 
because the observed (raw data) eigenvalue for each factor was larger than the 
corresponding 95th percentile random data eigenvalue (Ledesma & Valero-Mora, 2007; 
see Table 17). Figure 7 presents the scree plot for the results of the parallel analysis, 
showing that seven factors were above the mean and should be retained. Because the 
parallel analysis is regarded as the best available alternative, providing the most accurate 
approach for solving the number-of-factors-to-retain problem for the PCA (Henson & 
Roberts, 2006; Ledesma & Valero-Mora, 2007), the first seven factors were retained for 
interpretation, which explained 55.18% of the variance. The proportion of total variance 
explained by the seven-factor model was greater than the average proportion in factor 
analysis, which was 52.03% (Henson & Roberts, 2006).  
  114 
Table 17  
Raw Data Eigenvalues, Mean, and Percentile Random Data Eigenvalues for 10 Roots 
Generated by Parallel Analysis 
 
Root         Raw Data          Means        Percentile 
1                 16.60                1.98             2.06 
2                 5.55                  1.89             1.96 
3                 3.78                  1.83             1.88 
4                 2.67                  1.77             1.82 
5                 2.34                  1.72             1.77 
6                 2.02                  1.67             1.72 
7                 1.81                  1.63             1.67 
8                 1.57                  1.59             1.63 
9                 1.41                  1.56             1.59 
10               1.28                  1.52             1.55 
Note. N= 333; 63 variables; 1000 datasets. 
 
Figure 7. Scree plot of parallel analysis  
 
Loadings. Due to the circumstances of zero loading and cross loadings of items 
on factors, two rules were applied for the item screening. First, .40 was arbitrarily chosen 
as a cut-off point for interpreting loadings. If an item had a loading of <.40 on any of the 
factors, the item was eliminated. Second, in the circumstance of cross loading, “an item is 
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retained if its primary loading is greater than .5-.6 and, also if its second highest factor 
loading is smaller than .2-.3” (Matsunaga, 2010, p. 101). Given the rules, a total of 16 
items (Q5, Q6, Q12, Q13, Q14, Q17, Q26, Q27, Q35, Q45, Q46, Q48, M4, M5, M12, 
M15) were eliminated from the item pool.  
Final PCA results. A final PCA of the remaining 47 items, using promax 
rotations, was conducted with the seven factors explaining 58.40% of the variance (see 
Table 18). The KMO measure of sampling adequacy was .90, and the Bartlett’s test was 
statistically significant for the data, c2 (1081) = 8791.54, p < .001. The Cronbach’s alpha 
internal consistency reliability coefficient of the updated scale (47 items) was .93. The 
results suggested low to medium correlation among the extracted factors, as shown in 
Table 19.  
Table 18 
Total Variance Explained by Seven Factors Extracted from PCA with Promax Rotation 
 
















1 12.41 26.41 26.41 12.41 26.41 26.41 10.52 
2 4.14 8.81 35.23 4.14 8.81 35.23 8.50 
3 3.29 7.01 42.23 3.29 7.01 42.23 4.67 
4 2.39 5.08 47.31 2.39 5.08 47.31 7.27 
5 2.14 4.56 51.87 2.14 4.56 51.87 6.65 
6 1.58 3.35 55.22 1.58 3.35 55.22 3.48 
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Table 19 
 
Component Correlation Matrix Extracted by PCA with Promax Rotation 
 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 1.000 .546 .213 .478 .555 .255 .347 
2 .546 1.000 .130 .522 .373 .133 .382 
3 .213 .130 1.000 .154 .074 .179 .213 
4 .478 .522 .154 1.000 .448 .111 .319 
5 .555 .373 .074 .448 1.000 .173 .159 
6 .255 .133 .179 .111 .173 1.000 .127 
7 .347 .382 .213 .319 .159 .127 1.000 
 
Based on the items and the corresponding loadings on the factors, the seven 
factors were labeled as collaboration and effectiveness, pressure and turnover, 
collaborative measures, policy and structure, motivation and satisfaction, input-based 
measures, and mixed measures. Among the factors, collaboration and effectiveness, 
pressure and turnover, policy and structure, and motivation and satisfaction focused on 
teachers’ perceptions towards performance pay, while collaborative measures, input-
based measures, and mixed measures concentrated on teachers’ perceptions of 
performance evaluation measures. The names of four factors regarding teachers’ 
perceptions toward performance pay were decided by the high-loading items contained 
within each factor, which indicated particular dimensions of teachers’ perceived impact 
of performance pay. Labels for the three factors focusing on teachers’ perceptions toward 
performance evaluation measures were adapted from S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016), although 
the items underneath each factor were not completely the same as in S. Liu, Zhao, et al. 
(2016). The specific discussion regarding the comparisons of factors across two different 
studies are presented in Chapter 5. Figure 8 shows the final factors extracted through 
PCA using three methods and the associated statistics (number of items, the reliability 
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coefficient, the explained variance for each factor). The factor loading matrix (pattern 
matrix) of the seven-factor model is presented in Table 20, together with communalities 
of each item, the number of items contained in each factor, the Cronbach’s alpha values 
for each factor and the variance explained by each one. 
The Cronbach’s alpha values for each factor (subscale) were .93, .84, .87, .84, .76, 
.68, and .50, respectively. The Cronbach’s alpha values of .50 indicated poor internal 
consistency of the subscale (Gliem & Gliem, 2003), but the possible reasons might be the 
small number of items (6) in the subscale and different question types for the items. 
Different from the other factors, mixed measures included items across two parts of the 
scale. Four items regarding teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay were loaded on 
this factor along with two items of performance evaluation measures. However, the four 
items were also associated with performance evaluation indicating multiple sources of 
teacher performance evaluation; therefore, the factor was retained. Additionally, each 
factor’s alpha value was basically aligned with its percentage of explained variance, 
which was in descending order from the first factor to the seventh. 
 
Figure 8. Factors generated through principal component analysis with the number of  
items, the reliability coefficient and the explained variance for each factor   
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Table 20  
Factor Loadings and Communalities Based on a Principal Component Analysis with Promax Rotation for 46 Items 
from the Survey of Chinese Teachers' Perceptions of Performance Pay (N=333) 
 
Item CE PT CM PS MS IM MM h2 
I have a clear understanding regarding teacher performance 
pay at my school.    0.84    0.66 
I know about the composition of my total salary.    0.95    0.73 
I clearly understand about working duties associated with 
my payment.    0.91    0.73 
I clearly understand the performance evaluation rubrics 
associated with my payment.    0.87    0.76 
I support teacher performance pay at my school.       0.44 0.62 
I fully understand the national policy of performance pay at 
compulsory schools.    0.47    0.37 
According to national policy, 70% of payment is due to 
basic duties and 30% is incentive payment, and I think it is 
reasonable.       0.51 0.56 
After teacher performance pay reform, I think my payment 
is higher than local governmental officials.     0.46   0.46 
I am satisfied with the policy of teacher performance pay.      0.43   0.61 
Teacher performance pay at my school is based on teacher 
performance evaluation.       0.44 0.60 
For obtaining incentive payment, I will change or have 
already changed my teaching methods.     0.75   0.45 
Teacher performance pay will motivate teachers to work 
harder for obtaining higher payment.     0.87   0.55 
Teacher performance pay is not a long-term policy, so 
teachers are pessimistic about its long-lasting results.   0.50      0.27 
Implementing teacher performance pay can retain effective 
teachers.     0.63   0.66 
Implementing teacher performance pay can attract more 
excellent teachers.     0.59   0.66 
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Item CE PT CM PS MS IM MM h2 
Teacher performance pay at my school can effectively 
identify effective teachers. 0.54       0.60 
Teachers have strong objection towards teacher 
performance pay at my school.  0.67      0.56 
Teacher performance pay at my school has negative 
influence on school culture and colleague relationship.   0.81      0.64 
Implementing teacher performance pay disturbs teachers’ 
collaboration.    0.84      0.61 
Teacher performance pay at my school can improve 
students’ academic achievement.  0.76       0.63 
After implementing teacher performance pay, teachers’ job 
satisfaction is improved. 0.67       0.65 
After implementing teacher performance pay, teachers have 
more pressure than before.  0.61      0.38 
Prior to the policy, I prefer how school is operating now.  0.59       0.64 
I always want to transfer to the other schools after 
implementing teacher performance pay.  0.61      0.57 
After implementing teacher performance pay, teachers at 
my school have more passion in working. 0.71       0.62 
If there is a chance, I want to change my job.  0.62      0.47 
After implementing teacher performance pay, I want to 
become a better teacher due to the collaborative culture 
encouraged by my school. 0.52       0.56 
After implementing teacher performance pay, I feel 
supported from the other teachers. 1.03       0.70 
After implementing teacher performance pay, teachers at 
my school prefer competition rather than collaboration.  0.72      0.47 
After implementing teacher performance pay, teachers at 
my school do not trust each other any more.  0.71      0.53 
After implementing teacher performance pay, teachers at 
my school feel they have responsibility to try the best to 
help each other.  0.89       0.67 
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Item CE PT CM PS MS IM MM h2 
After implementing teacher performance pay, teachers at 
my school encourage students to keep trying when they 
come across challenging academic questions. 
 
0.88       
 
0.64 
After implementing teacher performance pay, teachers at 
my school always help each other, even if it’s not their 
duty. 0.94       0.72 
The school administrators decide my payment based on 
teacher performance evaluation with reliable information of 
my performance. 0.54       0.67 
After implementing teacher performance pay, my school 
principal tends to award teachers who show loyalty to him 
or her.  0.50      0.58 
My school principal fully knows my performance.         0.41 0.50 
Highest academic qualification degree       -0.58 0.49 
Students’ test scores      0.69  0.57 
Performance evaluations by principals       -0.68 0.41 
Student evaluations of teaching performance   0.83     0.70 
Collaboration with peers and staff   0.75     0.68 
Efforts to involve parents in students’ education   0.81     0.70 
Awards certifications   0.57     0.42 
Parent satisfaction with teacher   0.75     0.68 
Teaching in specific subject      0.66  0.49 
Serving as Banzhuren, or other duties      0.65  0.60 
Mentoring other teachers   0.63     0.67 
Number of items per factor 11 10 6 5 6 3 6  
Alpha 0.93 0.84 0.87 0.84 0.76 0.68 0.5  
% of variance 26.41 8.81 7.01 5.08 4.56 3.35 3.17  
Note. CE=Collaboration and Effectiveness; PT=Pressure and Turnover; CM=Collaborative Measures;   
PS=Policy and Structure; MS=Motivation and Satisfaction; IM=Input-based Measures; MM=Mixed Measures; h2=communality.
  121 
Mixed measures, as the seventh factor, only explained 3.17% of the variance, so the 
associated alpha was the lowest.  
It is interesting to note that the loadings for items of evaluation measures were 
negative while the loadings for items of performance pay were positive, indicating 
negative correlations among the items and between the factor and the items with negative 
loadings. For example, the negative relationship between “performance evaluations by 
principals (-0.68)” and “my school principal fully knows my performance (0.41)” 
suggests that if the school principals fully know teachers’ performance, teachers are less 
likely to choose “performance evaluation by principals” in performance evaluation. The 
positive relationship between “I support teacher performance pay at my school (0.44)” 
and “my school principal fully knows my performance (0.41)” shows that if the school 
principals fully know teachers’ performance, teachers are more likely to support the 
school-based performance pay.  
Findings for Research Question 5: 
Are there differences in the perceptions of participants toward performance pay 
based on selected characteristics of teachers (gender, teaching experience, teacher 
type, and teachers’ professional ranking) and schools (school level and school 
rank)? 
MANOVAs. Multiple one-way multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) 
was used to explore the research question because MANOVA is a statistical technique for 
comparing the mean differences among different groups when more than one correlated 
dependent variable is involved. In the analysis, four dependent variables (collaboration 
and effectiveness, pressure and turnover, policy and structure, motivation and 
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satisfaction) were the extracted factor scores computed with regression technique during 
the PCA. One predictor (from selected characteristics of teachers and schools) with 
multiple comparison groups was entered into the analysis each time for testing the 
differences in teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay based on the specific 
characteristics of teachers and schools. The selected characteristics of teachers and 
schools included: gender, teaching experience, teacher type, teachers’ professional 
ranking, school level, and school rank. 
All four dependent variables were normally distributed such that the range of 
skewness and kurtosis values were within -2 and 2. The histogram of each dependent 
variable also provided the visual evidence of normal distributions. Boxplots were used to 
check outliers of each dependent variable. Several mild outliers (n < 5) were found with 
each variable, but due to the large sample size and the normal distribution of each 
variable, mild outliers were retained. 
Box’s M tests were used to test homogeneity of the covariance for each 
MANOVA. The significant results indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of the 
covariance matrix was violated for all predictors (gender, teaching experience, teacher 
type, and teachers’ professional ranking, school level, and school rank). Additionally, for 
each predictor, the sample size of each group was unequal. Attributed to these, the tests 
might lose some robustness, even though the total sample size was large. Therefore, the 
values of Pillai’s Trace, the most conservative among the available analysis techniques, 
were used to interpret the results of MANOVAs. Table 21 shows the MANOVA results 
of teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay by the characteristics of teachers’ 
gender, teaching experience, teacher type, professional ranking, school level, and school 
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rank. The descriptive statistics and follow-up statistical analysis results for each predictor 
was presented below.  
Table 21 
 
MANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions toward Performance Pay Based on Selected 
Characteristics of Teachers and Schools 
 
Variables Value of 
Pillai’s 
Trace  
   F Hypothesis 
df 
Error df Sig. Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Gender .025 2.111 4 328 .79 .025 
Teaching 
Experience 
.105 2.179 16 1296 .005* .026 
Teacher 
Type 




.171 7.683 12 960 .001* .035 
School 
Level 
.039 3.346 4 328 .011* .039 
School Rank .171 7.683 8 656 .000** .086 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
 
Gender. The descriptive statistics of teachers’ perceptions toward performance 
pay based on teachers’ gender are documented in Table 22. A one-way MANOVA was 
conducted to test the hypothesis that there would be one or more mean differences of 
teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay between male teachers and female 
teachers. A statistically non-significant MANOVA effect was obtained, Pillai’s Trace = 
.025, F (4, 328) = 2.111, p > .05 (see Table 21). There was no mean difference in 
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Table 22 
Descriptive Statistics of Four Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward 
Performance Pay by Gender 
 
Variable Gender M      SD       n 
Collaboration and 
Effectiveness 
Male -.093 .944 93 
Female .036 1.020 240 
Pressure and Turnover Male -.182 .919 93 
Female .071 1.023 240 
Policy and Structure Male .003 1.025 93 
Female -.001 .992 240 
Motivation and Satisfaction Male .064 .791 93 
Female -.025 1.070 240 
 
Teaching experience. The descriptive statistics with means, standard deviations, 
and sample size for teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay based on teachers’ 
years of teaching experience are documented in Table 23. A one-way MANOVA was 
conducted to test the hypothesis that there would be one or more mean differences of 
teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay among teachers with different years of 
teaching experience. A statistically significant MANOVA effect was obtained, Pillai’s 
Trace = .105, F(16, 1296) = 2.179, p < .05 (see Table 21). The multivariate effect size 
was estimated at .026, which implied that 2.6% of the variance in the canonically derived 
dependent variable was accounted for by teachers’ teaching experience.  
Given the significant MANOVA result, a series of one-way ANOVAs on each of 
the four dependent variables was conducted as follow-up tests to the MANOVA. The 
Bonferroni approach was employed to prevent Type I error (alpha level .05/4= .0125). No 
significant univariate main effect for teachers’ teaching experience was obtained for 
teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay in collaboration and effectiveness, 
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pressure and turnover, policy and structure, or motivation and satisfaction (see Table 
24).  
Table 23 
Descriptive Statistics of Four Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward 
Performance Pay by Teachers’ Years of Experience 
 
Variable Years of experience M SD n 
Collaboration and Effectiveness <5 years .326 .994 32 
5-9 years -.151 .836 59 
10-14 years -.047 1.026 72 
15-19 years -.081 .994 57 
>20 years .037 1.060 109 
Pressure and Turnover <5 years .310 .993 32 
5-9 years .039 .835 59 
10-14 years .044 1.001 72 
15-19 years -.168 .994 57 
>20 years -.079 1.083 109 
Policy and Structure <5 years -.171 1.103 32 
5-9 years -.010 .774 59 
10-14 years .112 .945 72 
15-19 years -.034 1.024 57 
>20 years -.015 1.113 109 
Motivation and Satisfaction <5 years .358 .944 32 
5-9 years .102 .715 59 
10-14 years .152 .675 72 
15-19 years -.150 1.126 57 
>20 years -.186 1.209 109 
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Table 24 
ANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Pay Based on Teachers’ 
Years of Experience 
 










Contrast 5.409 4 1.352 1.359 .248 .016 
Error 322.471 324 .995 
   
Pressure and 
Turnover  
Contrast 5.557 4 1.389 1.389 .237 .017 
Error 324.035 324 1.000    
Policy and 
Structure 
Contrast 1.921 4 .480 .474 .755 .006 
Error 328.369 324 1.013    
Motivation and 
Satisfaction 
Contrast 11.409 4 2.852 2.902 .022 .035 
Error 318.469 324 .983    
 
Teacher type. Table 25 shows the descriptive statistics of teachers’ perceptions 
toward performance pay based on teacher type. The one-way MANOVA was conducted 
to test the hypothesis that there would be one or more mean differences of teachers’ 
perceptions toward performance pay among different types of teachers. A statistically 
non-significant MANOVA effect was obtained, Pillai’s Trace = .053, F(12, 969) = 1.453, 
p > .05 (see Table 21). There was no mean difference in teachers’ perceptions toward 
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Table 25 
Descriptive Statistics of Four Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward 
Performance Pay by Teacher Type 
 




Municipal expert .167 1.003 27 
District expert -.002 1.044 95 
School expert -.104 .906 57 
Non-expert -.013 1.015 149 
Pressure and Turnover  
 
Municipal expert .245 .841 27 
District expert -.102 1.059 95 
School expert .076 1.024 57 
Non-expert -.007 .980 149 
Policy and Structure  
 
Municipal expert .078 .836 27 
District expert .106 1.118 95 
School expert .114 .923 57 
Non-expert -.119 .978 149 
Motivation and 
Satisfaction 
Municipal expert .013 1.125 27 
District expert -.028 1.012 95 
School expert .204 .650 57 
Non-expert -.072 1.078 149 
 
Teachers’ professional ranking. The descriptive statistics of teachers’ 
perceptions toward performance pay based on teachers’ professional ranking are shown 
in Table 26. A one-way MANOVA was conducted to test the hypothesis that there would 
be one or more mean differences of teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay among 
teachers with different professional rankings. A statistically significant MANOVA effect 
was obtained, Pillai’s Trace = .171, F(12, 960) = 7.683, p < .05 (see Table 21). The 
multivariate effect size was estimated at .086, which implied that 8.6% of the variance in 
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Table 26 
Descriptive Statistics of Four Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward 
Performance Pay by Teachers’ Professional Ranking 
 




Highest -.156 .977 97 
Level 1 .003 1.035 131 
Level 2 .104 .928 79 
Level 3 .114 1.145 18 
Pressure and Turnover  
 
Highest .013 1.016 97 
Level 1 -.051 1.009 131 
Level 2 .019 .930 79 
Level 3 .302 1.168 18 
Policy and Structure Highest -.046 .968 97 
Level 1 .100 1.009 131 
Level 2 -.195 1.060 79 
Level 3 .315 .829 18 
Motivation and 
Satisfaction 
Highest -.276 1.160 97 
Level 1 -.045 1.003 131 
Level 2 .233 .645 79 
Level 3 .490 .847 18 
 
Due to the statistically significant MANOVA result, multiple one-way ANOVAs 
were conducted to explore the mean differences among groups on each of the dependent 
variables. One significant univariate main effect for teachers’ professional ranking was 
obtained for teachers’ perceptions on performance pay in motivation and satisfaction, 
F(3, 321) = 5.674, p < .0125, partial eta square = .050 (see Table 27). Attributed to the 
statistically significant Levene’s test result, F(3, 321) = 7.469, p = .000, which violated 
the assumption of equal variance, and unequal sample sizes across groups, the Games-
Howell test was employed for post hoc pairwise comparisons. To control the familywise 
error rate of alpha across comparisons, the Bonferroni approach was applied so that the 
alpha level for the comparisons was .0125/6 = .002. Significant pairwise difference was 
obtained in teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay in motivation and satisfaction 
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between teachers with the highest professional ranking and teachers with the Level 2 
professional ranking, M = -0.509, SD = .138, p = .002, 99% CI [-0.937, -0.081]. This 
suggests that teachers with the highest professional ranking had lower motivation and 




ANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Pay Based on Teachers’ 
Professional Ranking 
 










Contrast 3.381 3 1.127 1.129 .337  .010 
Error 320.522 321 .999 
   
Pressure and 
Turnover  
Contrast 2.023 3 .674 .672  .570 .006 
Error 322.222 321 1.004    
Policy and 
Structure 
Contrast 6.307 3 2.102 2.098 .100 .019 




Contrast 16.164 3 5.388 5.674 .001* .050 
Error 304.804 321 .950 
   
Note. * p < .0125. ** p = .00. 
 
School level. The descriptive statistics of teachers’ perceptions toward 
performance pay based on school level are documented in Table 28. A one-way 
MANOVA was conducted to test the hypothesis that there would be one or more mean 
differences of teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay between elementary schools 
and secondary schools. A statistically significant MANOVA effect was obtained, Pillai’s 
Trace = .039, F(4, 328) = 3.346, p < .05 (see Table 21). The multivariate effect size was 
estimated at .039, which implied that 3.9% of the variance in the canonically derived 
dependent variable was accounted for by the level of school. 
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Table 28 
Descriptive Statistics of Four Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward 
Performance Pay by School Level 
 
Variable School level M SD n 
Collaboration and 
Effectiveness 
Elementary .126 1.034 162 
Secondary -.119 .954 171 
Pressure and Turnover  
 
Elementary .137 1.025 162 
Secondary -.129 .961 171 
Policy and Structure Elementary .155 1.017 162 
Secondary -.147 .964 171 
Motivation and Satisfaction Elementary .006 1.136 162 
Secondary -.005 .855 171 
 
Given the significant MANOVA results, multiple one-way ANOVAs were 
conducted to test the univariate main effect on each of the four dependent variables. A 
significant univariate main effect in terms of school level was obtained for teachers’ 
perceptions on the performance pay in policy and structure, F(1, 331) = 7.731, p < .0125, 
partial eta square = .023 (see Table 29). This indicates that elementary teachers were 
more positive regarding their understanding about performance pay’s policy and structure 
than secondary teachers.  
Table 29 
ANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Pay Based on School 
Level 
 









Contrast 4.985 1 4.985 5.046 .025 .015 
Error 327.015 331 .988 
   
Pressure and 
Turnover  
Contrast 5.891 1 5.891 5.980 .015 .018 
Error 326.109 331 .985    Policy and 
Structure 
Contrast 7.577 1 7.577 7.731 .006* .023 
Error 324.423 331 .980    Motivation and 
Satisfaction 
Contrast .010 1 .010 .010 .921 .000 
Error 331.990 331 1.003    Note. * p < .0125. ** p = .00. 
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School rank. Table 30 shows the descriptive statistics of teachers’ perceptions 
toward performance pay based on school rank. A one-way MANOVA was conducted to 
test the hypothesis that there would be one or more mean differences of teachers’ 
perceptions toward performance pay among teachers from schools with different ranks. A 
statistically significant MANOVA effect was obtained, Pillais’ Trace = .171, F(8, 656) = 
7.683, p < .05 (see Table 21). The multivariate effect size was estimated at .086, which 
implied that 8.6% of the variance in the canonically derived dependent variable was 
accounted for by teachers’ teaching experience. Among six characteristics, school rank is 
the strongest influence on teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay, but the effect 
size (.086) is relatively quite weak. 
Table 30 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Four Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward 
Performance Pay by School Rank 
 




Provincial Key .214 1.005 128 
Municipal Key -.297 .552 29 
Ordinary -.107 1.027 176 
Total .000 1.000 333 
Pressure and Turnover 
 
Provincial Key .126 1.013 128 
Municipal Key .341 .837 29 
Ordinary -.148 .994 176 
Total .000 1.000 333 
Policy and Structure 
 
  
Provincial Key .196 .936 128 
Municipal Key .345 .734 29 
Ordinary -.200 1.043 176 
Total .000 1.000 333 
Motivation and 
Satisfaction 
Provincial Key .316 .720 128 
Municipal Key .386 .471 29 
Ordinary -.293 1.141 176 
Total .000 1.000 333 
 
Given the significance of the overall test, a series of one-way ANOVAs were 
conducted as follow-up tests to explore the univariate main effect on each of the four 
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dependent variables. Significant univariate main effects in terms of school rank were 
obtained for teachers’ perceptions on performance pay in collaboration and effectiveness, 
F(2, 330) = 5.369, p < .0125, partial eta square = .032; in pressure and turnover, F(2, 
330) = 4.716, p < .0125, partial eta square = .028; in policy and structure, F(2, 330) = 
8.016, p < .0125, partial eta square = .046; and in motivation and satisfaction, F(2, 330) = 
17.760, p < .0125, partial eta square = .097 (see Table 31).  
Table 31 
 
ANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Pay Based on School 
Rank 
 










Contrast 10.463 2 5.231 5.369 .005* .032 
Error 321.537 330 .974 
   
Pressure and 
Turnover  
Contrast 9.225 2 4.613 4.716 .010* .028 
Error 322.775 330 .978    
Policy and 
Structure 
Contrast 15.382 2 7.691 8.016 .000** .046 
Error 316.618 330 .959    
Motivation and 
Satisfaction 
Contrast 32.262 2 16.131 17.760 .000** .097 
Error 299.738 330 .908    
Note. * p < .0125. ** p = .00. 
 
The sample sizes across three groups were unequal. The results of Levene’s tests 
were significant for collaboration and effectiveness, F(2, 330) = 9.029, p = .000; policy 
and structure, F(2, 330) = 6.165, p = .002; motivation and satisfaction F(2, 330) = 
19.101, p = .000; and nonsignificant for pressure and turnover F(2, 330) = 1.095, p = 
.336. Therefore, the Games-Howell tests were used for post hoc pairwise comparison for 
collaboration and effectiveness, policy and structure, and motivation and satisfaction, 
while the Tukey test was used for pressure and turnover. Meanwhile, the Bonferroni 
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approach was applied to control the familywise error rate across comparisons that the 
alpha level for the ANOVAs is .0125/3 = .004. Significant pairwise differences were 
obtained in teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay in collaboration and 
effectiveness between teachers from provincial key schools and teachers from municipal 
key schools, M = 0.512, SD = .136, p = .001, 99% CI [0.115, 0.908]. Additionally, 
significant pairwise differences were obtained for policy and structure between teachers 
from ordinary schools and teachers from provincial key schools, M = -0.396, SD = .114, 
p = .002, 99% CI [-0.722, -0.069]; and between teachers from ordinary schools and 
teachers from municipal key schools, M = -.544, SD = .157, p = .003, 99% CI [-1.012, 
0.077]. Additionally, significant pairwise differences were obtained for motivation and 
satisfaction between teachers from ordinary schools and teachers from provincial key 
schools, M = -0.610, SD = .107, p = .000, 99% CI [-0.916, -0.303], and between teachers 
from ordinary schools and teachers from municipal key schools, M = -0.679, SD = .123, p 
= .000, 99% CI [-1.036, -0.322]. The results suggest that in collaboration and 
effectiveness, teachers from provincial key schools had a more positive attitude than 
teachers from municipal key schools. Additionally, teachers from ordinary schools were 
less familiar with performance pay’s policy and structure than teachers from the higher-
ranked schools. Meanwhile, teachers from ordinary schools had a less positive attitude 
toward the impacts of performance pay on motivation and satisfaction than teachers from 
the higher-ranked schools. The significant pairwise comparisons for each dependent 
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Table 32 
 
Summary of Significant Pairwise Comparisons for Chinese Teachers’ Perceptions 
Toward Performance Pay  
 
Variable         Significant Pairwise Comparisons 
Collaboration and 
Effectiveness 







• Elementary teachers were less familiar than secondary 
teachers 
• Ordinary-school teachers were less familiar than 
provincial-key-school teachers 




• Teachers with the highest professional ranking were less 
positive than teachers with the level-2 professional 
ranking. 
• Ordinary-school teachers were less positive than 
provincial-key-school teachers. 
• Ordinary-school teachers were less positive than 
municipal-key-school teachers 
 
Findings for Research Question 6: 
Are there differences in the perceptions of participating teachers regarding 
evaluation measures upon which performance pay is based in their public schools in 
terms of selected characteristics of teachers (e.g., gender, teaching experience, 
professional ranking) and schools (e.g., grade level, school rank)? 
MANOVAs. To answer the question, several one-way MANOVAs were 
conducted with three dependent variables (collaborative measures, input-based 
measures, and mixed measures), which were the extracted factor scores computed with 
the regression technique during the PCA in Research Question 4. One predictor (selected 
characteristics of teachers and schools) with multiple groups was entered in the analysis 
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each time for testing the differences in teachers’ perceptions toward performance 
evaluation measures based on the specific characteristics of teachers and schools. The 
selected characteristics of teachers and schools included: gender, teaching experience, 
teacher type, teachers’ professional ranking, school level and school rank. 
Based on the distribution histograms and the skewness and kurtosis values, all 
three dependent variables were normally distributed. Boxplots were used to check 
outliers of each dependent variable. Several mild outliers (n < 5) were found with each 
variable, but due to the large sample size and normal distribution of each variable, the 
mild outliers were retained. 
Box’s M tests were used to test homogeneity of the covariance for each 
MANOVA. The significant results indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of the 
covariance matrix was violated for gender, teaching experience, teacher type, teachers’ 
professional ranking, school level, and school rank. Additionally, for each predictor, the 
sample size in each group was unequal. Due to these conditions, the tests lost some 
robustness, although the total sample size was large. Therefore, the values of Pillai’s 
Trace were used to interpret the results of MANOVAs. Table 33 shows the MANOVA 
results of teachers’ perceptions towards performance evaluation measures by gender, 
teaching experience, teacher type, teachers’ professional ranking, school level and school 
rank. The descriptive statistics and follow-up statistical analysis results for each predictor 
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Table 33 
MANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Evaluation Measures 
Based on Selected Characteristics of Teachers and Schools 
 
Variable Value of 
Pillai’s 
Trace 
   F Hypothesis 
df 
Error df Sig. Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Gender .050 5.758 3 329 .001** .050 
Teaching 
experience 
.105 2.938 12 972 .001** .035 




.124 4.613 9 963 .000** .041 
School level .105 12.840 3 329 .000** .105 
School rank .381 25.822 6 658 .000** .191 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
 
Gender. The descriptive statistics of teachers’ perceptions toward performance 
evaluation measures based on teachers’ gender are documented in Table 34. A one-way 
MANOVA was conducted to test the hypothesis that there would be one or more mean 
differences of teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation measures between 
male teachers and female teachers. A statistically significant MANOVA effect was 
obtained, Pillai’s Trace = .050, F(3, 329) = 5.758, p < .05 (see Table 33). The 
multivariate effect size was estimated at .050, which implied that 5% of the variance in 
the canonically derived dependent variable was accounted for by teachers’ gender.  
Table 34 
Descriptive Statistics of Three Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward 
Performance Evaluation by Gender 
 
Variable School level M SD n 
Collaborative measures Male -.203 1.132 93 
Female .079 .934 240 
Input-based measures Male .014 .956 93 
Female -.006 1.018 240 
Mixed measures Male -.321 1.028 93 
Female .124 .963 240 
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Given the significant result of MANOVA, multiple one-way ANOVAs were 
conducted to test the univariate main effect on each of the three dependent variables. A 
significant univariate main effect in terms of gender was obtained for teachers’ 
perceptions toward performance evaluation in mixed measures, F(1, 331) = 13.827, p < 
.017, partial eta square = .040 (see Table 35). In this study, female teachers had a more 
supportive attitude of using mixed measures in performance evaluation than male 
teachers.  
Table 35 
ANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Evaluation Based on 
Gender 
 









Contrast 5.340 1 5.340 5.411 .021 .016 
Error 326.660 331 .987    
Input-based 
measures  
Contrast .026 1 .026 .026 .872 .000 
Error 331.974 331 1.003    
Mixed 
measures 
Contrast 13.313 1 13.313 13.827 .000** .040 
Error 318.687 331 .963    
Note. * p < .017. ** p = .00. 
 
Teaching experience. The descriptive statistics of teachers’ perceptions toward 
performance evaluation measures based on years of teaching experience are documented 
in Table 36. The one-way MANOVA was conducted to test the hypothesis that there 
would be one or more mean differences of teachers’ perceptions toward performance 
evaluation measures among teachers with different years of teaching experience. A 
statistically significant MANOVA effect was obtained, Pillai’s Trace = .105, F(12, 972) 
= 2.938, p < .05 (see Table 33). The multivariate effect size was estimated at .035, which 
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implied that 3.5% of the variance in the canonically derived dependent variable was 
accounted for by teachers’ years of teaching experience.  
Table 36 
Descriptive Statistics of Three Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward 
Performance Evaluation by Teacher’s Years of Experience 
 
Variable Years of experience M SD n 
Collaborative 
measures 
<5 years .065 .830 32 
5-9 years .069 1.223 59 
10-14 years -.177 .963 72 
15-19 years -.018 .945 57 
>20 years .068 .962 109 
Input-based measures <5 years .222 .583 32 
5-9 years .185 .878 59 
10-14 years .059 .928 72 
15-19 years -.168 1.230 57 
>20 years -.128 1.053 109 
Mixed measures <5 years .326 .851 32 
5-9 years -.399 .940 59 
10-14 years -.247 1.067 72 
15-19 years .126 .910 57 
>20 years .195 .990 109 
 
A series of one-way ANOVAs on each of the three dependent variables was 
conducted as follow-up tests to the MANOVA. A significant univariate main effect for 
teachers’ teaching experience was obtained for teachers’ perceptions on mixed measures 
of performance evaluation, F(4, 324) = 5.865, p < .017, partial eta square = .068 (see 
Table 34). Due to the nonsignificant result of the Levene’s test of equal variance, F(4, 
324) = 1.655, p = .160, the Turkey test was used for post hoc pairwise comparisons 
among groups. The Bonferroni approach was applied to control the familywise error rate 
across comparisons that the alpha level for the pairwise comparisons was .017/10 = .002. 
Nonsignificant pairwise differences for teachers’ teaching experience were obtained in 
teachers’ perceptions toward mixed measures. 
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Table 37 
ANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Evaluation Based on 
Teacher’s Years of Experience 
 









Contrast 3.182 4 .795 .796 .529 .010 
Error 323.931 324 1.000    
Input-based 
measures  
Contrast 7.259 4 1.815 1.833 .122 .022 
Error 320.782 324 .990    
Mixed 
measures 
Contrast 22.215 4 5.554 5.865 .000** .068 
Error 306.803 324 .947    
Note. * p < .017. ** p = .00. 
 
Teacher type. The descriptive statistics of teachers’ perceptions toward 
performance evaluation measures based on teacher type are documented in Table 38. A 
MANOVA was conducted to test the hypothesis that there would be one or more mean 
differences of teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation measures among 
different types of teachers. A statistically significant MANOVA effect was obtained, 
Pillai’s Trace = .155, F(9, 972) = 5.876, p < .05 (see Table 33). The multivariate effect 
size was estimated at .052, which implied that 5.2% of the variance in the canonically 
derived dependent variable was accounted for by teachers’ types. 
Given the significance of the overall test, the univariate main effects were 
examined with one-way ANOVAs on each of the three dependent variables. Significant 
univariate main effects for teacher type were obtained for teachers’ perceptions on 
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Table 38 
Descriptive Statistics of Three Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward 
Performance Evaluation by Teacher Type 
 
Variable Teacher type M SD n 
Collaborative measures Municipal expert -.044 .897 27 
District expert -.003 .989 95 
School expert -.357 .963 57 
Non-expert .125 1.019 149 
Input-based measures Municipal expert .361 .718 27 
District expert .063 .947 95 
School expert .157 1.019 57 
Non-expert -.181 1.050 149 
Mixed measures Municipal expert .266 .938 27 
District expert .063 1.075 95 
School expert -.670 .918 57 
Non-expert .155 .899 149 
 
Table 39 
ANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Evaluation Based on 
Teacher Type 
 









Contrast 9.588 3 3.196 3.251 .022 .029 
Error 318.555 324 .983    
Input-based 
measures  
Contrast 10.182 3 3.394 3.447 .017 .031 
Error 318.987 324 .985    
Mixed 
measures 
Contrast 31.453 3 10.484 11.392 .000** .095 
Error 298.183 324 .920    
Note. * p < .017. ** p = .000. 
 
Due to the nonsignificant result of the Levene’s test, F(3, 324) = 1.755, p = .156, 
the Turkey test was used for post hoc pairwise comparisons among groups. Bonferroni 
approach was applied to control the familywise error rate across comparisons that the 
alpha level for the pairwise comparisons was .017/6 = .003. Significant pairwise 
differences were obtained in teachers’ perceptions toward mixed measures of 
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performance evaluation between school-expert teachers and municipal-expert teachers, M 
= -0.936, SD = .224, p = .000, 99% CI [-1.631, -0.240]; between school-expert teachers 
and district-expert teachers, M = -0.733, SD = .161, p = .000, 99% CI [-1.231, -0.234]; 
and between school-expert teachers and non-expert teachers, M = -.825, SD = .149, p = 
.000, 99% CI [-1.289, -0.362]. The results suggest that school-expert teachers in this 
sample were less positive toward using mixed measures in performance evaluation than 
municipal-expert teachers, district-expert teachers, and non-expert teachers.  
Teachers’ professional ranking. The descriptive statistics of teachers’ 
perceptions toward performance evaluation measures based on teachers’ professional 
ranking are documented in Table 40. The one-way MANOVA was conducted to test the 
hypothesis that there would be one or more mean differences of teachers’ perceptions 
toward performance evaluation measures among teachers with different professional 
rankings. A statistically significant MANOVA effect was obtained, Pillai’s Trace = .124, 
F(9, 963) = 4.613, p < .05 (see Table 33). The multivariate effect size was estimated at 
.041, which implied that 4.1% of the variance in the canonically derived dependent 
variable was accounted for by teachers’ professional ranking.  
The follow-up one-way ANOVAs on each of the three dependent variables were 
conducted to explore the group mean differences on the specific performance evaluation 
measure. Significant univariate main effects for teachers’ professional ranking were 
obtained for: teachers’ perceptions on collaborative measures of performance evaluation, 
F(3, 321) = 3.857, p < .017, partial eta square = .035; teachers’ perceptions on input-
based measures, F(3, 321) = 4.301, p < .017, partial eta square = .039; teachers’ 
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perceptions on mixed measures, F(3, 321) = 5.149, p < .017, partial eta square = .002 (see 
Table 41).  
Table 40 
Descriptive Statistics of Three Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward 
Performance Evaluation by Teacher’s Professional Ranking 
 
Variable Teacher’s professional ranking M SD n 
Collaborative 
measures 
Highest .005 .984 97 
Level 1 .169 1.002 131 
Level 2 -.263 .979 79 
Level 3 -.339 .860 18 
Input-based 
measures 
Highest -.252 1.122 97 
Level 1 -.034 1.018 131 
Level 2 .268 .802 79 
Level 3 .190 .627 18 
Mixed measures Highest .082 .996 97 
Level 1 .179 .907 131 
Level 2 -.333 1.078 79 
Level 3 -.272 1.028 18 
 
Table 41 
ANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Evaluation Based on 
Teacher’s Professional Ranking 
 









Contrast 11.201 3 3.734 3.857 .010* .035 
Error 310.758 321 .968    
Input-based 
measures 
Contrast 12.553 3 4.184 4.301 .005* .039 
Error 312.325 321 .973    
Mixed 
measures 
Contrast 14.955 3 4.985 5.149 .002* .046 
Error 310.752 321 .968    
Note. * p < .017. ** p = .00. 
 
Results of Levene’s tests were: nonsignificant for collaborative measures, F(3, 
321) = 0.196, p = .899; significant for input-based measures, F(3, 321) = 3.851, p = .010; 
and significant for mixed measures, F(3, 321) = 2.789, p = .041. Given the violations of 
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equal variances and unequal sample sizes of groups, Games-Howell tests were used for 
post hoc pairwise comparisons for input-based measures and mixed measures. The Tukey 
test was employed for collaborative measures. Meanwhile, the Bonferroni approach was 
applied to control the familywise error rate of alpha across comparisons. The alpha level 
was .017/6 = .003. A significant pairwise difference was obtained in teachers’ 
perceptions toward input-based measures between teachers with the highest professional 
ranking and teachers with the Level 2 professional ranking, M = -0.519, SD = .149, p = 
.003, CI [-0.916, -.0123]. Additionally, a significant pairwise difference was obtained in 
teachers’ perceptions toward mixed measures between teachers with the Level 1 
professional ranking and teachers with the Level 2 professional ranking, M = 0.512, SD = 
.140, p = .002, CI [0.140, 0.884]. The results demonstrate that teachers in this study with 
the highest professional ranking preferred using input-based measures in performance 
evaluation less than teachers with the Level 2 professional ranking. Teachers with the 
Level 1 professional ranking were more likely to support using mixed measures than 
teachers with Level 2 professional ranking. 
School level. The descriptive statistics of teachers’ perceptions toward 
performance evaluation measures based on school level are documented in Table 42. A 
one-way MANOVA was conducted to test the hypothesis that there would be one or 
more mean differences of teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluations between 
elementary schools and secondary schools. A statistically significant MANOVA effect 
was obtained, Pillai’s Trace = .105, F(3, 329) = 12.840, p < .05 (see Table 33). The 
multivariate effect size was estimated at .105, which implied that 10.5% of the variance 
in the canonically derived dependent variable was accounted for by level of school.  
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Table 42 
Descriptive Statistics of Three Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward 
Performance Evaluation by School Level 
 
Variable School level M SD n 
Collaborative measures Elementary .200 .949 162 
Secondary -.190 1.013 171 
Input-based measures Elementary -.117 .933 162 
Secondary .111 1.050 171 
Mixed measures Elementary .237 .921 162 
Secondary -.225 1.023 171 
 
Multiple one-way ANOVAs were conducted to test the univariate main effect on 
each of the three dependent variables. Significant univariate main effects in terms of 
school level were obtained for teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation on: 
collaborative measures, F(1, 331) = 13.105, p < .017, partial eta square = .038; and 
mixed measures, F(1, 331) = 18.727, p < .017, partial eta square = .054 (see Table 43). 
Elementary teachers in this sample were more positive toward using collaborative 
measures and mixed measures than secondary teachers. 
Table 43 
ANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Evaluation Based on 
School Level 
 









Contrast 12.644 1 12.644 13.105 .000** .038 
Error 319.356 331 .965    
Input-based 
measures 
Contrast 4.332 1 4.332 4.376 .037 .013 
Error 327.668 331 .990    
Mixed 
measures 
Contrast 17.777 1 17.777 18.727 .000** .054 
Error 314.223 331 .949    
Note. ** p = .00. 
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School rank. The descriptive statistics of teachers’ perceptions toward 
performance evaluation measures based on school rank were documented in Table 44. A 
one-way MANOVA was conducted to test the hypothesis that there would be one or 
more mean differences of teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation measures 
among teachers from schools with different ranks. A statistically significant MANOVA 
effect was obtained, Pillai’s Trace = .381, F(6, 658) = 25.822, p < .05 (see Table 33). The 
multivariate effect size was estimated at .191, which implied that 19.1% of the variance 
in the canonically derived dependent variable was accounted for by school rank.  
Table 44 
Descriptive Statistics of Three Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward 
Performance Evaluation by School Rank 
 
Variable School rank M SD n 
Collaborative measures Provincial Key -.221 1.106 128 
Municipal Key .205 .977 29 
Ordinary .127 .893 176 
Input-based measures Provincial Key .239 .857 128 
Municipal Key -1.426 .725 29 
Ordinary .061 .947 176 
Mixed measures Provincial Key -.379 1.105 128 
Municipal Key -.484 .610 29 
Ordinary .355 .825 176 
 
Given the significance of the overall test, the univariate main effects were 
examined with one-way ANOVAs on each of the three dependent variables. Significant 
univariate main effects for school rank were obtained for teachers’ perceptions on: 
collaborative measures, F(2, 330) = 5.300, p < .017, partial eta square = .031; input-
based measures, F(2, 330) = 41.676, p < .017, partial eta square = .202; and mixed 
measures, F(2, 330) = 27.469, p < .017, partial eta square = .143 (see Table 45).  
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Table 45 
ANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Evaluation Based on 
School Rank 
 









Contrast 10.332 2 5.166 5.300 .005* .031 
Error 321.668 330 .975    
Input-based 
measures 
Contrast 66.947 2 33.473 41.676 .000** .202 
Error 265.053 330 .803    
Mixed 
measures 
Contrast 47.382 2 23.691 27.469 .000** .143 
Error 284.618 330 .862    
Note. * p < .017. ** p = .00. 
 
The results of Levene’s tests were: significant for collaborative measures, F(2, 
330) = 4.539, p = .011; nonsignificant for input-based measures F(2, 330) = 0.701, p = 
.497; and significant for mixed measures, F(2, 330) = 17.197, p = .000. For collaborative 
measures and mixed measures, given the violations of equal variances and unequal 
sample sizes across groups, Games-Howell tests were used for post hoc pairwise 
comparisons. The Tukey test was employed for input-based measures. Meanwhile, the 
Bonferroni approach was applied to control the familywise error rate across comparisons 
that the alpha level for the ANOVAs is .017/3 = .006. Significant pairwise differences 
were obtained in teachers’ perceptions toward input-based measures between teachers 
from municipal key schools and teachers from ordinary schools, M = -1.488, SD = .180, 
p = .000, CI [-1.910, -1.065], and between teachers from municipal key schools and 
teachers from provincial key schools, M = -1.665, SD = .184, p = .000, CI [-2.099, -
1.231]. Additionally, significant pairwise differences were obtained in teachers’ 
perceptions toward mixed measures of performance evaluation between ordinary schools 
and provincial key schools, M = 0.734, SD = .116, p = .000, CI [0.461, 1.007], and 
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between ordinary schools and municipal key schools, M = 0.839, SD = .129, p = .000, CI 
[0.526, 1.152]. The results indicate that municipal-key-school teachers in this study 
preferred using input-based measures less than ordinary-school teachers and provincial-
key-school teachers. Additionally, ordinary-school teachers in this study were more 
positive toward using mixed measures than the other higher-ranked-school teachers. The 




Summary of Significant Pairwise Comparisons for Chinese Teachers’ Perceptions 
Toward Performance Evaluation  
 
Variable Significant Pairwise Comparison 
Collaborative 
Measures 




• Teachers with the highest professional ranking were less 
supportive than teachers with the Level 2 professional 
ranking. 
• Municipal-key-school teachers were less supportive than 
ordinary-school teachers. 




• Female teachers were more supportive than male teachers. 
• School-expert teachers were less supportive than municipal-
expert teachers. 
• School-expert teachers were less supportive than district-
expert teachers. 
• School-expert teachers were less supportive than non-expert 
teachers. 
• Teachers with the Level 1 professional ranking were more 
supportive than teachers with the Level 2 professional 
ranking. 
• Elementary teachers were more supportive than secondary 
teachers. 
• Ordinary-school teachers were more supportive than 
municipal-key-school teachers. 
• Ordinary-school teachers were more supportive than 
provincial-key-school teachers. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Discussion 
Summary of Findings 
In this study, I explored teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay and the 
associated performance evaluation measures at 16 elementary and secondary public 
schools of Panda district in Kunming City, Yunnan province, China. Teacher 
performance pay is an important topic linked to teacher evaluation, teacher effectiveness, 
teacher retention, and student achievement. The impact of performance pay on teachers 
includes various aspects from teachers’ intrinsic motivation (e.g., Ballou & Podgursky, 
1993; Jacob & Springer, 2008) to students’ learning outcomes (e.g., Pham et al., 2017). 
The policy of teacher performance pay has been implemented in China for eight years; 
many researchers have discussed issues involved in the implementation process in a 
theoretical analysis approach (e.g., B. Li, 2014; Mi & Dai, 2011; X. Wang, 2013; Wei, 
2013). But teachers’ voice and perceptions toward performance pay and performance 
evaluation measures were rarely investigated. Without teachers’ support and cooperation, 
the effects of the policy implementation would be questionable. This mixed-method study 
presented empirical evidence of teachers’ perceptions of the performance pay policy and 
its implementation at the school level, which not only includes the voice of front-line 
teachers but also offers implications for policy stakeholders, school administrators and 
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researchers in decision-making, school practices, and future research. The findings of the 
study include: 
• Teachers had low support of performance pay in Panda School District of 
Kunming city, Yunan province, China.  
• Three themes related to the value of performance pay and 14 themes related to 
problems associated with performance pay emerged from the data generated with 
participating teachers. Teachers perceived the merits of performance pay in terms 
of its theoretical goal (motivation), application (clearer salary scheme), and 
impact (competition mechanism). The major categories of problems included 
limited and unbalanced funding; problematic implementation process; unfairness; 
and demotivation. 
• The top three performance evaluation measures preferred by participating 
teachers were: serving as banzhuren, or on other duties; students’ test scores; and 
performance evaluation by principals. According to the school-based performance 
evaluation plan, “ethics,” “working load,” and “teaching practice” were the most 
important categories of performance evaluation perceived by participating 
teachers. Teachers reported that only quantifiable indicators were normally used 
in teacher evaluation. Three themes regarding teachers’ perceptions toward 
performance evaluation emerged through qualitative data analysis. First, 
performance evaluation was more summative than formative; second, specific 
evaluation standards and rubrics were lacking; third, performance evaluation 
measures were oversimplified and ineffective.   
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• A seven-factor model was extracted from the teacher perception survey through 
Principal Component Analyses and explained 58.4% of the variance among 
teachers regarding their perceptions toward performance pay and performance 
evaluation. Four factors (collaboration and effectiveness, pressure and turnover, 
policy and structure, and motivation and satisfaction) focused on teachers’ 
perceptions toward performance pay; three factors (collaborative measures, input-
based measures, and mixed measures) represented teachers’ perceptions toward 
performance evaluation.  
• Participating teachers’ perceptions related to performance pay were significantly 
different with small effect sizes (in parentheses) based on teachers’ teaching 
experience (.026), professional ranking (.035), school level (.039), and school 
rank (.086).  
• Participating teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation were 
significantly different with small effect sizes (in parentheses) based on teachers’ 
gender (.050), teaching experience (.035), type (.052), professional ranking (.041), 
school level (.105), and school rank (.191).  
Discussion 
This study reveals some themes that are consistent with previous studies, while 
some themes were inconsistent to previous ones or newly found, which may be worth 
further discussion. The themes for discussion were explored as follows.  
Low teacher support for performance pay. The findings suggest that surveyed 
teachers expressed low (46%) support for performance pay, which was similar to the 
support rate (48.5%) found in S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016). Considering the support rate in 
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S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016) was reported only by middle-school teachers, the 
corresponding support rate of secondary teachers (40.4%) in this study was actually 
lower than that found in S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016a). Also, the finding was consistent to 
H. Zhao, et al. (2011), who found that most of the Chinese public-school teachers in their 
study opposed teacher performance pay, although 93% of the school administrators 
supported it. Compared to school administrators’ high support rate, the consistent low 
teacher support across studies is more likely to provide the objective evidence for any 
failures in performance pay implementation. Due to the results of the present study and 
previous literature, five possible reasons might be associated with the low-level teacher 
support to performance pay.  
More problems than merits. Based on teachers’ responses to the survey and 
interview questions pertaining to the merits and problems of performance pay, more 
problems than merits were identified by participating teachers, suggesting that teachers 
were not satisfied with the program. For example, problems of performance pay included: 
unfairness perceived by teachers; conflicts among colleagues brought on by competition 
for performance pay; the small amount of performance pay; unbalanced funding 
distribution irrespective to school contexts, et cetera. These themes align with the reasons 
teachers opposed performance pay in a study conducted by Ballou and Podgursky (1993). 
It is worth noting that, in the present study, teachers perceived unfairness in various 
aspects, which linked with demotivation for working. According to equity theory 
(Adams, 1963) and previous research evidence (e.g., Johnson & Johnson, 1991; S. Liu, 
Zhao, et al., 2016; S. Liu & Onwuegbuzie, 2014), if teachers felt treated unfairly by 
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examining their inputs (i.e., work effort) and outputs (i.e., salary) compared with others, 
they were less likely to show support for school reforms.  
Targeting school development over teacher development. From the international 
perspective, teachers’ support for performance pay or incentive pay was inconsistent 
from study to study. For example, 64% of participating teachers supported the POINT 
program in the U.S. (Springer, Ballou, et al., 2010); only moderate teacher support was 
found among teachers from public schools in Florida (Jacob & Springer, 2008); 80% of 
Indian teachers from 300 government-run schools had supportive opinions toward 
incentive pay (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011); and 100% surveyed teachers (one 
headmaster and three teachers at each school) from 100 schools supported the incentive 
program in Kenya (Glewwe et al., 2010). Although these studies were not completely 
comparable due to the heterogeneity of program design, teacher and school 
characteristics, and research methods (Jones, 2013; Sojourner et al., 2014, it was 
important to learn from the successful programs with a high rate of teacher support. For 
example, Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) pointed out that framing the 
performance pay programs more toward “teacher recognition,” rather than toward 
“school accountability,” would be helpful to build a friendly relationship between 
teachers and administrators and, therefore, acquire better support from teachers. 
Consistent with previous studies (e.g., J. Wang, 2012), the results from my study indicate 
that participating teachers’ personal development was neglected in the implementation of 
performance pay. Some schools even required teachers to sacrifice their personal benefits 
to maintain the harmonic school culture. The program design with an emphasis on 
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organizational development but not teachers’ development, might be one reason for low 
teacher support.  
Failing to focus on teachers’ teaching performance. It is worth noting that the 
successful international cases mentioned in the preceding paragraphs were designed to 
award extra money to teachers for their excellent performance in teaching and their 
success in improving student test scores. However, teacher performance pay in the 
Chinese context strove to break the impression that student test scores were used as the 
only indicator for teacher performance evaluation and reduce teaching-to-the-test 
phenomena in the classroom through a new emphasis of using multiple sources to 
evaluate teachers as reflected in multiple government policy documents. Therefore, 
teacher performance pay in China was intended to motivate teachers through recognizing 
their duties and contributions both inside and outside the classroom, instead of rewarding 
directly their performance in classroom teaching. This seemed to be a departure from 
teaching quality or effectiveness, which should be the focal point for any quality 
educational system. If teacher performance pay concentrated on teachers’ working loads 
in non-teaching categories—but not their teaching quality—then teachers were less likely 
to obtain high performance pay and to be motivated to work harder if they had no 
adjustments in teaching loads or duties. Furthermore, if the performance evaluation 
system failed to inform and guide teachers’ professional development, teachers were less 
likely to have a supportive attitude.  
Lacking effective communication. The present study indicated that participating 
teachers had limited understanding about performance pay due to multiple reasons, such 
as the limited access to the plan, complex and confusing contents, and lacking thorough 
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discussions between teachers and administrators. If teachers have limited understanding 
about the performance pay reform, they are less likely to be motivated and show their 
support (Lundström, 2012. Communication is an important media in social relations, so 
does in school reform. Additionally, participating teachers found that the process of 
performance evaluation was not open and transparent. According to Muralidharan and 
Sundararaman (2011), performance pay based on “objective measures of performance 
that are transparently and fairly applied” (p. 396) would obtain teachers’ support. 
Therefore, if teachers found the implementation process problematic, they were less 
likely to show their support.  
Communication is bilateral. School administrators fail to effectively deliver the 
information. Meanwhile, teachers are less likely to actively communicate with 
administrators. One possible reason is the lack of democracy in public sectors in China. 
Teachers are afraid to speak out their concerns or provide suggestions, especially young 
teachers. Also, there is no Teacher Union similar group to help teachers defend their 
benefits. Therefore, teachers fail to express their opinions and make suggestions, which 
leads to ineffective or “zero” communication between teachers and administrators 
regarding performance pay. 
Limited funding support. In the aforementioned international cases, extra money 
or bonus pay was used to reward teachers, which meant teachers could obtain higher pay 
if they made extra efforts to improve student achievement. But in the Chinese contexts, 
similar to the finding in S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016), interviewed teachers in the present 
study reported their total salary was decreased after implementing performance pay, and 
some schools used the teachers’ own money (which used to be part of their salary) as 
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performance pay. The result is inconsistent with previous studies (e.g., Fu & Gui, 2010; 
X. Li, 2010) which indicates the increase of teachers’ salaries in general after 
implementing performance pay in some provinces. However, the increase of teachers’ 
salaries might be attributed to the development of the local economy, the increase of 
teachers’ years of teaching, and the promotion of teachers’ professional ranking, which 
are associated with teachers’ basic salary. There is no directly causal relationship 
between the implementation of performance pay and the general increase of teachers’ 
salary. However, some scholars pointed out that the intention of the performance pay 
reform was to minimize the inequality in pay between teachers in different schools (L. 
Wang et al., 2014) through increasing the basic salary while decreasing the performance 
pay. From the identified problems of performance pay, a series of new inequalities are 
created in the process. The limited amount of performance pay sets barriers for school 
administrators in designing the school-based plan, which further leads to unfairness and 
demotivating perceived by teachers. If the performance pay program did not live up to 
the expectations of incentivizing teachers, teachers would not support the program.  
Problems of performance pay perceived by teachers. Four main categories 
with 14 themes emerged from the qualitative data regarding problems associated with 
teacher performance pay (see Figure 9). The four major issues indicated problems from 
the origin (funding), to the process (implementation), and to final impacts (unfairness and 
demotivation) perceived by participating teachers. The problems were interrelated.  
Specifically, the fundamental problem was the limited funding used for teacher 
performance pay and the unbalanced distribution among schools at the district level, 
which failed to consider school contexts. The problems involved in the implementation 
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were demonstrated from two aspects. One is the poor design of the implementation plan 
at school level, with oversimplified indicators disconnected from the complexity of 
teachers’ work. Implementation also included failure to differentiate teachers’ 
effectiveness and responsibilities using performance pay. Finally, participating teachers 
perceived ineffective communication between administrators and teachers about the 
performance pay plan; teachers reported that they were not well informed about the plan 
and the implementing process was nontransparent. The last two categories—unfairness 
and demotivation—suggested the impacts of performance pay perceived by participating 
teachers. Unfairness perceived by teachers was described as: their opinions being 
ignored; their performance not being appropriately rewarded; their salary being lower 
than before; and their performance pay being lower than teachers from the other schools 
and districts. Meanwhile, teachers were demotivated by the small amount of incentives, 
negative side effects brought by performance pay (e.g., conflicts among colleagues, 
teaching to the test), and administrators’ egalitarian philosophy. 
 
• Small amount
• Conflicts among colleagues
• Teaching to test
• Failing to reward good
performance
• Lacking voice of front-line
teachers
• In favor of administrative
positions
• Using original payment	as	
performance	pay
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Figure 9. Categories and themes of problems perceived by participating teachers 
The qualitative themes found in the present study were consistent with issues of 
teacher performance pay in China discussed in previous literature. For example, teachers 
felt unmotivated or demotivated due to the small amount of performance pay (X. Li, 
2010; K. Liu, 2012); teacher performance pay resulted in teaching to the test (H. Li & Li, 
2011), high pressure (He & Liu, 2011), and tensions in collegial relationships (X. Liu, 
2011); and teachers were unsatisfied about using teachers’ original salaries as incentives 
(H. Liu, 2012; S. Liu, Zhao, et al., 2016). The findings are consistent across schools and 
regions in China, which indicates that even though the performance pay implementation 
plans are school-based, the universal problems might be attributed to factors beyond 
school contexts and regional disparities. Two possible factors are discussed in the 
following sections. 
The first factor is the decentralization of the national policy. The national policy 
of teacher performance pay suggested that the implementation of teacher performance 
pay should be based on local economic development and that implementation plans 
should be school-based. It seemed that local educational agencies and administrators 
were empowered in the decision-making process, which was regarded as a good sign of 
decentralization (S. Liu, Zhao, et al., 2016). However, too much freedom at the local 
level resulted in limited teacher performance funding and overly diverse implementation 
plans, which led to participating teachers’ perceptions of unfairness and demotivation.  
The second factor is the traditional Chinese culture rooted in Confucianism. 
Competition and conflicts brought by the reform of teacher performance pay might be 
against the tenet of harmony in Confucianism (B. Li, 2014). Therefore, some school 
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administrators employed egalitarian methods or sacrificed veteran teachers’ benefits to 
meet the collective benefits for avoiding tensions among teachers and maintaining the 
harmonic school culture. However, this has contributed to teachers’ sense of unfairness 
and demotivation.  
Compared with the teacher support rate found in Question 1 that only 15.3% of 
participating teachers show very unsupportive or unsupportive attitudes toward 
performance pay, the qualitative themes regarding problems perceived by teachers 
suggests that teachers were strongly unsatisfied with performance pay. The inconsistency 
between results of two research questions indicates that teachers’ response to the survey 
questionnaire may have lacked validity to some degree and the qualitative data is 
important in digging into information underneath. It also indicates that the Chinese 
teachers are more open to interviews than to surveys and they do have opinions toward 
the implementation of performance pay, but school administrators fail to provide a path 
for them to express their opinions.  
Teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation measures. The findings 
indicate that the top three performance evaluation measures preferred by teachers were 
“serving as banzhuren, or on other duties,” “students’ test scores,” and “performance 
evaluations by principals.” However, the results are not completely consistent with S. 
Liu, Xu, et al. (2016), who found the top three measures preferred by teachers were: 
“collaboration with faculty and staff,” “efforts to involve parents in student education,” 
and “students’ test scores” (see Table 47). The main reason associated with the difference 
is that answer choices provided to participants in both studies are not completely same, 
for example, “serving as banzhuren, or on other duties,” “highest academic qualification 
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degree,” “teaching in particular subject” were not included in S. Liu, Xu, et al. (2016). 
Admittedly, there are divergence in two studies’ samples in terms of teachers’ 
characteristics and perceptions toward performance evaluation measures. However, there 
might have been stronger correlation between the findings if the study contexts were 
more similar. The three least preferred evaluation measures found in both studies were 
the same (i.e., “performance evaluations by peers,” “awards certifications,” “independent 
evaluation of teaching portfolios”).  
Table 47 
Comparison of Most Preferred and Least Preferred Evaluation Measures (Mean) Among 








• Serving as banzhuren, or 
on other duties (4.03) 
• Collaboration with faculty 
and staff (3.83) 
• Students’ test scores 
(3.88) 
• Efforts to involve parents 
in student education (3.76) 
• Performance evaluations 
by principals (3.80) 




• Performance evaluations 
by peers (3.37) 
• Award certificates (3.11) 
• Awards certifications 
(3.37) 
• Performance evaluations 
by peers (3.09) 
• Independent evaluation 
of teaching portfolios 
(3.34) 
• Independent evaluation of 
teaching portfolios (2.99) 
aAdapted from “Chinese Middle School Teachers’ Preferences Regarding Performance 
Evaluation Measures,” by S. Liu, X. Xu, and J. Stronge, 2016, Educational Assessment, 
Evaluation and Accountability, 28, p. 170. Copyright 2016 by Springer International 
Publishing AG. 
 
The quantitative results of teachers’ preference on “serving as banzhuren, or on 
other duties” were consistent with the qualitative result. Interviewed teachers recognized 
the great effort banzhuren made and agreed that banzhuren work deserved incentive 
  160 
rewards. Meanwhile, teachers’ choice of this measure suggested that they supported the 
philosophy of “more credits for larger workload,” which is the theme of performance 
pay.  
“Performance evaluations by principals” was a striking finding because Qi (2012) 
showed that school administrators were teachers’ least preferred evaluator of 
performance. Additionally, results from the PCA in the present study indicated that 
teachers were less preferred to be evaluated by principals if they thought the principals 
know their performance. The contradictory results indicated that the participating 
teachers prefer to be evaluated by their principals if they think the principals have limited 
knowledge about their performance. The possible explanation might be that teachers 
usually impress their principals by their good performance. But, if principals fully know 
their performance, including both good and bad, the results of performance evaluation 
might be not as good as if principals only know their good sides.  
For the least preferred measures, Chinese teachers’ dislike of “awards 
certifications” were consistent with previous study (S. Liu, Xu, et al., 2016). According 
to the qualitative result, “independent evaluation of teaching portfolios” was not familiar 
to Chinese teachers and not often used in performance evaluation. Therefore, 
participating teachers ranked it as the least preferred measure. 
Three themes were generated regarding teachers’ perceptions toward performance 
evaluation; these were consistent with previous studies in the Chinese context. First, 
performance evaluation was more summative than formative (e.g., Hong, 2014; Meng & 
Yuan, 2014). Second, specific evaluation standards and rubrics were lacking (e.g., Hong, 
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2014; C. Li, 2014; Mao, 2013). Third, performance evaluation measures were 
oversimplified and inaccurate (e.g., Mi & Dai, 2011; Xiong, 2009).  
Regarding evaluation measures, teachers have concerns toward students’ 
achievement, because it is frequently used as the only indicator for teacher performance 
evaluation. It “guides” teachers to focus on improving students’ test scores, and finally 
results in teaching to test (Chai & Wang, 2010; H. Li & Li, 2011). It is contradictory to 
the nature of education that teaching and learning spans a long-term period (B. Li, 2014). 
However, the quantitative results show that students’ achievement is among the top three 
evaluation measures preferred by participating teachers. Three possible explanations for 
the inconsistent results are presented here.  
First, teachers agree that students’ achievement is an objective measure showing 
teaching effectiveness, but they think students’ achievement is not a comprehensive 
measure manifesting all their efforts. As mentioned by interviewed teachers, it is unfair to 
link performance pay with students’ test scores of a certain exam, because there are many 
other uncontrollable factors associated with students’ test scores. Second, the education 
system in China is test-centered, therefore, teachers’ accountability is primarily aligned 
with students’ achievement. Test-based enrollment exams at different levels (middle 
school, high school, and college) decide the educational quality students obtain for the 
following educational period, and further impact students’ future. In recent years, with 
internationalization and globalization, the government attempts to “shift” the centrality of 
testing in the education system through emphasizing on the well-development education 
(emphasizing moral, intellectual, physical and aesthetic education) and teacher evaluation 
with multiple indicators. However, the impact is limited due to the fact that students’ test 
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scores are still the only criteria in school selection. Consequently, the essential role of 
students’ achievement in teachers’ performance evaluation is still unshakable. Third, the 
inequality of performance pay is tied to the emphasis on students’ achievement. 
Interviewed teachers from the disadvantaged schools reported that student source was a 
cause for the disparity of performance pay between them and teachers from the 
advantageous schools. The reason is that the school would award teachers if their 
students’ achievement were ranked in the top three or five in enrollment exams (usually 
uniform at the provincial level), and these top-ranked students were usually from the 
advantageous schools. Therefore, teachers in the disadvantaged schools would fail to 
obtain this part of performance pay, which they felt unfair because they worked as hard 
as teachers in the advantageous schools.  
Factors extracted from the teacher perception survey. Seven factors were not 
completely the same as the factors found in both S. Liu, Xu, et al. (2016) and S. Liu, 
Zhao, et al. (2016) studies. In the present study, four factors representing teachers’ 
perceptions toward performance pay were: collaboration and effectiveness, pressure and 
turnover, policy and structures, and motivation and satisfaction. Compared to S. Liu, 
Zhao, et al. (2016), the similar dimensions were effectiveness, pressure/stress, motivation, 
and collaboration. The divergent dimensions were fairness and competition (S. Liu, 
Zhao, et al., 2016) compared to turnover, satisfaction and policy and structures (present 
study; see Table 48). The similar dimensions indicated the universal concerns teachers 
had across samples, but the dissimilar factors showed the distinctive concerns teachers 
had for different teacher samples.  
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Turnover was one dimension that teachers had strong opinions about in the 
present study, and the qualitative results similarly indicated that participating teachers 
perceived an increase of teacher turnover at schools after the implementation of 
performance pay. The result was consistent with Lai (2014). However, the international 
studies (e.g., Springer et al., 2008) showed that increasing the amounts of incentive 
decreased teacher turnover rate. Therefore, the limited amount of performance pay might 
be one of the reasons teachers in the present study perceived turnover to be caused by 
performance pay. Also, fairness was a dimension generated in S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016), 
but not in the present study. However, qualitative results in both studies demonstrated 
that teachers felt unfairness regarding the implementation of performance pay from 
various aspects. This finding was consistent with previous studies in the Chinese context 
(e.g., H. Li & Li, 2011; C. Li, 2014; H. Liu, 2012; K. Liu; 2012; X. Liu, 2011).  
Table 48 
Comparison of Factors (Alpha of Internal Consistency) Representing Chinese Teachers’ 
Perceptions toward Performance Pay in Two Studies  
 
The present study S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016)a 
• Collaboration and Effectiveness 
(.93) 
• Pressure and Turnover (.84) 
• Policy and Structures (.84) 
• Motivation and Satisfaction (.76) 
• Fairness and Effectiveness (.89) 
• Competition and Stress (.64) 
• Motivation (.49) 
• Peer Collaboration (.82) 
aAdapted from “Chinese Teachers’ Attitudes Toward Performance Pay: The Cases of 
Three Schools,” by S. Liu, D. Zhao, and W. Xie, 2016, International Journal of 
Educational Management, 30, p. 799. Copyright 2016 by Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited.  
 
Additionally, the items with the associated loadings under policy and structure 
suggested that surveyed teachers had a clear understanding of the structure of 
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performance pay at their schools. However, the qualitative results contradicted this 
finding. Interviewed teachers were unfamiliar with school-based implementation plans 
for performance pay. Similarly, Jacob and Springer (2008) found teachers knew little 
about the operation of incentive program based on teachers’ responses to survey 
questions. The possible explanation for the discrepancy between quantitative and 
qualitative results in the present study might be that surveyed teachers provided socially 
desirable response, rather than expressing their real knowledge level about performance 
pay, because they were afraid the survey was an inspection to them. 
The quantitative factors suggested teachers’ perceived impacts of performance 
pay on teaching effectiveness. However, the qualitative data showed that some teachers 
felt no influence of performance pay on their teaching practice, which was contrary to the 
quantitative result. Teachers expressed that they were not satisfied with performance pay, 
but their self-efficacy and sense of responsibility supported them to continue teaching as 
they had before the implementation of performance pay, which was consistent with Mao 
(2013). However, teachers also stated that they had concerns regarding how long such 
support would last. It seemed performance pay might not have a long-term impact on 
teaching effectiveness in that teachers’ self-efficacy and sense of responsibility were 
consumed by the negative influence perceived by teachers. If teachers’ self-efficacy 
decreased, they were less likely to support performance pay (Jacob & Springer, 2008), 
and their teaching practice and associated student achievement would be negatively 
affected (Fan & Ren, 2013). 
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The three factors focusing on teachers’ perceptions toward performance 
evaluation in the present study were labeled with the same names as in Liu et al. (2016b), 
but the specific items under each factor were dissimilar (see Table 49).  
There are two possible reasons for the inconsistency of results between studies. 
First, the items entered into factor analysis were not completely identical for the two 
studies. In the present study, 64 items of the teacher perception scale were entered into 
PCA as a whole, including items associated with performance pay and items regarding 
performance evaluation measures, for maintaining the complete data structure. But, 
separate PCAs were conducted for teachers’ perceptions of performance pay and 
teachers’ perceptions of performance evaluation measures in S. Liu, Xu, et al. (2016) and 
S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016) because the two studies were separately conducted.  
Second, different techniques of PCAs were used. For example, considering the 
correlations between items and correlation among factors, I chose promax rotation for 
PCAs, while S. Liu, Xu, et al. (2016) used PCA with oblimin rotation. Although both 
rotations were oblique (assuming correlation between factors), the heterogeneity of 
results might still exist. Additionally, the cut-off point of pattern/structure coefficient was 
.40 in my study, while it was .35 in S. Liu, Xu, et al. (2016). Therefore, varied items were 
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Table 49 
Comparison of Factors and the Associated Items (Loading) Representing Chinese 
Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Evaluation Measures 
 





• Student evaluations of 
teaching performance (.83) 
• Efforts to involve parents in 
student education (.81) 
• Collaboration with peers and 
staff (.75) 
• Parent satisfaction with 
teacher (.75) 
• Mentoring other teachers (.63) 
• Awards certifications (.57) 
 
• Efforts to involve parents in 
student education (.73) 
• Collaboration with faculty 
and staff (.72) 
• Parent satisfaction with 
teacher (.71) 
• Student evaluations of 
teaching performance (.71) 
• Working with students 
outside of class time (.67) 




• Students’ test scores (.69) 
• Teaching in specific subject 
(.66) 
• Serving as Banzhuren, or other 
duties (.65) 
• Award Certificate (.85) 




• Performance evaluations by 
principals (-.68) 
• Highest academic 
qualification degree (-.58) 
• According to national policy, 
70% of payment is due to 
basic duties and 30% is 
incentive payment, and I think 
it is reasonable. (.51) 
• Teacher performance pay is 
based on teacher performance 
evaluation. (.44) 
• I support teacher performance 
pay at my school (.44) 
• My school principal fully 
knows my performance. (.41) 
• Performance evaluations by 
principals (.81) 
• Performance evaluations by 
peers (.71) 
• Students’ test scores (.62) 
• Independent evaluation of 
teaching portfolios (.54) 
 
aAdapted from “Chinese Middle School Teachers’ Preferences Regarding Performance 
Evaluation Measures,” by S. Liu, X. Xu, and J. Stronge, 2016, Educational Assessment, 
Evaluation and Accountability, 28, p. 171. Copyright 2016 by Springer International 
Publishing AG. 
 
 The interesting relationships among items underneath mixed measures showed a 
positive association between “I support teacher performance pay at my school.” and “My 
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school principal fully knows my performance.” In other words, participating teachers 
were more likely to support performance pay when they think their principals have a 
comprehensive understanding about their performance. This is consistent with previous 
studies which demonstrated a positive association between teachers’ support of 
performance pay and teachers’ perceptions of their school leaders (Goldhaber et al., 2011 
Jacob & Springer, 2008). Principals’ complete knowledge about teachers’ performance 
shows that principals care for teachers and they have a close relationship, which reflects 
principals’ leadership. Therefore, based on the assumption that if teachers favor the 
principals’ leadership, teachers are more likely to support performance pay, principals’ 
leadership is important in the reform of performance pay.  
Differences of teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay based on 
selected characteristics.  Six characteristics of teachers and schools were explored for 
differences in teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay. MANOVA results were 
significant for teachers’ teaching experience, professional ranking, school level, and 
school rank. The non-significant finding with regard to teachers’ gender was consistent 
with S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016) and studies in the international contexts (e.g., Jacob & 
Springer, 2008; Jones, 2013). However, different from S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016), the 
findings indicated significant differences with regard to teachers’ teaching experience and 
professional ranking. Besides the small sample size cited by S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016), 
the other major reason for this discrepancy might be the data analysis method. MANOVA 
was employed in the present study while separate one-way ANOVAs were used in S. Liu, 
Zhao, et al. (2016). MANOVA is regarded as more powerful than univariate ANOVA 
when multiple dependent variables are examined (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014). 
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Specifically, teachers with the highest professional ranking had less positive 
attitudes regarding motivation and satisfaction of performance pay. The result can also be 
applied to veteran teachers and young teachers because professional ranking is positively 
associated with teachers’ years of teaching experience, even though no significant 
univariate main effect for teachers’ teaching experience were found for teachers’ 
perceptions toward performance pay. The finding that veteran teachers had less positive 
attitudes in motivation and satisfaction for performance pay was similar to previous 
studies in both the Chinese context (e.g., L. Wang et al., 2014) and international contexts 
(e.g., Ballou & Podgurskdy, 1993; Jones, 2013; Sojourner et al., 2014. Additionally, the 
qualitative results showed aligned with this finding. For example, veteran teachers 
already had a high basic salary due to their long years of teaching experience and high 
professional ranking, and they thought the performance pay was too small to be worth 
extra effort, so they perceived less motivation for performance pay than young teachers 
who counted on performance pay to increase their overall salary. Similarly, the veteran 
teachers already worked as effectively as they could before the implementation of 
performance pay, therefore, they were less likely to be motivated, which is consistent 
with Springer, Ballou, et al. (2010).  
The finding of different perceptions teachers had based on their professional 
ranking was inconsistent with S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016). One possible reason, besides the 
sample size and the statistical technique, might be that the sample of the present study 
included both elementary and secondary teachers, while only middle school teachers 
were sampled in S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016). In China, elementary teachers’ and secondary 
teachers’ professional rankings were accredited differently with various criteria. 
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Therefore, the present study sample involved more variability in terms of teachers’ 
professional ranking for teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay.  
Significant results were also found based on teachers’ school level and school 
rank. The finding on school level was consistent with studies in the international context 
(e.g., Ballou & Podgursky, 1993; Burns et al., 2009; Jacob & Springer, 2007; Goldhaber 
et al., 2011). It is reasonable that elementary teachers and secondary teachers had 
different perceptions toward performance pay due to their divergent work load (e.g., 
difficulty level of subjects, teaching hours per week) and pressure of student 
achievement.  
The difference related to school rank was a striking finding because the effect size 
(.086) was the largest among the significant results. School rank was not examined in 
terms of teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay in previous studies in the Chinese 
context. The case study of S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016) explored teachers’ perceptions 
within a particular school context, but school rank was not mentioned. However, school 
rank might be associated with the amount of performance pay and the program design. 
The qualitative findings of the present study demonstrated this point. Teachers from the 
ordinary schools stated that they felt they had been treated unfairly due to having less 
performance pay than teachers from the high-ranked schools because they made the 
same, or even more, effort than teachers from high-ranked schools to improve students’ 
achievement. After the implementation of performance pay, the local government had 
made an effort to balance teachers’ salary among schools by controlling the various 
incomes of schools (L. Wang et al., 2014). But according to teachers’ responses, the 
high-ranked schools still have a variety of monetary awards (e.g., students’ high rank in 
  170 
enrollment exams), and teachers’ performance pay in those schools was higher than 
teachers in ordinary schools because the implementation plan was school-based. 
However, from the practical significance, it might be unfeasible to distribute the funding 
of performance pay according to school rank, because it would create unfairness.  
Differences of teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation 
measures based on selected characteristics. Teachers’ perceptions of performance 
evaluation measures were statistically significant on teachers’ gender, teaching 
experience, type, professional ranking, school level and school rank. In contrast, due to 
the small sample size, no significant results were found in S. Liu, Xu, et al. (2016) related 
to teachers’ gender, professional ranking, and teaching experience. From the statistically 
significant pairwise comparisons, female teachers in my study were more supportive of 
using mixed measures in performance evaluation. Mixed measures include items: “I 
support teacher performance pay at my school” and “Teacher performance pay at my 
school is based on teacher performance evaluation.” This suggests that participating 
female teachers had a more positive attitude toward performance pay and performance 
evaluation than participating male teachers, which was inconsistent with previous 
international studies (e.g., Ballou & Podgursky, 1993; Jacob & Springer, 2008).  
Additionally, elementary teachers were more supportive of using collaborative 
measures and mixed measures in performance evaluation than secondary teachers. 
Collaborative measures include measures like student evaluations of teaching 
performance, efforts to involve parents in students’ education, and parent satisfaction 
with teacher. Previous researchers have expressed doubt regarding the reliability of 
students’ and parents’ evaluation on teachers’ performance (F. Liang, 2012), but studies 
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also indicated the importance of involving multiple evaluators in teacher performance 
evaluation (e.g., N. Li, 2010). Parental involvement is more important in elementary 
schools than in secondary schools, so elementary teachers might have more cooperation 
with parents and put a higher value on parents’ satisfaction than secondary teachers do, 
which might explain the significant pairwise comparison. Also, elementary teachers’ 
more supportive attitude toward mixed measures indicated their more positive attitude 
toward performance pay and performance evaluation than secondary teachers’. But, the 
result is inconsistent with Goldhaber et al. (2011) and Jacob and Springer (2008). The 
possible reason might be the different school system, teachers’ working load, and the 
difference in working hours between China and the U.S. For example, Jacob and Springer 
(2008) indicated that secondary teachers were expected to teach longer than elementary 
teachers, so they were more likely to support incentive programs than elementary 
teachers, but the standard cannot be applied to Chinese teachers. In China, elementary 
teachers work as long as secondary teachers do, so some other reasons, such as pressure 
of students’ enrollment exams, might be associated with the difference of perceptions 
between elementary teachers and secondary teachers.  
School-expert teachers were found less positive toward mixed measures than non-
expert teachers and the higher-level-expert teachers (municipal-expert teachers and 
provincial-expert teachers). No relevant previous studies explored the differences among 
the groups of expert teachers in the Chinese context. The hypothesized reason is that, 
compared to the higher-level-expert teachers who might have extra rewards from the 
corresponding governmental agency to approve their teaching effectiveness at the certain 
level, school-expert teachers fail to obtain such extra payment from schools. Meanwhile, 
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compared to non-expert teachers, school-expert teachers have more responsibilities and 
heavier working loads. Without extra rewards identifying their extra efforts, they are less 
likely to have a positive attitude toward performance pay and the associated mixed 
measures. 
Ordinary-school teachers were found more supportive in mixed measures than 
municipal-key-school teachers and provincial-key-school teachers, which also indicated 
that ordinary-school teachers were more supportive for performance pay than municipal-
key-school teachers and provincial-key-school teachers. There are two possible reasons. 
First, teachers from both municipal-key schools and provincial-key schools used to have 
higher performance pay than teachers from ordinary schools, because higher-ranked 
schools used to have more advantages in funding (extra money paid by parents, and 
rewards from local government for the schools’ good performance) than ordinary 
schools. However, the extra funding was disallowed after implementing performance 
pay, and the amount of teachers’ performance pay was largely decreased in the higher-
ranked schools. Therefore, comparing the “loss” in performance pay, higher-ranked-
school teachers have the less supportive attitude toward performance pay than ordinary-
school teachers.  
Second, compared with ordinary schools, higher-ranked schools usually have 
more expert teachers who have the high-level professional ranking. The other findings in 
the present study indicated teachers with higher-level professional rankings were less 
likely to be motivated by performance pay than teachers with the low-level professional 
ranking, and teachers with higher-level professional rankings had the less supportive 
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attitude toward mixed measures than teachers with low professional ranking. Therefore, 
ordinary-school teachers were more supportive than higher-ranked-school teachers. 
It is worth noting that the school rank accounts for 20.2% of the variance of 
teachers’ perceptions toward input-based evaluation measures, which is the largest 
among the six characteristics identified. Three items are under input-based measures: 
students’ test scores, teaching in specific subject, and serving as banzhuren, or other 
duties. The three items were the most influential factors resulting in disparities of 
teachers’ performance pay. This finding suggests that teachers from different ranked 
schools have diverse perceptions toward these three items. The point echoes the previous 
finding that teachers from the lower-ranked schools felt unfairly treated because they 
work as hard as teachers from the higher-ranked schools, while they fail to be equally 
rewarded due to to student achievement differences and funding associated with school 
rank. 
Additionally, both school level and school rank, newly explored in the present 
study, accounted for approximately 30% of the differences in teachers’ perceptions 
toward performance evaluation; teacher characteristics (e.g., gender, teaching experience, 
type, professional ranking) only accounted for 17.8% of the differences. From the 
statistical significance, this suggests that school-level factors had a larger impact than 
teacher-level factors on teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation. From the 
practical significance, it implies that if the local government wanted to balance teachers’ 
perceptions toward performance evaluation across schools, building uniform evaluation 
standards considering school-level factors would be necessary. 
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Implications 
 Based on the tentative findings from my study, I have developed implications for 
teaching practice, leadership, and future research.  
Practice. Teachers perceived unfairness due to the inequality among schools 
created by diverse performance pay plans. It seemed challenging for administrators to 
design the school-based plan with fairness, feasibility and, more importantly, teachers’ 
support. Therefore, at the municipal or provincial level, the government should publish 
guidance considering school contexts (e.g., school level and school rank) to regulate the 
design of school-level implementation plan. For example, develop guidance specific for 
elementary schools and secondary schools, respectively, and frame the policy targeting  
teacher development. Meanwhile, local educational agencies should inspect the 
implementation of performance pay at schools and restrict the overlay of administrative 
duties, such as distributing teachers’ performance pay based on the quantity of 
administrative duties, to reduce the negative effect of performance pay on teachers. 
Additionally, policymakers and school administrators should focus on the structure of 
performance pay plans and the associated performance evaluation indicators. Given the 
statistically significant variation of teachers’ perceptions based on teachers’ 
characteristics, any performance pay plan should consider elements such as teachers’ 
years of experience and professional ranking. The implementation plan should indicate 
not only the methods, but also the associated conditions based on both individual and 
organizational characteristics. Furthermore, considering the impact of performance pay 
on teachers’ collaboration, satisfaction, pressure, effectiveness, and collegial relationships 
among teachers, policymakers and school administrators should periodically conduct 
  175 
program evaluations, collecting teachers’ opinions to modify the implementation plan 
and meet the needs of teachers.  
 Leadership. The study provides a way to hear the voice of front-line teachers 
regarding performance pay and performance evaluation for school administrators and 
policymakers. Although teachers’ voices may not be strong enough to reform 
performance pay in the Chinese context, it does affect the quality of schooling. If teachers 
feel their opinions are being ignored, they will be less likely to support performance pay. 
Therefore, including teachers’ voices in the decision-making process is critical to school 
leadership. It is important to build the path for teachers to freely express their opinions. 
Additionally, the study results indicate that teachers’ perceptions of their principals’ 
leadership influenced their attitudes toward performance pay. To enhance performance 
pay support, it is necessary to improve school leadership. School leaders, especially those 
lacking strong leadership practices should attend principal professional development 
programs alongside implementing performance pay. Finally, funding for teacher 
performance pay is distributed at the district level and the funding amount is associated 
with educational input. Thus, increasing the educational input is the fundamental way to 
improve teacher performance pay. The district-level government should align the 
educational input with the local economy to serve the needs of local schools and teachers 
better. More importantly, provide corresponding rewards to teachers in the disadvantaged 
schools to confirm their efforts and motivate them to improve the teaching practice. 
 Future research. Results of this study provide empirical evidence of 
participating teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay and performance evaluation 
in the Chinese context. Findings also add to the literature related to international studies 
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of teacher performance pay from Chinese teachers’ perspectives. Given the diversity 
across regions in China and the limited generalizability of the sample, future research 
should consider a larger and more representative sample, including teachers from rural 
areas, to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of teachers’ perception toward 
performance pay. The study investigated the extent of teachers’ support for performance 
pay based on teachers’ self-reported response on the survey, which might be biased by 
teachers’ personal attitude. Therefore, future research should employ the more objective 
statistical method such as ordinary least squares regression to predict teachers’ attitude 
toward performance pay with reliable predictors. Additionally, based on large effect sizes 
obtained from school-level characteristics, future research should use more advanced 
statistical analyses such as hierarchical linear model to examine the impact of factors at 
varying hierarchical levels (teacher, cohort, and school) on teachers’ perceptions. The 
last, but not the least, implication is that more qualitative studies are needed to explore 
teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay and performance evaluation because it is 
revealing to explore teachers’ real experience and thoughts in a deep level compared to 
quantitative studies. 
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Appendix A: Informed Consent Form-English 
Consent Form 
 
Please read this consent form carefully before you decide whether or not to 
participate in this study. 
 
Study Title: Teachers’ Perceptions of Teacher Performance Pay in China 
 
Investigator: Yi Hua 
 
Background and Purpose: You are being asked to participate in a study project, which 
is one part of the dissertation required for my Ph.D. degree. The purpose of this study is 
to investigate Chinese teachers’ perceptions for teacher performance pay at public regular 
schools in China. As a teacher working at public regular schools in China, you are in a 
position to provide me with your perceptions of teacher performance pay, and I would 
appreciate it if you would agree to participate in this study. 
 
Procedures: The study will be composed of two parts: survey and individual interview. 
Your involvement in the study might be limited solely to taking a survey or taking both a 
survey and an interview. The survey is composed of 63 items and five open-ended items, 
which might take 15-20 minutes to accomplish. You will be asked to provide relevant 
demographic information used in the study to answer research questions. If you will 
participate in the interview, questions regarding your understanding and concerns of 
performance pay will be asked. With your permission, I will audiotape the interview, but 
only for the purpose of accurately transcribing our conversations. The audiotapes and 
transcriptions will be stored securely in my personal computer, and will be destroyed 
when the study has been completed.  
 
Participation: Your participation in the study is completely voluntary. You do not have 
to answer every questions asked of me. Should you decide at any time after giving 
consent to participate that you no longer wish to be involved with the study, you may 
withdraw your consent without penalty and prejudice by informing me of your decision 
via email or telephone. My and my supervisor’s contact information is listed below. 
 
Confidentiality and Privacy: None of the information collected in the survey will be 
used to reveal your identity as a participant or to link your responses with your identity. 
Pseudonyms in interview documents will be used to protect your privacy and 
confidentiality. The information that you provide in the study will be handled 
confidentially. Without your permission, the information will not be used in any 
presentation or publication. The audio records will be destroyed after the study is 
complete. Please know though that you do not have to answer any questions or discuss 
any topics that make you feel uncomfortable.  
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Costs and Benefits to You: This survey may take approximately 15-20 minutes to 
complete and the individual interview may take approximately 40-60 minutes. There are 
no direct benefits to you. However, you may request a copy of the study’s results from 
me by sending an email requesting results to yhua@email.wm.edu. 
If you have any questions or concerns about this study, please contact me (the 
researcher), or the supervising professor, Dr. James Stronge (jhstro@wm.edu) at The 
College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia (757-880-3881). If you have 
additional questions or concerns or regarding your rights as a study participant, or are 
dissatisfied at any time with any aspect of this study, you may contact, anonymously if 
you wish, Dr. Tom Ward at 757-221-2358 (tjward@wm.edu) or Dr. Ray McCoy at 757-
221-2783 (rwmcco@wm.edu), chairs of the two William & Mary committees that 
supervise the treatment of study participants. 
 
SIGNATURE: I confirm that the purpose of the research, the study procedures, and the 
possible discomforts as well as benefits have been explained to me. All of my questions 
have been answered. I agree to participate in the research study described above. 
 
Signature:______________________                     Date:  _____________ 
 
 
You will receive a copy of this form for your records. 
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Appendix C: Survey Questionnaire-English 
 
Teacher Perception Survey:  
Teacher Performance Pay 
 
School name:                                  Grade:                                         Subject: 
BACKGROUND: Many schools are conducting teacher performance pay based on 
teacher performance evaluation. This study is attempting to identify how teachers 
perceive connecting teacher performance pay with performance evaluations. 
DIRECTIONS:  Based on your knowledge and experience, please respond to the 
following questions regarding your perceptions of teacher performance pay.  Please 
indicate the extent to which you agree with each statement on a scale of Strongly 
Disagree (1), Disagree (2), Not Know (3), Agree (4), to Strongly Agree (5).  
Thank you for your participation.   
 
Part I: Background Information 
 
1. Your gender is:  
a. Male                  b. Female 
 
2. Your age is:   
a. 21-30 b. 31-40 d. 41-50 e. above 51 
 
3. Your teaching experience is:   
a. Less than 5 years b. 5-9 years c. 10-14 years     d. 15-19 years      e. More than 20 
years 
 
4. Your education degree is:  
a. Doctor b. Master c. Bachelor d. High School        e. Other 
 
5. Your school is:  
a. urban school     b. suburban school    c. county school    d. township school   e. village 
school  
 
6. Your school is: 
a. national key school    b. provincial key school   c. municipal key school   d. ordinary 
school 
 
7. You are: 
a. municipal expert teacher     b. district-level expert teacher     c. school-level expert 
teacher  d. non-expert teacher 
 
8. besides teaching classes, the other administrative title(s) you have is(are): 
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a. principal b. vice principal c. chief of teaching d. grade leader       
e. Banzhuren f. none 
 
9. Your professional ranking is: 
a. high  b. level one c. level two  d. primary level 
 
10. Your general view towards the implementation of teacher performance pay is: 
a. strongly disagree   b. disagree   c. neutral  d. agree   e. strongly agree 
 
Part II 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about 
performance pay? 
 







1. I have a clear understanding 
regarding teacher performance 
pay at my school. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I know about the composition 
of my total salary. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I clearly understand about 
working duties associated with 
my payment. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I clearly understand the 
performance evaluation rubrics 
associated with my payment. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I think teacher performance 
pay at my school is reasonable. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Teacher performance pay at 
my school failed to effectively 
motivate me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I support teacher performance 
pay at my school. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. I fully understand the national 
policy of teacher performance 
pay at compulsory schools.  
1 2 3 4 5 
9. According to national policy, 
70% of payment is due to basic 
duties and 30% is incentive 
payment, and I think it is 
reasonable.  
1 2 3 4 5 
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10. After teacher performance 
pay reform, I think my payment 
is higher than local governmental 
officials. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. I am satisfied with the policy 
of teacher performance pay.  
1 2 3 4 5 
12. I am satisfied with the 
implementation of teacher 
performance pay at my school. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. Teacher performance pay at 
my school ignored what I think is 
important to  my performance 
evaluation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. I think it is necessary to 
implement teacher performance 
pay. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. Teacher performance pay at 
my school is based on teacher 
performance evaluation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. For obtaining incentive 
payment, I will change or have 
already changed my teaching 
methods. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. Teacher performance pay at 
my school is fair to all teachers. 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. Teacher performance pay will 
motivate teachers to work harder 
for obtaining higher payment. 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. Teacher performance pay is 
not a long-term policy, so 
teachers are pessimistic about its 
long-lasting results.  
1 2 3 4 5 
20. Implementing teacher 
performance pay can retain 
effective teachers. 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. Implementing teacher 
performance pay can attract more 
excellent teachers. 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. Teacher performance pay at 
my school can effectively 
identify effective teachers. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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23. Teachers have strong 
objection towards teacher 
performance pay at my school. 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. Teacher performance pay at 
my school has negative influence 
on school culture and colleague 
relationship.  
1 2 3 4 5 
25. Implementing teacher 
performance pay disturbs 
teachers’ collaboration.   
1 2 3 4 5 
26. Teacher performance pay at 
my school can improve teachers’ 
professional level.  
1 2 3 4 5 
27. Teacher performance pay at 
my school can improve teachers’ 
teaching.  
1 2 3 4 5 
28. Teacher performance pay at 
my school can improve students’ 
academic achievement.  
1 2 3 4 5 
29. After implementing teacher 
performance pay, teachers’ job 
satisfaction is improved. 
1 2 3 4 5 
30. After implementing teacher 
performance pay, teachers have 
more pressure than before. 
1 2 3 4 5 
31. Prior to the policy, I prefer 
how school is operating now.  
1 2 3 4 5 
32. I always want to transfer to 
the other schools after 
implementing teacher 
performance pay. 
1 2 3 4 5 
33. After implementing teacher 
performance pay, teachers at my 
school have more passion in 
working. 
1 2 3 4 5 
34. If there is a chance, I want to 
change my job. 
1 2 3 4 5 
35. My salary has been improved 
since the policy has been 
implemented. 
1 2 3 4 5 
36. After implementing teacher 
performance pay, I want to 
become a better teacher due to 
the collaborative culture 
encouraged by my school. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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37. After implementing teacher 
performance pay, I feel supported 
from the other teachers. 
1 2 3 4 5 
38. After implementing teacher 
performance pay, teachers at my 
school prefer competition rather 
than collaboration. 
1 2 3 4 5 
39. After implementing teacher 
performance pay, teachers at my 
school do not trust each other any 
more. 
1 2 3 4 5 
40. After implementing teacher 
performance pay, teachers at my 
school feel they have 
responsibility to try the best to 
help each other.  
1 2 3 4 5 
41. After implementing teacher 
performance pay, teachers at my 
school encourage students to 
keep trying when they come 
across challenging academic 
questions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
42. After implementing teacher 
performance pay, teachers at my 
school always help each other, 
even if it’s not their duty. 
1 2 3 4 5 
43. The school administrators 
decide my payment based on 
teacher performance evaluation 
with reliable information of my 
performance. 
1 2 3 4 5 
44. After implementing teacher 
performance pay, my school 
principal tends to award teachers 
who show loyalty to him or her.  
1 2 3 4 5 
45. My school principal has the 
autonomy to distribute incentives 
to excellent teachers. 
1 2 3 4 5 
46. School administrators have 
ever communicated with me 
regarding the process of teacher 
performance pay. 
1 2 3 4 5 
47. My school principal fully 
knows my performance.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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48. My school principal and other 
evaluators should participate in 
training to improve their 
knowledge and abilities of 
performance evaluation.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Part III 
How much importance would you give to each of the following in teacher 
performance evaluation? 
 











1 2 3 4 5 
2. Students’ test 
scores. 


















1 2 3 4 5 
7. Collaboration 
with peers and 
staff. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Efforts to 
involve parents in 
students’ 
education. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Awards 
certifications. 




1 2 3 4 5 
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11. Teaching in 
specific subject. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. Time spent in 
professional 
development. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. Serving as 
Banzhuren, or 
other duties. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. Mentoring 
other teachers. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. Working with 
students outside of 
class time. 




1. Which indicator(s) (e.g. teachers’ morality, professional ranking, education degree, 
teaching experience, working load, teaching process, and student’s achievement) do you 
think are the most important in teacher performance evaluation? And why? 
 
 
2. What do you think are the main problems associated with the implementation of 
teacher performance pay? And why? 
(1) how much the salary can be increased 
(2) whether teachers’ salary is lower than local governmental officials’ or not 
(3) how does school allocate the incentive payment 
(4) the disparities of performance pay across different school districts 
(5) the disparities of performance pay among different schools at the same district 
(6) the disparities of performance pay among colleagues 
(7) others (please specify) 
 
 










5.  What are the influence of implementing teacher performance pay on your teaching, 
peer relationship and students’ studying? 
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a. ƚ          b. Ä      
2. ĖƟóɢ	 
   a. 21-30å     b. 31-40å     c. 41-50å      d. 51å4      
3. ĖƟŁɢ	 
a. Þ&5ó    b. 5-9ó        c. 10-14ó    d. 15-19ó   e. 20ó4 
4. ĖƟÍ/Í@Ŏ	 
a. »     b. ƪ»       c. Řư      d. ư    e. í    f. Z2  
5. ĖĢ±Íŧã&	 
a.µ|Íŧ  b.µìȷ|Íŧ c.µÍŧ   d.ɆĊÍŧ  e.ŜÞ     
6. ĖĢ±ƟÍŧƿ´:   
a. ¯ÖǂȾƉ   b. ƤĠǂȾƉ    c. ìĠǂȾƉ   d. őȰÍŧ  
7. ĖŎ	  
a. ìǂɟñŁí  b. |ǂɟñŁí  c. ŧǂɟñŁí     d. ɕɟñŁí  
8. ɐ8ȑ½,Ė±ÍŧƟZÐǝ@	  
a.ŧɇ  b.mŧɇ c.ŁÛ8  d.ŁƨǅɇĠóǂǅɇ e.ƒ8  
f. Z2       
9. ĖƟǝƲŎ	 
a.ɠǂ      b.ǂ      c.%ǂ      d. gǂ 
10. ĔBşȎĖÇCƥĆŁíǐŀèȚk÷ƟÔŊ? 
a. ɕðțĞ     b. țĞ     c. ƶ     d. țĞ     e. ɕðțĞ 
 
                           
                                           Ƹ%ȸe 
Ú&4ɉɜĖƟěƳ÷	 
1. ĖÚŁíǐŀȇ7ƃȇ-Ãu-ŕƅŭƟƓǺ 
   a. ÒVě  b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě     e. ÒVě 
2. Ė"ǺǤêèȚȸeŃɝŎÇCšĞƟ 
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   a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě     e. ÒVě 
3. Ėƅŭ²"ǺĖèȚįɃƟèE\× 
   a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě     e. ÒVě 
4. Ėƅŭ²"ǺĖèȚįɃƟèEǐŦb 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
5. ĖǽșŧƫƶƟèEǐŦbŎƓƟ 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
6. șŧkÓƟŁíǢ¿ǪƟŔɠŃɝÃɀÚĖƟƈuÀ 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
7. ĖĻĮ±șŧÔŊŁíǐŀèȚĿƻ 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
8. ĖÚqŁǟɍŴƟÍŧÔŊǐŀèȚƟĿƻɕð"Ǻ 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
9. ıƋ¯ÖĿƻǶÓqŁǟÍŧǐŀèȚĔȿƟ70%E·Ʃēȸe®Óľ
ĠǛıǝqľZD30%EÃuēȸeıǐŀǚŨ》ţľĖǸĈćƓ  
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
10. ĖǽǐŀèȚĽɗǤêƟèȚŸŘ²|Wq£ɠ 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
11. ĖÚǐŀèȚĿƻɕðƇě 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
12. ĖÚǐŀèȚĿƻ±șŧƟÔŊĘaɕðƇě 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
13. șŧƟŁíǐŀèȚĿƻďǷ"ǮȿĖèEƟȾǳŉɖ 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
14. ĖǽÔǭŁíǐŀǚŨɕðċǳ  
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
15. șŧƟǐŀèȚ4ǐŀǚŨ》ţJĶ 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
16. "ǪĈÃuēèȚĖÜĽĠëĽ"ĖƟŁÍŉƀèEŉý 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
17. șŧÔŊƟǐŀèȚÚŁíŎWòƟ 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
18. ŁíǐŀèȚÜ<ɡuŁí"ĳjœ¾ƟɄǜœtnèE 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
19. ǐŀèȚĿƻǢɇªųŁíÚÐƟĮē》ţĩėǵĐ÷ 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
20. ÔŊǐŀèȚŕs&GÆŁíǏǑƛ±Łǟæ@ 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
21. ÔŊǐŀèȚÜ<¡þœdǧƟŁípUjŁíɌ: 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
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22. șŧƟǐŀƈuŉūǢ¿ćÆ²Ɂid;ƭŁí 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
23. șŧƟǐŀƈuŉūþȝŁíƟÿƊƇ 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
24. șŧƟǐŀƈuŉūÚŧ«Ņy¤$Yǀŕ)Ȗɖă¥ 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
25. ÔŊǐŀèȚÜ<ĥ!ŁíƟEź­ 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
26. șŧƟǐŀƈuŉūŕs&ĹɠŁíyŻò 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
27. șŧƟǐŀƈuŉūŕs&ĹɠŁíŁÍŻò 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
28. șŧƟǐŀƈuŉūŕs&ĹɠÍƕÍ 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
29. ĔBǜǻǤÔŊǐŀèȚșŧŁíƟèEƇě÷Ÿ4lœɠ" 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
30. șŧŁíƟŁÍnŸÔŊǐŀèȚ4lœÀ" 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
31. ÔŊǐŀèȚ4lƣŸĖœ§űÍŧƑ±ƟȨ
ǭŉý 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
32. ǤșŧÔŊǐŀèȚĖĔĚȤjÍŧ 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
33. ÔŊǐŀèȚșŧŁíƟèEƱŠēōŏĹɠ 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
34. Çţŕř<ĖÜ<Ȥǭ 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
35. ǐŀèȚ±șŧĽɗǥ.ĖƟèȚŻòńBşȎĹɠ" 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
36. ÔŊǐŀèȚƘ&șŧƣ'ɡuEƟź­ĖĚĞœÆƟŁí 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
37. ÔŊǐŀèȚĖĜǸĈjóǅZ2ŁíƟĻĮ 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
38. ÔŊǐŀèȚșŧŁíÆSƷ#À&E 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
39. ÔŊǐŀèȚșŧŁíĄųœL8" 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
40. ÔŊǐŀèȚșŧŁíĜjœŕȗ8áŔÀtn'ƣïs 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
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41. ÔŊǐŀèȚāÍƕ±ÍȲjĲġēɉɜŌșŧŁíœpɡuÍƕ
ŇàȊ 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
42. ÔŊǐŀèȚșŧŁíœ《ðƟĄųïČGŎ25e\Ɵ$ 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
43. ÍŧɛÛ±ũĶĖƟǐŀǯƑkÓèȚŌ<ļɒJĶŲƫƟLĕ 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
44.  ÔŊǐŀèȚșŧŧɇPÃuȵ)č&ÅƟ,Ġĵ!Ɵ, 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
45. āǋȵ);ƭƟŁíÃuŌșŧŧɇŕȟ¿ƟǤŚ 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě                                                  
46. ÍŧɛÛÚèȚeȺƳõĖȪǭ"*Ƃ 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
47. șŧŧɇɕð"ǺĖƟèEƏa 
a. ÒVě     b. ě     c. Ƨȳ     d. ě    e. ÒVě 
48. șŧŧɇ¤ZÐȇ>,£ɓp¶ǿĹɠZȇ7ŁíƟƧȈ¤ĦǢ 





a. ɕðȾǳ     b. Ⱦǳ     c. Ǧ     d. Ⱦǳ     e. ɕðȾǳ 
2. ÍƕǚȊĞǐƟĹɠ 
a. ɕðȾǳ     b. Ⱦǳ     c. Ǧ     d. Ⱦǳ     e. ɕðȾǳ 
. ŧɇÚŁíȪǭƟǐŀȇ7 
a. ɕðȾǳ     b. Ⱦǳ     c. Ǧ     d. Ⱦǳ     e. ɕðȾǳ 
4. $ɊȪǭƟǐŀȇ7 
a. ɕðȾǳ     b. Ⱦǳ     c. Ǧ     d. Ⱦǳ     e. ɕðȾǳ 
5. ÚŁíŁÍŬūǰƟȇ7 
a. ɕðȾǳ     b. Ⱦǳ     c. Ǧ     d. Ⱦǳ     e. ɕðȾǳ 
6. ÍƕÚŁíŁÍƟȇ7 
a. ɕðȾǳ     b. Ⱦǳ     c. Ǧ     d. Ⱦǳ     e. ɕðȾǳ 
7. $ɊƟE 
a. ɕðȾǳ     b. Ⱦǳ     c. Ǧ     d. Ⱦǳ     e. ɕðȾǳ 
8. ǾƌŶÎËŁǟĢQƟtn 
a. ɕðȾǳ     b. Ⱦǳ     c. Ǧ     d. Ⱦǳ     e. ɕðȾǳ 
9. ƯǪÃȆ  
a. ɕðȾǳ     b. Ⱦǳ     c. Ǧ     d. Ⱦǳ     e. ɕðȾǳ 
10. ƌŶÚŁíƟƇěƳ÷ 
a. ɕðȾǳ     b. Ⱦǳ     c. Ǧ     d. Ⱦǳ     e. ɕðȾǳ 
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11. ŁíĢŁƟÍư  
a. ɕðȾǳ     b. Ⱦǳ     c. Ǧ     d. Ⱦǳ     e. ɕðȾǳ 
12. ŁíƖ&yâƟŌɊ 
a. ɕðȾǳ     b. Ⱦǳ     c. Ǧ     d. Ⱦǳ     e. ɕðȾǳ 
13. ŁíäǭƟɝ½ǝȗÇƒ8 
a. ɕðȾǳ     b. Ⱦǳ     c. Ǧ     d. Ⱦǳ     e. ɕðȾǳ 
14. İÛZ2Łí 
a. ɕðȾǳ     b. Ⱦǳ     c. Ǧ     d. Ⱦǳ     e. ɕðȾǳ 
15. ȑ½ïsÍƕƟĘa 
a. ɕðȾǳ     b. Ⱦǳ     c. Ǧ     d. Ⱦǳ     e. ɕðȾǳ 
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Project: Teachers’ Perceptions of Teacher Performance Pay in China 
Instruction: Teacher performance pay has been implemented in China since 2009. The 
study is going to investigate teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay, which 
includes the content, the implementation process and the impact. Meanwhile, the study is 
going to explore your perceptions of performance evaluation. You can answer the 
questions based on your knowledge and thinking.  
 






1. Please introduce the implementation of teacher performance pay at your school. 
What’s the implementation plan at your school? 
 
 
2. What measures are used at your school to evaluate teachers’ performance? And what 
do you think of these measures? 
 
 
3. What are the influences of implementing teacher performance pay on your teaching? 
On peer relationships? On students’ studying? 
 
 








6. What do you think are the main problems associated with the implementation of 




7. For better implementing teacher performance pay, do you have any suggestions to your 
principal and local educational agency? 
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